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Abstract 
 
This thesis aims to make an original contribution to knowledge by looking at the 
phenomenon of resistance in the French region of Upper Normandy between 1940 and 1944 
from a perspective of ‘history from below’, by looking principally at the testimonies of 
former resisters, and demonstrating a political history of resistance. 
 The introduction defines what is meant by Upper Normandy and justifies its choice as 
a region for this study, before analysing both the historiography and the epistemology of 
resistance, both locally and nationally, and then giving a justification and an analysis of the 
methodology used. 
The main body of the thesis is then divided into four chapters. Chapter one looks at 
resistance that was designed to revolutionise society, by looking at Communist resisters and 
the idea of the grand soir, as well as the sociological origins of these resisters, and how this 
influenced their resistance action. Chapter two looks at more gradualist forms of resistance, 
which were conceived to slowly prepare for an eventual liberation and the struggle against 
Vichyite hegemony, arguing that these resisters formed a ‘resistance aristocracy’, aiming to 
slowly forge a post-Vichy vision of the polis. Chapter three analyses resistance purely from a 
patriotic angle, and identifies three different forms of patriotism, before arguing that 
resistance was part of a process to ‘remasculate’ France after the defeat of 1940, and that 
these resisters saw their engagement as primarily being one of serving France. Chapter four 
looks at auxiliary resistance, or resistance actions that were designed to help people, whether 
they were fleeing persecution or were active resisters, aiming to show that resistance went 
beyond just organisations and networks, and could be about facilitating other actions rather 
than direct confrontation. 
The conclusion then argues for a new understanding of resistance, not as une 
organisation or even un mouvement, but as a form of la cité, or polis, engaged in creating a 
new form of polity. It shows that the political history of resistance is a combination of 
institutional politics and expression politics, and that resistance, even if not necessarily 
politicised, was political by its very nature. 
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The Mémorial de Caen is a museum dedicated to the history of the Second World War, but 
also the years of the Occupation in France. A succession of different spaces look at aspects 
such as daily life, anti-Semitism, collaboration, and the battle for Normandy to name but four, 
and this reflects, in its own way, the turn away from a purely military conception of the 
history of World War Two in France. 
 Almost discreetly amongst the exhibits is a small plaque, commemorating 
Normandy’s role within the French Resistance. In Boos, just outside Rouen, in June 1940, 
just two days after de Gaulle’s appel du 18 juin, a farm labourer called Etienne Achavanne 
cut the phone lines to the airbase, which was being used by the Luftwaffe. A British air raid 
struck the base, which was caught unprepared, and destroyed a number of aircraft on the 
ground. Achavanne was arrested soon after, and executed by firing squad on July 4, 1940, at 
Bonsecours.1 He therefore became not just the first saboteur in France, but also the first 
fusillé, the word given to those who were executed by firing squad. Yet the plaque is 
necessarily discreet- no photo exists of him, and very little is known about him. Only a 
handful of monuments exist to commemorate his memory- in Bonsecours and in Boos (a bus 
stop and a square respectively), and a primary school in his home village in the Eure-et-Loir. 
Attempts by historians to uncover more have encountered various difficulties, and failed to 
make much headway.2 
The Allied bombings of 1944 seem to dominate the memory of les années noires in 
Upper Normandy, as reflected by the images shown as part of the exhibition by the Archives 
Départementales de la Seine-Maritime on 1914-1944.3 But if marginalised by memory, it 
                                                             
1 Gilles Pernaut, Dictionnaire amoureuse de la Résistance (Paris, Plon, 2011), pp.11-13. See also Olivier 
Wieviorka, Histoire de la Résistance (Paris, Perrin, 2013), p.42. 
2 Pernaut, op.cit., p.12. 
3 Exhibition D’une guerre à l’autre, 1914-1944, held at the Archives Départementales de la Seine-Maritime 
(ADSM), Rouen, April 7-July 12, 2014. 
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does not follow that there was no resistance in Upper Normandy. The plaque at the Mémorial 
de Caen is testament to that, and the works of Michel Baldenweck and Julien Papp show that 
although the number of resisters was small in both the Seine-Inférieure and the Eure, 
resistance was far from non-existent.4 There were acts of resistance in Normandy just as there 
were acts of resistance in virtually all parts of France. The difference is that some of these 
areas have been subject to more attention from academic historians than what has been the 
case for Normandy- the history of the Resistance in Upper Normandy has not yet been fully 
historicised within a critical framework. This thesis aims to fill this gap.        
  
What Upper Normandy? Why Upper Normandy? 
At the time I started this thesis, Seine-Maritime and the Eure formed the region of Haute-
Normandie, or Upper Normandy, but January 2016 saw this region merge with Basse-
Normandie (Lower Normandy) to form Normandy- and furthermore, the division only came 
in administratively in 1960. As an administrative entity, Upper Normandy did not exist in 
1940-1944. So what justifies the choice of Upper Normandy as the geographical field of 
study? 
 The answer lies in a mixture of practical considerations and epistemological rationale. 
It would be interesting to do a study of the Resistance in Normandy, but it quickly became 
clear that the material for five departments would be too great for a PhD thesis.5 By contrast, 
I was not sure that there was enough material or variety to justify just focusing upon one 
town or city. Moreover, there are some important differences between Upper Normandy and 
                                                             
4 Michel Baldenweck, De la Résistance au rétablissement de la légalité républicaine : Histoire de la Seine-
Inférieure, 1943-1946 (unpublished PhD thesis, Université de Rouen, 2012) ; Julien Papp, La Résistance dans 
l’Eure (Epinal, Ed. Sapins d’Or, 1988).  
5 There have been studies of the Resistance across all five departments, such as the summary offered by Jean 
Quellien, ‘la Normandie’ in François Marcot, Christine Levisse-Touzé and Bruno Leroux (eds.), Dictionnaire 
Historique de la Résistance (Paris, Robert Laffont, 2006), pp.300-301, or Raymond Ruffin, La Résistance 
normande face à la Gestapo (Paris, Presses de la Cité, 1977).    
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Normandy as a whole- Upper Normandy is more industrialised, more densely populated, and 
geographically closer to Paris. Its politics have also leaned more to the Left, in particular the 
significance of the French Communist Party (PCF). So there were also cultural, social and 
political dimensions to take into account.6 
 This cultural dimension also informs the desire for this thesis to avoid being very 
strictly defined by the boundaries of the departments. The two departments considered in this 
study were both created in 1790. Yet the fact that it was not until 2005 that an adjective was 
created for residents of the Seine-Maritime shows that in the case of this particular 
department, there is no identity linked. If one is to write a history from below, then the 
parameters should have a clear justification ‘from below’- a point that Thompson makes 
when stating why he chose to look at the ‘English Working Class’ and not the ‘British 
Working Class’.7 These departments were created primarily for reasons of governance and 
administration- deliberately designed so as to reinforce the centralist Jacobinism of the 
French Revolution. What is particularly remarkable about Upper Normandy is the binary 
between urban and rural, and how this has governed and conditioned its politics, culture and 
society- and so focusing on officially designated locales such as the region or the department 
would have resulted in an epistemological tension.  
 In defining therefore the territory chosen, ‘history from below’ has been accompanied 
by ‘geography from below’.8 Whereas some geographers have chosen to define territories by 
administrative boundaries, others have chosen to follow the idea of the territory as an 
                                                             
6 These are aspects also mentioned in passing by Quellien, op.cit., p.300. 
7 Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1963; 2nd. Ed., 1980)., p.15. 
The noun used for a resident of Seine-Maritime nowadays is ‘seinomarin’, but no such term existed in the era of 
Seine-Inférieure. 
8 The term is used particularly to look at geographical studies in the developing world- for an example, see 
Michel Ben Arrous & Lazare Ki-Zerbo (eds.), Etudes africaines de géographie par le bas/African Studies in 
Geography from Below (Dakar, CODRESIA, 2009). This particular volume explores the tension between ‘from 
the top’, a political project often rooted in the era of colonialism, and ‘from below’, a historical process that sees 
the emergence of a different set of spatial dynamics reflecting the evolution of differing social forces.  
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‘inhabited space’, or espace vécue.9 This was the line of argument chosen by Olivier Feiertag 
and Yannick Marec, who put forward a ‘geohistorical’ approach to the history of Upper 
Normandy over the longue durée, and how it had been shaped by relations not with Lower 
Normandy but with Paris, based upon the geographical feature of the Seine basin.10 The idea 
of defining a territory by how it is inhabited and how it functions seems to allow for a 
geography defined by ordinary people and their everyday lives. In the case of Upper 
Normandy, this entails the fact that key to the topography and economy of both departments 
is the river Seine, which flows into the English Channel at Le Havre. The Seine estuary is to 
the heart of the identity of Le Havre, explaining its significance as a port; the course of the 
Seine also defined Rouen’s importance as a port, and bisects the city into rive droite and rive 
gauche. In parts, the Seine also forms the boundary between the two departments. So the 
Seine axis based upon the bassin has shaped the living and working realities of the people of 
Upper Normandy in a way that it has not for the rest of Normandy.  
This separateness means that whilst one can talk of a Norman identity developing in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the so-called ‘Second Industrial Revolution’, 
beginning in the 1870s and 1880s, and lasting up to the mid-1980s and the advent of the 
‘post-industrial’ era, results in Upper Normandy existing as a separate ‘lived space’ distinct 
from the rest of Normandy- a combination of agricultural and industrial, of conservative and 
radical, of the culturally refined and the culturally deprived.11 Upper Normandy can be seen 
not just as being distinctly different from the rest of Normandy, it can also be used to 
                                                             
9 For a further exploration of this notion, which in some ways is a forerunner to the idea of ‘Geography from 
Below’, see Claude Raffestin, ‘Remarques sur les notions d’espace, de territoire et de territorialité’ in Espaces et 
Sociétés, No. 41, 1982, pp. 91-96. 
10 Olivier Feiertag & Yannick Marec, Pour une histoire de l’axe Seine, Seminar at the Université de Rouen, 
October 2, 2013. 
11 François Guillet, Naissance de la Normandie : Genèse et épanouissement d’une image régionale en France, 
1750-1850 (Caen, Annales de Normandie, 2000) ; Feiertag, Histoire de l’aménagement des territoires de la 
Seine au XXe siècle, seminar at Université de Rouen, November 13, 2013. 
12 
 
represent a ‘lived space’ that acts as a microcosm of the principal political and social 
tendencies of France between 1940 and 1944. 
 
A perilous history? The historiography of the Resistance 
The title of this sub-section is borrowed from Laurent Douzou’s work on the historiography 
of the Resistance and how it had evolved from the Liberation to 2004.12 Broadly speaking, 
Douzou sets out a pattern that largely concurs with Henry Rousso’s periodisation given in Le 
Syndrome de Vichy- the period of the glorification of the Resistance, known as 
résistancialisme, which ran from the Liberation to the early 1970s; the revisionist period of le 
miroir brisé or ‘the broken mirror’, which lasted from the 1970s and into the early 1980s; and 
from there on, a period of historicisation and ‘memory wars’ that characterised the period 
from 1980 through to the present day.13 This section wishes not to challenge this 
interpretation, but to nuance it, whilst also bringing the historiography into the present day, 
and look broadly at developments in the decade since Douzou published his work. 
 Firstly, it is important to show that the phase of résistancialisme actually had two sub-
phases, and as a historiographical school of thought, had two variants that ran parallel to each 
other. The first phase was immediately in the aftermath of the war, when the Resistance 
legacy was at its apogee. Obviously this was a time still too recent for detailed historical 
analyses, so the gap was filled by political discourse, media and the cinema. The most notable 
film of this first phase was La Bataille du Rail, which depicted the heroic struggle of a group 
of railwaymen against German occupation. Vichyite collaborators are notably absent from the 
film, showing that the war was regarded as purely a Franco-German affair, one that pitted 
France against Germany.14 This was ultimately of a process to try and close the parenthesis of 
                                                             
12 Laurent Douzou, La Résistance française : une histoire périlleuse (Paris, Seuil, 2005); Henry Rousso, Le 
Syndrome de Vichy (Paris, Seuil, 2nd ed., 1990). 
13 Douzou, op.cit. 
14 La Bataille du Rail (dir. René Clément, 1946). 
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the Occupation- Vichy was declared illegal, and when it was suggested to de Gaulle upon 
arriving in Paris in August 1944 that he should go to the Hôtel de Ville to proclaim the 
Republic, he refused, saying that the Republic had never ceased to exist.15 The man who led 
the prosecution at Pétain’s trial later entitled his memoirs Quatre ans à rayer de notre 
histoire, or ‘four years to erase from our history’.16 Meanwhile, some resisters who returned 
home from deportation were told to forget that they had been resisters, even if that meant 
working for people who during the war had been collaborators.17 One could conclude that the 
resistance legacy was being used as an attempt to actually close down the ambitions of the 
Resistance.18 
This, along with the outbreak of the Cold War and the ensuing collapse of tripartism 
in the early governments of the Fourth Republic, meant that the Communist interpretation of 
the Resistance began to vary from the Gaullist interpretation- and the singular myth of the 
Resistance began to fracture not with Le Chagrin et la Pitié in 1971, but actually in 1947. 
Résistancialisme was actually résistancialismes, with Gaullist and Communist variants.19 The 
Gaullist vision prided itself on a select few acting on behalf of a silent and suffering majority 
to liberate France from German occupation. The Communist version also prided itself upon 
suffering- it styled itself as le parti des fusillés, or the party of those who had been executed 
by firing squad- a figure that the Communists put at 75,000, which was at best an 
exaggeration.20 The Communists saw their resistance as a continuation of the struggles of le 
peuple against those who oppressed the people, be they French or foreign. It was little 
wonder that many French Communists made reference to Valmy in 1792, where the French 
                                                             
15 Matthew Cobb, The Resistance (London, Simon & Schuster, 2009), p.268.  
16 André Mornet, Quatre ans à rayer de notre histoire (Paris, Self, 1949).  
17 Papp, Construction des mémoires collectives dans l’Eure : enjeux et protagonistes (1944-1951) in Jacqueline 
Sainclivier & Christian Bougeard (eds.), La Résistance et les Français : Enjeux stratégiques et environnement 
social (Rennes, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 1995), p.328. 
18 This is also the conclusion of Cobb- see op.cit., pp.276-279. 




Revolutionaries defeated an Austrian army invited to restore the full law of the monarchy.21 
Resistance, as François Furet saw it, was for the Communists a legacy descended from the 
Jacobinism of the Revolution.22  Put at its simplest, Gaullism and resistance emphasised the 
state, whilst Communism and resistance emphasised the people.  
 In the 1950s, résistancialisme had to contend with a revisionist movement called 
résistantialisme, which questioned the achievements of the Resistance, and portrayed many 
resisters as being little better than hoodlums.23 Georges Guingouin and Robert Leblanc were 
just two of the maquis leaders who faced accusations of crimes and offences committed on 
their watch, and were prosecuted for their alleged crimes, although neither man was 
convicted in the end.24 These revisionists (the most famous of which was Robert Aron) saw 
the period of post-war purging known as the épuration to be a period of bloodthirsty score-
settling- Aron’s Histoire de l’épuration gave a figure for those who had been summarily 
executed that is now generally concluded to have been impossibly high.25 Historical work 
began to be produced at this time, partly as a defence against this initial revisionism- the 
Comité d’Histoire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale (CH2GM) was created in 1951, and Henri 
Michel, the organisation’s chair, defended the first doctoral thesis on the Resistance in 
1962.26 Many of the CH2GM’s correspondents were ex-resisters, and had often led the 
networks- this was the Resistance, or rather its upper orders, writing their own history.27  
Then in 1958, résistancialisme gained new traction as de Gaulle returned to power, 
and the Gaullists set out about consolidating their position by the construction of a 
mythology. This was reinforced by a series of cultural practices, such as the Concours de la 
                                                             
21 Claude-Paul Couture, Les écrits de la Résistance en Seine-Maritime et leurs emprunts à la Révolution 
française (Luneray, Bertout, 1986). 
22 François Furet, Le passé d’une illusion (Paris, Calmann-Lévy/Robert Laffont, 1996), p.410. 
23 Rousso, op.cit., pp.43-44. 
24 Raymond Ruffin, Ces Chefs du Maquis qui gênaient (Paris, Presses de la Cité, 1980). 
25 Robert Aron, Histoire de l’épuration, tome I : De l’indulgence aux massacres, novembre 1942-septembre 
1944 (Paris, Fayard, 1967); Cobb, op.cit., p.280.  
26 Published as Les Courants de pensée dans la Résistance (Paris, Robert Laffont, 1963).   
27 Julian Jackson, The Dark Years: France 1940-1944 (London, OUP, 2001), pp. 6-8.  
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Déportation et de la Résistance, which was inaugurated in 1964, the interment of the remains 
of Jean Moulin at the Panthéon in Paris in the same year, accompanied by a speech by André 
Malraux, and a renewed interest in the period amongst filmmakers.28 Yet questions had 
already started being asked though about just how passive or resisting the French had been, 
and how much many had profited from collaboration, particularly in the domain of literature, 
with novels such as Jean Dutourd’s Au Bon Beurre (1952).29  
This questioning became more prominent firstly with the era of revisionism referred 
to as le miroir brisé, which was heralded by Marcel Ophuls’ 1971 film Le Chagrin et la Pitié, 
which looked at the Occupation in and around the central French city of Clermont-Ferrand, 
and Robert Paxton’s 1972 book Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, which was 
translated into French in 1974.30 However, if this questioned the Resistance within the history 
of France during the Second World War, then the actual history of the Resistance itself 
remained disconnected from this. Instead, the conflict between the two résistancialismes 
reached fever pitch. The squabbling was typified by the massive Histoire de la Résistance, a 
project initially conceived to bring together a national narrative from the mass of research 
carried out by the historians and local correspondents of the CH2GM. One of the authors, 
Jean-Louis Vigier, abandoned the project after the second volume- the two remaining authors 
saw it through to its conclusion in 1981, fourteen years and ten volumes after it had started, 
by which time the CH2GM had become the Institut d’Histoire du Temps Présent (IHTP), and 
gone beyond purely the history of the Resistance- a reflection of the change in the 
historiographical climate. But in what was an indictment of the nature of resistance 
historiography, rather than a conclusion, the final volume offered ‘conclusions’- so 
diametrically opposed to each other had Henri Noguères and Marcel Degliame-Fouché 
                                                             
28 Rousso, op.cit., p.270. See also Sylvie Lindeperg, Les Ecrans de l’Ombre, Paris, CNRS, 1997.  
29 Jean Dutourd, Au Bon Beurre (Paris, Gallimard, 1952). 
30 Le Chagrin et la Pitié (dir. Marcel Ophuls, 1971); Robert Paxton, Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order 
(New York, Columbia University Press, 1972).  
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become, that they could not agree upon a mutual conclusion, and so wrote separate ones that 
dissented from one another- both of which were published.31 The Resistance had become 
incoherent, and as the film Papy fait de la résistance showed in 1983, it had also become ripe 
for parody.32 
The third phase of resistance history saw a group of professional historians go in 
search of resistance history by looking at the archives. It was in some ways a reaction to the 
two undeniable facts about resistance historiography- firstly, the resisters who had written 
resistance history up to this point were now starting to pass away, and secondly, the debates 
around resistance history had become increasingly absurd- what Rod Kedward in the mid-
1970s referred to as ‘crazy mirrors’.33 The idea was that testimony had become increasingly 
biased, and therefore, untrustworthy. The IHTP was composed principally of professional 
historians. As such, archival material was drawn upon, such as dossiers d’homologation, and 
given primacy in terms of methodology. With professional historians came new readings, and 
new narratives. Historians such as François Marcot, Jacqueline Sainclivier, Michel Boivin 
and Jean-Marie Guillon began looking at resistance within localities, with the first two 
focusing upon sociology and structures, and the latter two framing their studies of the 
Manche and the Var respectively within a political framework, willing to look to the earlier 
stages of the Resistance between 1940 and 1942.34 The result of this shift was that by 1986, 
Bédarida was able to claim at a round table organised by the IHTP that ‘the Resistance, 
                                                             
31 Henri Noguères & Marcel Delgliame-Fouché, Histoire de la Résistance, (Paris, Robert Laffont, 1982), Vol.5, 
pp.573-581. 
32 Papy fait de la Résistance (dir. Jean-Marie Poiré, 1983). 
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which hitherto had been seen as the chosen territory of oral history now appears as the site of 
the triumph of written history’.35  
Yet this was a simplification: oral history had never gone away. Archives, museums 
and associations had begun collecting testimonies, and historians working outside the 
mainstream of French academia made novel uses of oral testimony.36 Rod Kedward looked at 
resistance in the southern free zone using oral testimony, with two volumes published in 1978 
and 1993 respectively.37 Historians working upon women’s history, such as Hanna Diamond, 
also drew upon the accounts of women to frame a wider account of the Resistance and the 
role played by women.38 At the same time as spoken testimony was in retreat amongst more 
historians whose approaches were considered more scientifique, it was gaining ground in the 
propagating of the memory of resistance. This reflected to some extent a wider problem 
within the history of the Second World War in France- there was an ever-growing number of 
theses and books on the topic by professional historians, but the ‘wars of memory’ were 
becoming ever more problematic. Henry Rousso claimed in Le Syndrome de Vichy that 
France was ‘ill from its memory’ (as opposed to an illness of memory- i.e. the memories were 
never-ending), and a book that he co-authored in 1994 with Eric Conan talked about ‘a non-
passing past’.39  
The 21st century has seen a slight change in resistance history. Though the process of 
historicisation has continued, there has been a turn back towards testimony as a basis for 
methodology. The techniques of oral history have developed considerably since the era of the 
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CH2GM, and now it is not just the details stated that interest historians, but the form of the 
recollections. The focus is no longer purely on faits de résistance, but also on motivations, 
ideas, how resistance was framed and conceived. Johanna Barasz has looked at vichysto-
résistants, resisters who both engaged in resistance and yet also had an adhesion to Marshal 
Pétain, even to the Vichy regime.40 Alya Aglan, for her habilitation, wrote Le temps de la 
Résistance, which looked at how resisters conceived the future, and how this influenced their 
action. She based her analysis upon diaries, letters, reflections, texts and propaganda written 
by active resisters.41 Fabrice Grenard’s habilitation was a prosopographical analysis of the 
Limousin resistance leader Georges Guingouin which both uses the extensive Communist 
archives in the archives départementales at Bobigny just outside Paris, but also analyses 
Guingouin’s own account of the period 1940-1944, oral testimony given by Guingouin, 
Communist propaganda that he edited not just in the Resistance but in the Inter-War years, 
and also oral history interviews that Grenard himself carried out.42 
The second development has been the widening of the subjects of study. There has 
been a widening in the definition of resistance, which has inspired historians such as Jacques 
Sémelin working on the shelter of Jewish children from the Holocaust, Margaret Collins 
Weitz working on female resisters, and Denis Peschanski working on immigrants within the 
Resistance.43 So the parameters of what constitutes a resister have also changed considerably 
for many (though not all) historians since 1980. 
The third development has been in the number of fields of study. No longer is the 
Resistance seen as the exclusive domain of military history; it is instead analysed by a variety 
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of different factors, such as social history (a collection of essays edited by Antoine Prost in 
1997), labour history in the case of Claude Malon’s study of Le Havre, police history in the 
case of studies by Emmanuel Chevet and Christian Chevandier, the history of identities and 
cultural history for Cécile Vast, regional histories for Sylvain Gregori, and gender history in 
the case of Catherine Lacour-Astol, whose study of resisters in the Nord department was 
published as Le Genre de la Résistance in 2015.44 In the case of some of the above, there has 
also been an intersectionality of factors- societal analysis has informed Gregori’s and Vast’s 
work, local specificities for Lacour-Astol and Malon- so the range of tools available to the 
historian has increased, and allowed for new readings and new interpretations of the 
Resistance.  
The conclusions to be drawn from this are that firstly, the historiography has 
continued to evolve, particularly since the late 1970s, when resistance history may perhaps 
have seemed in danger of becoming trapped in a cul-de-sac of fierce dispute and increasing 
irrelevance.45 Just as the works of Philippe Burrin and Pierre Laborie have permitted us to see 
that the French population of the time can no longer be seen as rigidly-set categories of 
collaborators and resisters, but introduced us to other forms of behaviour such as 
accommodation and passivity,46 so we can see that resisting and resisters had a wide variety 
of motivations. The second is that historians are now more conscious about the role of 
memory in shaping the history of the Resistance. Alya Aglan pointed out recently that the 
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history and the memory of the Resistance have often been constructed at the same time; that 
is to say that resistance action, resistance memory, and resistance historiography are all very 
closely linked.47 This has impacted upon the historical writing, and historians now look 
beyond faits de résistance and take into account shapings, constructions and impressions of 
resistance histories.48 
The third and final conclusion to draw is that there is now a new fault line within the 
historiography of the Resistance. Whereas previously it had been between Gaullist and 
Communist résistancialismes, the new fault line is between résistance-mouvement and 
résistance-organisation. The terms were put forward in a 1997 essay by François Marcot, 
who saw the former concept (which grounded resistance within the much larger context of 
French society and smaller-scale adhesions to the resistance cause) as an expansion of the 
latter (which viewed resistance purely through the prism of organisations and networks and 
resisters who actively conspired or bore arms against the Nazis).49 This spirit was behind the 
Dictionnaire Historique de la Résistance in 2006, which aimed to sum up the state of play in 
resistance history and research, concentrating not just on individuals, groups, structures and 
regions, but also social groups and behaviours.50 However, when in 2013 Olivier Wieviorka’s 
Histoire de la Résistance was published, the approach was purely based on those who had 
been active resisters, and mostly upon those who had belonged to networks.51 Wieviorka’s 
approach was criticised by Marcot in an essay that appeared in Le Débat later that same year, 
and Marcot expanded further on his concept to even evoke the idea of résistance-mouvement 
social, or the Resistance being a small section of wartime society who had a small number of 
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full-time resisters, but a larger number of occasional, part-time, even one-off resisters who 
nonetheless adhered to resistance principles and ideals.52  
So this debate, and the recent developments in resistance history since the turn of the 
century, raises the question as to whether or not resistance history now consists of a divide 
between ‘The French Resistance’, looking at the organised, structured, even paramilitary 
resistance, and ‘resistance in France’, looking at the behaviour and forms of resistance.53 The 
first bases itself on an analysis of organisations and networks, and their operations; the 
second looks more at individual resisters and their actions and visions, presenting an image of 
a movement that is more heterogenous and less formally structured than a military-based 
interpretation of resistance offers.  
The regional historiography for the area around Upper Normandy is not abundant. 
Most published material is based either upon journalism (such as articles in Paris-
Normandie) or memoirs of ex-resisters. Since the 1970s, there have been a number of 
dissertations for the maîtrise or for the diplôme des études approfondies (and in the 2000s, 
the Master), which have either focused on, or looked at as part of their scope, the Resistance 
in the Seine-Inférieure. Some of these have revealed interesting insights into aspects of the 
Resistance within the department, but the quality of these dissertations is variable, and very 
few have actually looked at the department as a whole. Catherine Blanquet’s 1979 
dissertation did, but was subtitled un essai sociologique, and was primarily a sociological 
analysis of dossiers held at the departmental Office National des Anciens Combattants 
(ONAC).54 It also seems to have been conceived in reaction to the previous CH2GM tradition 
of testimony, as the dossiers were never analysed individually, meaning that any sense of 
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individual peculiarity or trajectory was lost. It should also be noted that the length of these 
dissertations, at around one hundred pages, did not necessarily lend itself to detailed analysis.  
A partial attempt at writing a history of the Resistance in Seine-Inférieure came in 2012, with 
Michel Baldenweck’s doctoral thesis entitled De la Résistance au rétablissement de la 
légalité républicaine: histoire de la Seine-Inférieure, 1943-1946.55 In terms of sheer volume, 
this is the most detailed work thus far on the Resistance in the department- the period leading 
up to the Liberation in 1944 covers approximately three hundred pages. Yet he himself, in 
writing two follow-up pieces, one covering the structure of the Resistance, and the second 
looking at its actions and accomplishments, acknowledged that ‘the history of the Resistance 
in Seine-Inférieure remains to be written’.56 
But the shortcoming of Baldenweck’s approach is how resistance is conceived. It is 
conceived uniquely from a patriotic viewpoint, and the war is seen less as a struggle against 
Nazism, and more against Germany, evoking even the spectre of a ‘thirty years war’- a 
historiographical school of thought that emerged in 1947, and which has not really had much 
traction since.57 Moreover, it is conceived within the perspective of liberating the Patrie and 
restoring the state and legality. Whilst this thesis acknowledges that patriotism and statecraft 
were part of resistance history, it wishes to contend that this was not the sum of resistance.  
The history of the Resistance in the Eure has, in contrast, been written- twice. Firstly, 
the former leader of the Resistance in the Eure, Marcel Baudot, became in due course the 
CH2GM’s correspondent for the department, and had also been the department’s chief 
archivist. He wrote in 1960 a work entitled L’opinion publique d’un département français 
sous l’Occupation.58 This work in fact contained a lengthy description of the Resistance in 
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the Eure. This was followed by one of Baudot’s successors as departmental correspondent, 
this time of the IHTP, Julien Papp, who took advantage of the recently donated archives 
(donated, it should be noted, by Baudot himself), to write a history of the Resistance in the 
Eure in 1988. However, this again largely focused upon organised resistance, and at times 
tended towards quantitative history.59  
Few attempts have been made to write a history spanning across the departmental 
boundaries, and the attempts that have been made have brought mixed results. Baudot’s 1974 
work Libération de la Normandie focuses primarily upon the summer of 1944, and is mostly 
a military history.60 The best-known work is that of Raymond Ruffin, whose 1977 book La 
Résistance normande face à la Gestapo, eventually ran to five editions, the last coming out in 
1999.61 Yet Ruffin’s style is unashamedly résistancialiste, and far-removed from the standard 
norms of historical work. The sources are unclear and the footnoting next to non-existent.  
The summary that one arrives at when looking at the regional historiography specifically is 
that it lags behind the national historiography- whilst there is work that looks at the 
Resistance in these individual departments, as per the paradigm of résistance-organisation, 
nothing as yet examines resistance in either of the departments as per the conceptions of 
Kedward & Gildea, or even Marcot, let alone across Upper Normandy as a ‘lived space’ to 
use Raffestin’s term. In short, the history of ‘the Resistance in Upper Normandy’ has been 
covered and analysed, but that is not the case for ‘resistance in Upper Normandy’, which is a 
slightly different object of study.  
This is the gap in historical knowledge that this thesis aims to fill- the subject of the 
thesis is not the Resistance, but resistance. The first of our research questions that this thesis 
                                                             
59 Papp, op.cit. 
60 Baudot, La Libération de la Normandie (Paris, Hachette, 1974). 
61 Ruffin, La Résistance normande....  
24 
 
will address is thus: what was the nature of resistance (as opposed to the Resistance) in Upper 
Normandy?  
           
Comment peut-on être résistant? Understanding resistance in France 
So what is resistance? What makes a resister? In response to the second question, the answer 
being advanced here is a simple one. Just as Simone de Beauvoir famously wrote ‘One is not 
born a woman, one becomes a woman’,62 so we can say the same for a resister. A resister is 
made by a series of influences and factors, such as environment, politics, education, 
upbringing and culture, but these then cristalise into motivations for wanting to resist, and 
then the act of resistance itself. It is by committing the act that one becomes the resister. 
Resistance was as much about opportunity as what it was about ideology, perhaps even more 
so. To this end, it is important to look at ‘the capacity to resist’, which was one of the 
determining characteristics of qualifying resistance for Howard Caygill.63 This is an 
epistemology in line with E.P. Thompson’s notion of agency in The Making of the English 
Working Class.64 When considering resistance, the capacity to resist is as important as the 
motivation to resist, because that then defines the nature of the resistance. 
 But if we can say that it is the act of resistance that makes the resister, then what is 
resistance? Michel Baldenweck’s view is that the Resistance was a patriotic struggle.65 In this 
view, the Resistance is conceived purely in terms of the raison d’État, and national interest, 
resisters doing no more than being enfants de la Patrie. This is a top-down view of history, 
whereas this thesis aims firmly to be a ‘history from below’. Moreover, claiming that 
resistance was purely a patriotic action therefore implies that those who held office at Vichy 
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and collaborated with the occupiers were not truly French. Yet one’s ability to prove one’s 
adhesion to being French was one of the most prominent rhetorical features of the time: there 
was a famous poster of Pétain, and a caption underneath asking people if they were more 
French than him.66 Moreover, Baldenweck’s thesis also makes the claim that public opinion 
in the Seine-Inférieure was ‘plutôt maréchaliste’.67 Certainly there was a massive public 
adhesion to Pétain across France in 1940.68 Would that therefore mean that the majority of 
French people were not truly French for much of the Second World War? The philosophical 
debate could become absurd quite quickly, because then a debate about what it means to be 
French would then follow, and some sort of essentialist conception would have to be devised 
within the realms of objectivity- yet such an essentialist conception does not, and cannot 
exist, beyond the mere fact of possessing a French passport and French citizenship. Certainly 
many resisters conceived their actions as patriotic, and this motivation is clearly recognised in 
this thesis,69 but that does not oblige the historian to arrive at that same conclusion and write 
the history of the Resistance as some sort of hymne à la France.  
How, then, do we understand resistance as a concept broader than the Resistance? 
Rod Kedward proposed in 2015 a more widespread understanding of resistance across time 
and place: 
 
The active struggle for freedom must surely be one criterion of resistance, 
across time and place. The voluntary commitment of civilians to the 
subterfuge, creativity, secrecy and subversion necessary to fight against 
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overwhelming and unacceptable oppression must also be a constituent. And 
thirdly, I would want to add, the aim to restore or extend human rights.70 
 
Kedward’s theory is more solidly founded, but in itself, provides possible problems here for 
the historian. For there were resisters who talked about the importance of order. Jean Thomas 
conceived his actions as purely a fight against the German enemy, and André Gosse had been 
in the Croix de Feu in the 1930s, and still talked about the importance of order in his 
testimony.71  
 Many conceptions of resistance have been advanced when it comes to France in 1940-
1944. Henri Michel was one of the first to attempt a definition, which focused on patriotism 
and ideology, and was couched in terms of combat.72 This represented the realpolitik of 
résistancialisme- the conception of a military resistance, but which encompassed both 
Gaullism and Communism. François Bédarida defined it as a struggle for ‘the liberty of the 
nation and the dignity of the human being…against the domination and mostly occupation 
…by a Nazi regime or satellite’.73 Bédarida’s conception is not one this thesis wishes to adopt 
because it could easily lead to a debate as to whether or not Vichy was a National Socialist 
regime or satellite, which is not the subject of this thesis. Nor would this thesis want to look 
through the narrow prism of Henri Michel’s analysis, because that would neglect many of 
those whose resistance was conceived as non-violent.       
 However, resistance was more than just theory; it was an action, it was practice. This 
was something at the heart of a paper by Henry Pickford at the University of Sussex in 
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November 2015. His argument was that to conceive resistance as a praxis, there had to be a 
clear understanding of the differences between ‘resistance against’, ‘resistance towards’, and 
‘resistance as’.74 ‘Resistance against’ is about what resistance aims to oppose. It is about 
defining the action that causes the reaction. Yet to see resistance purely in those terms is to 
conceive of it as a totally reactionary behaviour, and if the reaction does repel and overwhelm 
the action, then for it not to be nihilistic, it has to have further aims. This is where ‘resistance 
towards’ becomes important- what is the aim of a resistance? What is its vision of the 
future?75 How resisters conceived the future was the subject of Alya Aglan’s Le temps de la 
Résistance. This conception, she argues, was central to how resisters performed their actions 
and rhetoric.76 Finally, how is resistance performed? What acts are carried out? How does 
resistance challenge oppression? This is where we have to consider ‘resistance as’, which 
characterises, and is characterised by, the practices of resistance.77 This then takes us towards 
an understanding of resistance in France between 1940 and 1944.  
 In fact, Pickford made another vital point, and one that again goes to the heart of how 
we frame, epistemologically, the Resistance. He pointed out that in philosophy and in 
sociology, a collective agent can come apart. A superior in a collective may have different 
motivations to those which someone lower down in that collective has.78 This we see time 
and again in the Resistance. Benjamin Remacle led the Communist Front National in Seine-
Inférieure- but was himself a practicing Catholic and a Gaullist.79 Pierre Bérégovoy belonged 
to the youth wing of the Communist resistance, the Front Unie de la Jeunesse Populaire 
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(FUJP), but was never a Communist, and later became Prime Minister of a Socialist centre-
left government.80 
 This is why it becomes more accurate perhaps to talk about “resistance in France” 
rather than necessarily “the French Resistance”. Resistance was a much broader, much less 
structured, much more heterogenous idea, as Marcot, and before that, Jacques Sémelin, have 
suggested.81 It was also something that was shaped by the resisters themselves. What 
resistance actually meant to resisters varied depending on their actions and their beliefs. 
Resistance was an imagined community because what bound these disparate resisters 
together was not the formal structures of networks, or comités départementaux de libération 
(CDL) or the Conseil National de la Résistance (CNR) or even the Free French and General 
de Gaulle.82 What bound them together was the idea of disobedience, of opposition, of 
subversion, and the reality of secrecy, of adopting a stance that often went against the 
hegemony of the day. The esprit de la Résistance was a communion whose celebrants felt as 
though they knew what it meant to them individually. 
 So what was resistance in Upper Normandy against? It was against, ostensibly, the 
German occupation. But actually, it ran deeper and wider than that. One resister was keen to 
stress that it was not the Germans that the resisters were fighting. Germany, like France, was 
a civilised European nation, capable of producing writers, thinkers, composers. What they 
were fighting was a corruption of German ideals in Nazism.83 This explains how a number of 
the early resisters were teachers or intellectuals, who saw the corrosiveness of Nazi ideas. 
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This would set the tone for much of the next four years- resistance was more often a war of 
hearts and minds than a battle of bullets and brawn. 
 But it was not just Nazism that was being fought, it was Vichy as well. The National 
Revolution was the name given to the cultural revolution that the Vichy regime embarked 
upon in the summer of 1940. It adopted as its values travail, famille, patrie (work, family, 
fatherland).84 The official name of the administration was changed from République française 
to the more ambiguous État français, or ‘French State’. Vichy and the ideology of 
maréchalisme, the personality cult of Pétain, held a form of cultural hegemony, comparable 
to the dominance of capitalism and fascism in Italy identified by Antonio Gramsci.85 Bernard 
Lawday recalled as a young boy at the main grammar school in Rouen, Lycée Pierre 
Corneille, being set as a homework task by his History master, a letter of gratitude in 
response to Pétain’s New Year address of 1942.86 Even in 1944, when Pétain visited Rouen, 
he was greeted by cheering masses.87 Pierre Laborie makes the important distinction between 
le maréchal and the régime du Vichy in terms of the adhesion of the French people towards 
Vichy, especially in the later stages of the war.88 So right from the beginning, resistance was 
an engagement in a counter-society, going against the grain that seemed so accepted by the 
generality of public opinion.89 It was a political act, a contestation of this new order of 
National Socialism and National Revolution. This was very much what the ‘resistance 
against’ was. 
 The ‘resistance towards’ was more varied. Some wanted to create a Communist 
France. Some wanted to rebuild the Popular Front. Some wanted to restore republican values, 
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and some wanted to rebuild France as a nation of order. Some were simply concerned with 
driving les Boches out of France, and their collaborators out of power as traitors. Some 
wanted to prove their adhesion to France. Finally, there were some who simply wanted to 
save the lives of Allied airmen, or resisters on the run, or Jewish children.90 
 Even more multiple were the various forms of action that made up ‘resistance as’. 
This was often shaped by the capacity to resist, as well as the aims of the resister themselves- 
the forms of resistance available were as multiple and as varied as a resister’s agency allowed 
it to be. This thesis will be focusing on ‘resistance towards’ and ‘resistance as’ and how it 
shaped the greatest the different strands of resistance in Upper Normandy during this period.
 The understanding of resistance that we are therefore advancing in this thesis is that 
resistance in France between 1940 and 1944 was the contest and challenge, by thought, word 
and deed, of Nazism & Vichyism, and the policies and institutions involved in making these 
systems function, in order to create a new society. So the second research question for this 
thesis to answer is how does a study of ‘resistance’ differ from a study of ‘the Resistance’? 
To add to this, a third research question- how was resistance manifested, and how did the 
‘capacity to resist’ influence and impact upon resistance action?  
  
For a political history of resistance in France 
At the outset, the aim of this thesis was to be a ‘history from below’ of the Resistance. 
Initially, this led to wanting to write a social history of resistance in Upper Normandy, a field 
that seemed neglected after perusing through an initial literature review. Certainly what was 
to be avoided was an analysis written through the prism of networks, relegating resisters to 
anonymity. The idea of writing it as a political history seemed like re-treading old ground- 
                                                             
90 See Mason Norton, ‘A la recherche de la toile d’araignée et de la cité clandestine : Résister en Seine-
Inférieure, 1940-44’ in Feiertag (ed.), op.cit. 
31 
 
the interpretation and legacy of the Resistance that persists in collective memory is one 
divided between Gaullists and Communists, as Pierre Nora identified in his essay on the 
Resistance in Les Lieux de Mémoire, and indeed, the first scholarly works on the Resistance 
in the 1950s and 1960s concentrated upon its political aspects.91 Why then, is it that a 
political history of resistance offers a new reading today that still remains true to the original 
intention of ‘history from below’, whilst also avoiding a politicisation of resisters along the 
lines of either the Gaullist or Communist interpretations charted above?   
 Political history had been under attack in French academic circles for quite some time 
at the time that Henri Michel was producing his first scholarly works. The Annales school 
had rejected it for being événementielle, or revolving around single events rather than 
processes.92 The deep divisions in resistance historiography, as mentioned above, convinced 
many historians by the 1980s that if the Resistance was to become relevant again, it had to go 
beyond political history, and so a variety of different approaches and genres were employed, 
as we have seen above. 
 Political history was not absent by any means. Jean-Marie Guillon’s thèse d’État on 
the Var was subtitled ‘essai d’histoire politique’, but if it was a cultural history of the 
political, it still remained framed by a traditional conception of politics, revolving around 
parties and ideologies. Guillon’s work was influenced by the idea of the Var rouge,93 and 
Fabrice Grenard’s study of resistance leader Georges Guingouin in the Limousin rooted itself 
within a study of rural French Communism.94 This state of affairs was reflected in the 2006 
Dictionnaire historique de la Résistance, which contained essays advocating cultural and 
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social approaches, but very little advocating a political history. The nearest was an entry by 
Guillon himself entitled ‘Résistance et action politique’.95 
 Yet political history in France underwent a revival in the late 1980s, in part owing to 
Pour une histoire politique, edited by René Rémond, in 1988. As well as offering a definition 
of le politique as opposed to la politique, as mentioned above, it also showed how political 
history could offer new understandings of other topics, such as culture, intellectualism, 
religion, linguistics or war.96 The concept of le politique, or the political, was intended by 
Rémond to describe everything that governs or regulates everyday life and society more 
broadly.97 It was also given an alternative meaning in 2011 by Vincent Peillon, in his work 
Éloge du politique. Peillon defined le politique as ‘the search for the common good’, whilst 
la politique was the complex of powers and opinions geared towards the exercise of power. 
For Peillon, political action is not designed to serve the vehicle of a party political movement, 
but action for the benefit of society and of everyday life.98 
 But although many fields traditionally associated with new political history, such as 
gender, culture, or identity, or even, in the case of Alya Aglan’s Le temps de la Résistance, 
conceptual history, have made their way into the canon of resistance historiography over the 
course of the last decade, as we have seen above, new political history itself has not done so. 
This is surprising, because one of the more notable ways in which the legacy of the 
Resistance has manifested itself in recent years has been how the spirit of resistance has 
informed protest movements such as Occupy- demonstrated by the success of Stéphane 
Hessel’s bestseller Indignez-Vous!.99 This in many ways was another example of new 
political history- part of the book looked at the legacy of the Resistance, and analysed the 
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spirit of resistance through the emotion of indignation, thereby inscribing resistance within 
the realm of the history of emotions.100  
 It would seem, therefore, that within Resistance historiography as a whole, there is a 
gap to be filled. For if “The French Resistance” (la Résistance) is inscribed and often linked 
to a structure sometimes qualified as politico-militaire, and perhaps even la politique, then 
“resistance in France” (la résistance) is much more indicative of le politique, or the political. 
The political history of the French Resistance has been much charted and much written about, 
but the political history of resistance in France remains to be explored. In a society where the 
usual democratic checks and balances had been suspended, and the expression of dissent 
against authority was repressed, sometimes savagely, resistance was effectively voting by 
other means.101 The fourth research question that this thesis aims to answer interrogates the 
relationship between resistance and politics- how was resistance a political act in a society 
where the usual political forums and channels had been suspended? What is political action? 
 
Capturing the heat of the past: a conscious choice of methodology 
To add to the epistemological element of this thesis, a careful reflection needs to be made 
upon the methodology and the sources that this thesis has used. To achieve this, the thesis has 
decided to rely primarily upon testimony in order to comprehend the individual perspectives 
of resisters and their trajectories and nuances. 
The very nature of resistance meant that archives were not collated at the time. Most 
resistance groups did not compile archives until after the war when it came to obtaining 
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official recognition, a process known as homologation.102 Each group had someone who 
compiled a dossier of what the group and/or network had achieved. This person was known 
in the bureaucratic parlance as the liquidateur du groupe. Lists of actions carried out, resisters 
who belonged, resisters who were killed or deported, when the group was formed, when 
members joined and when, if applicable, the group was broken up and its members arrested, 
were compiled and then sent onto commissions who then decided whether or not to recognise 
or reject the demands.103 These archives were the basis for many of the works produced in the 
1980s and 1990s.  
 As an archival source, these dossiers remain important to any historian wanting to 
understand the Resistance. They act as the backbone of what we know about organised 
resistance, the résistance-organisation. Some dossiers are little more than just nominative 
lists and formal legal attestations, but others give detailed descriptions of their members, 
motivations and achievements. Some, such as the Comité Clandestin de Nonancourt in the 
Eure, offer an intriguing insight into the early years of resistance, and how such groups and 
their structures worked in a small town.104  
 The trouble, as Julien Blanc put it, is that if these archives are irreplaceable, they are 
also biased.105 For a start, the bureaucratic processes involved were considered complex. One 
of the peculiarities that this entailed was that a number of groups were given, and continue to 
be known by, names that they did not have at the time. So the famous group of the early 
Resistance in Paris, the Musée de l’Homme actually had no name whilst it existed, and was 
given that name because of where many of the resisters in the group worked and because the 
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bureaucratic process after the war demanded that the group had an official name.106 Likewise 
the group in Upper Normandy known as the Maquis de Barneville was actually known to the 
maquisards themselves as ‘Le Lorrain’- the term ‘Maquis de Barneville’ was chosen because 
it stuck out more.107 This situation whereby baptism occurred at the same time as winding up 
and writing the group’s history is an ironic one, and in itself, shows the divide between the 
reality of resistance and the vulgarisation process that the bureaucratisation of the Resistance 
legacy thus entailed.108 
 Moreover, the process was one that was prone to allegations of manipulating, and also 
privileged the networks over the individuals. Louis Jouvin, a resister from Grand-Quevilly, 
was arrested for having sabotaged telegraph wires, and then deported as a political prisoner 
(what the Nazis would term Nacht und Nebel), yet had his demand for recognition as a 
Combattant Volontaire de la Résistance (CVR) rejected.109 Elsewhere in France, Guy 
Môquet was presented by President Sarkozy in 2007 as an embodiment of resistance- arrested 
for belonging to the underground Communist Party, he was executed by firing squad at 
Châteaubriant near Nantes in reprisals for the Resistance assassinating the Feldkommandant 
of Nantes in October 1941. Yet Môquet was never part of an organised resistance network, 
and even had he not been executed, would not have been eligible for the CVR.110 Therefore, 
by the strictest legalistic definition, Guy Môquet could not have been considered a resister. 
Another survivor of the camps as a resister who was deported, Jean Thomas, saw his group 
(and thereby himself) refused recognition as resisters because the group had only lasted 87 
days- three days less than the minimum of 90. The group was eventually recognised in the 
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1990s after the rules were changed to allow for a minimum of 80 days.111 However, because 
he belonged to a resistance network in 1943-44, Maurice Papon was awarded the CVR- 
despite having worked for the Vichy authorities at the prefecture of the Gironde in Bordeaux 
until very late in the day.112 A methodology that accepts Papon but rejects Môquet raises, at 
the very least, questions as to its reliability. 
Furthermore, the CVR process privileged a military narrative that was 
overwhelmingly male and favoured the administrative prism of the state, and therefore 
became an instrument of, and an instrument for, ‘top-down history’. Equally, it favours 
quantitative history. It rarely looks at nuances, at motivations, at sentiments or at 
backgrounds.113 This leads to what this thesis sees as the principal difference between 
‘resistance in France’ and ‘the French Resistance’. The latter comes very much from the 
former, yet it has become a concept that serves very much a teleological purpose, designed to 
act as a support to a narrative that propagates a glorious national meta-narrative, known in 
French as le roman de la nation, even if that means forgetting the roles of others within that 
narrative who do not quite fit.  
This is why the importance of testimony is critical for an understanding of resistance 
in France. Consequently, this thesis will be based largely upon testimony by resisters 
themselves, both oral and written. There is a large archive of oral testimony at the archives 
départementales in Rouen, including interviews with a wide range of resisters from those 
who helped to lead the CDL in Seine-Inférieure to those who simply hid Allied airmen.114 
Oral testimony for the Eure is not so plentiful, but there are some interviews that do exist, 
most notably one of Marcel Baudot that was recorded in the mid-1980s.115 But there is also 
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the importance of written testimony. Some of this was carried out for the purposes of either 
the works carried out by successive departmental correspondents of the CH2GM or for the 
dossiers d’homologation, whilst others are memoirs & diaries. Whilst it has already been 
stated that many of these archives were focused purely on the details of actions, some 
testimonies in these archives are far more detailed, and offer us a rich insight into what life 
was like as a resister.116 Moreover, whereas the archives were compiled by resistance leaders, 
which I have identified in chapter two as being a certain kind of resister, oral histories look at 
both resistance leaders and those either lower down in the Resistance, or on its perimeters. 
This allows us to explore a wider range of motivations and resistances, as well as hear voices 
that resistance history has sometimes neglected, as Robert Gildea has recently showed in his 
2015 work Fighters in the Shadows.117    
Of course, such testimonies are by no means exclusively correct. There are, on 
occasions, errors, and oral testimony may well not possess the same attention to fine detail or 
exact chronology that more formal written archives might possess. But this in its turn is 
revealing and useful to the historian- it shows that these testimonies are just as liable to 
shaping as the archives mentioned above are. Indeed, oral historians such as Alessandro 
Portelli see oral testimonies as shaped narratives.118 In Portelli’s work The Death of Luigi 
Trastulli for example, Portelli talks about how some witnesses have ‘displaced’ the murder of 
a worker from 1949 to 1953, to fit in with their narrative.119 Portelli also identifies how 
personal memories are organised around personal events, and so other events are negotiated 
around this. The problem shown is what happens when two measurements of ‘lived time’ 
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collide, and shows the limits sometimes encountered in trying to use oral history as a source 
to establish an objective chronology of events.120 
Portelli’s work initially appeared in the 1980s, but when the bulk of the interviews 
cited here were carried out, oral history methodology was not necessarily as widely-known in 
France as in the UK or in Italy. Thierry Lamiraud carried out much of his research using 
questionnaires in the style of Mona Ozouf, and oral history was sometimes seen as another 
way of carrying out quantitative history, which as late as the 1980s, was a dominant form in 
social history in France.121 Others were semi-structured, which in the interviews that I have 
carried out, is the same form that I have followed, allowing for the questioning to be tailored 
to each individual history.  
 However, even then mistakes occurred in recollection. In the testimony of Yvonne 
Dissoubray, for example, the interview had been going for about twenty-five minutes, during 
which time she had been using as a key event in her recollection of the early years of the war 
the exode when her family had to flee, and her father returned to find that his property had 
been looted. It was only when she began to refer to direct action in 1940 that the interviewer 
noticed a discrepancy, and it emerged that she thought the exode had occurred in September 
1939, and not June 1940. This can be explained by a lapse in memory but also by colliding 
chronologies. Objectively, the war began in 1939; personally, for Yvonne Dissoubray, the 
war began in 1940 with the invasion of the Germans.122  
 The biggest way in which the shaping of narratives affects oral testimonies in this 
study is turning points. Left-wing resisters cite the attack on the Soviet Union in 1941,123 
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whilst conservative ones focus on the introduction of the Service du Travail Obligatoire 
(STO) in 1942-1943.124 This also explains, in some cases, differing entry points into the 
Resistance. Here, the question is emphasis. This can be lost in transcription, and underlines 
an important point- oral history interviews are meant to be listened, not read. Those who 
entered into resistance earliest focus upon pre-war upbringing in their accounts and thereby 
contextualise their experiences and their views. Hence, it took Tony Larue, in his 1985 
interview, the best part of two hours before arriving at 1939 and the outbreak of war.125 
Gustave Avisse takes a long time too to get to the start of the war, talking initially about his 
early working years, his tough background, and industrial relations in late 1930s Le Havre.126 
Those who started later, such as Raoul Boulanger and André Gosse, prefer to talk about the 
war- Boulanger talks little about his early years, and Gosse tries to avoid his past in the Croix 
de Feu or his early support for le maréchal.127  
But all structure local events and patterns around particular events that had little to do 
with them, on the bigger scale of the war. Those in the FTP talk about ‘after Barbarossa’, the 
Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, or those in the countryside will talk about 
‘after the STO’ in 1942-43. A number, on both sides of the divide, talk about the meeting 
between Pétain and Hitler at Montoire in late 1940, which appears to have taken upon an 
enormous significance in retrospect. Incidentally, it seems like it is younger resisters who are 
least concerned by the greater picture, and more influenced by things they actually saw, or 
could directly relate to. Georges Touroude was motivated by the death of Guy Môquet, who, 
like him, was born in 1924.128 Bernard Lawday was motivated by having to step aside for 
German soldiers in the street whilst on the way to school. ‘It seems petty, but it was a 
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personal humiliation’ he said.129 Pierre Jouvin’s was the arrest of his parents, although as 
someone who became a party member at the earliest opportunity (and remains a member 
today), and who had grown up in the sectarian Communist counter-culture of the 1930s, it 
seems likely that he would have resisted anyway.130  
So even the chronological errors show us something about the nature of resisting and 
the forms of resistance, the standpoints of individual resisters.  This also shows us that 
sometimes the accounts written retrospectively have been shaped for posterity. André Gosse, 
for example, wrote his memoir of resistance Ceux de l’Ombre in 1992. This came out nine 
years after his interview with the Seine-Maritime’s archivists, and just a year before his 
death. A world of tranquil agriculture in rural Normandy, interrupted by a stint of national 
service, and then by the arrival of the Germans, is described. Nowhere to be found is his 
Croix de Feu past nor his views on the Popular Front (which were revealed in 1983 to be 
scathing), and the Anglophobia he admitted to in an oral interview, situated firmly in the 
context of Mers-el-Kébir, is marginalised.131 There were hints of Gosse trying to distance 
himself from an embarrassing past in his oral history interview- he went out of his way to say 
that he did not try to overthrow the government in February 1934, whilst admitting to his 
membership of the Croix de Feu. ‘I can’t remember which demonstration I took part in when 
I was in Paris, but it wasn’t 6 février’ he said. His voice was also more halting when 
describing his activity prior to 1941, but considerably less so for his resistance years.132 
 For aspects such as chronology, there are limitations to oral history, and it is clear that 
the narratives presented are shaped by those testifying. But the fact that oral histories are 
shaped should not result in them being overlooked- written, more formal, archival sources are 
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just as susceptible to shaping, either wittingly or unwittingly. What oral history does allow 
for, unlike the archives of the homologation process, is an exploration of the nature of both 
action & motivation, and is also revelatory as to the visions of resisters- aspects that 
homologation did not concern itself with.133 Used in conjunction with written archives, oral 
history allows us to arrive at an account of resistance that reveals potentially significant 
divergences from the traditional account of the Resistance, allowing for a greater range of 
actions and motivations.  
Alistair Thomson, in his 1994 work Anzac Memories, looks at how individual 
accounts are constructed by negotiation between individual experience, personal identity, and 
collective memory.134 A similar process could be observed here, and actually furthers one of 
the aims of my research- a study that would put the resisters themselves back at the heart of 
the resistance narrative, and which would not just be a standard re-telling of what was evoked 
by Ruffin in the 1970s. This was what I tried to achieve in the interviews that I myself carried 
out, and also what I was interested in in the interviews that I listened to.  
It became clear within the first year of formal doctoral study that the number of 
interviews that I would be able to carry out myself would be very few, and not necessarily 
enough to sustain a full PhD thesis. The discovery of a large corpus of oral history interviews 
carried out by the Archives Départementales de la Seine-Maritime (ADSM) was undoubtedly 
a huge help in this respect. Mostly they were carried out between 1981 and 1986, with a few 
exceptions such as the interview of Christian Sénard, in 1991, and a handful of interviews 
carried out between 2010 and 2013.135 These were carried out mostly by two historians on 
internships at ADSM, one of whom, Vincent Auber, had been the author of a mémoire de 
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maîtrise on the Resistance in Seine-Inférieure in 1981.136 The structure of these interviews 
was one of formality, with a certain empirical basis to the questioning for the most part. The 
interviews did cover a larger amount of ground than just their time in resistance- they also 
covered family backgrounds, and the years before the war. But much of the interviewing felt 
focused upon establishing facts, and it also felt as though the choice of interviewees did not 
really go much beyond the organisational structure of the Resistance. It was almost as though 
the interviewers were trying to shape the interview and the resulting narrative 
chronologically, whereas today, interviewing acknowledges that memory does not 
necessarily work chronologically, or even accurately in terms of chronology, as Portelli’s 
research shows.  
An issue was therefore that the interviews were trying to do something that oral 
historians now recognise that oral history is not always well-designed to do. In the interviews 
that I carried out personally, I adopted a semi-structured style of interviewing. Whilst there 
were some loose parameters that I followed, and the interviews followed some common 
norms, I chose not to ask very much in the way of pre-prepared questions. I started the 
interviews with a standard question designed to establish the shaping of a witness’s memory, 
namely ‘what is your over-riding memory of the period 1940-44?’ From there, I would 
discuss briefly that period, before going back to the beginning, and establishing the person’s 
roots and origins, and then tailoring the questions to the experiences of the interviewee and 
what they had been through. There was a clear justification for this- influenced in part by 
Alistair Thomson’s arguments, I believe that the histories of individual people during the war 
require a certain amount of subjectivity insofar as each memory and each experience is 
negotiated. I believed that this could give the process of testimony more legitimacy within an 
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exploration of resistance than by analysing resistance through a prism of ‘comparative 
histories’, comparing and contrasting individual resisters in their turn. There were still some 
common ground between all of the interviews- each interview covered the same ground, such 
as politics, the exode, motivations for resistance, reactions to events such as the defeat of 
1940, Barbarossa, the STO, or the purges (épuration), and views on the period both at the 
time and looking back across a gap of seventy years. This allowed for the gauging of 
different perspectives, and maintaining some kind of empirical perspective necessary for the 
collection of evidence in historical enquiry, yet also respecting the individuality (and 
subjectivity) of witnesses and their negotiations between selves, experiences, and the broader 
context of both the Resistance as an organisation and the memory of the Second World War. 
In selecting both the testimonies used, and the quotations taken from these 
testimonies, I have made conscious decisions to construct an analysis rather than an account 
of resistance- that is to say, rather than write a detailed, definitive, even exhaustive history of 
resistance in Upper Normandy, I have chosen instead to chart its main evolutions and 
components. On occasion, the police archives have provided some of the testimonies- the 
police raid that broke up the CDL in Rouen in May 1944 confiscated the minutes of a 
previous meeting, which allows us a rare glimpse into the inner workings of a highly 
secretive committee and their discussions.137 But for the most part, these have come from the 
corpus of interviews collected in the 1980s. On their own, these testimonies would have led 
to a sometimes contradictory, or even uncertain, history- looking at resistance only through 
the eyes of testimony and nothing else would be indicative of the dangers of over-relying on a 
single source. But without these testimonies, as Laurent Douzou wrote, ‘the history of 
clandestinity is not possible’.138 
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The choice of testimonies used is intended to represent both breadth and depth. Breadth in 
that I did not want to focus too heavily on one group of resisters, such as Communists, or 
members of the SFIO, or Gaullists. I have tried to use oral testimonies from Communists, 
those aiding airmen, those who defined themselves as Gaullists, and those who saw 
themselves as apolitical, to name but a few categories. The choice also represents depth 
because of the detail involved in many of the recollections. Not all of the interviews go into 
great depth, and some are only half an hour or so long. The interviews that have been shorter 
I have tended to quote less often. But many of the interviews do go into depth, and discuss a 
range of activities but also views on the events of the time. These tend to reveal insights less 
into the actual history of resistance, but more into the experience of resistance. To some 
extent, I have used the so-called ‘recovery theory’ of oral history in order to find out about 
individual experiences, whilst acknowledging the subjectivity of these experiences, and then 
using wider secondary reading and theoretical interpretations as part of my broader analysis 
of these sources as a whole.139 
The passages above highlight both the benefits and pitfalls of oral history. The biggest 
difficulties are that the passage of time makes it very difficult now to write an oral history 
carried out primarily by the historian themselves- realistically, such histories of the period 
written from now onwards will rely heavily upon archives of oral testimony. This puts the 
shaping of the testimony, in many ways, out of the hands of the historian. These sources also 
need, on occasion, to be corroborated, either with other oral sources or with more formal 
written archives. They can also be more subjective than written sources, and in some ways 
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are more partial and more incomplete than some written sources, particularly when these are 
resisters who were not amongst the leaders of resistance networks- the testimony of Pierre 
Jouvin is not a definitive account of resistance in Grand-Quevilly for example, and the 
testimony of Bernard Lawday does not give a definitive history of resistance in Rouen around 
Lycée Pierre Corneille.140  
Yet it is the subjectivity that offers a benefit by comparison to the formal written 
archives. These testimonies reveal a wider set of motivations and ideologies- as Pickford 
stated, the collective agent can come apart.141 Resistance was a subjective movement- it 
meant different things to different resisters, whom in turn, resisted in different ways in the 
pursuit of different goals. Oral testimony allows the historian to discover these subjectivities 
in a way that the archives of the CVR do not allow for, and interpret these different 
meanings, in the same way that Luisa Passerini identified that the pursuit of oral history was 
not simply a case of researching facts, but of comprehending the testimony as 
representation.142 Here in this thesis, the testimony is not just a case of filling in the gaps of 
history- although it does bring insights where written archives are lacunar, and that is also a 
benefit in itself- but indicative of an interpretation and a strand of resistance. A final research 
question for this thesis to consider therefore is what testimony tells us about the nature and 
experience of resisting, and how it was conceived and regarded.   
 
The aims and structure of this thesis 
The aims of this thesis are to answer the research questions that arise from the survey of the 
historiographical, epistemological and methodological aspects of resistance history cited 
above. Firstly, what was the nature of resistance in Upper Normandy? How did it function 
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within the specific locality of Upper Normandy, not necessarily favourable topographically to 
guerilla-style action, yet nonetheless a ‘lived space’ representing a microcosm of what France 
was like at that time? How can it be considered through the prism of historicisation, that is to 
say analysis through a historical context, rather than historisation, the simple chronology and 
collection of facts and data? 
Secondly, how does a study of ‘resistance’ differ from a study of ‘the Resistance’? 
That is to say, resistance as a behaviour of defiance, a social engagement rather than 
necessarily a military or a patriotic one, an engagement grounded as much within the idea of 
Aristotle and the polis as the idea of an engagement for a state or nation. How did the 
‘movement’, as Marcot put it, differ from the organisation?   
Thirdly, how was resistance manifested and represented? How did the ‘capacity to 
resist’ influence resistance action? What can an intersectionality of different factors, such as 
gender, generation, identity, politics, culture and class tell us about resistance? 
Fourthly, how was resistance a political act in a society where the usual political 
forums and channels of peacetime had been suspended? In what ways was it inherently 
political? How, and in what ways, was resistance a manifestation of the political?  
Finally, what does resistance testimony convey to us about the nature of resisting and 
the experience of resisting? How was resistance conceived and regarded, both at the time and 
with reflection? All of this leads to the central research question of the thesis, which is how 
can we better appreciate the nature and character of resistance in the under-researched region 
of Upper Normandy without recourse to the conventional approaches of political history or 
military history?  
 The idea of resistance as being political and an engagement for the polis and la cité, is 
the idea around which the main body of this thesis will be structured. The first two chapters 
will be grounded within the idea of instrumental politics, resistance designed principally to 
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fundamentally alter society. Chapter one looks at Communist resistance, which conceived 
resistance as a continuation of the French Revolution of 1789. Influenced by Marxist 
thinking, the view of many Communists was that the Revolution and the Republic had been 
subverted, and that resistance action was a chance to complete the process of historical 
materialism- an acceleration towards the promised land of the Communist mode of 
production. In essence, this was resistance towards the ‘grand soir’, with the intention of 
revolutionising the polis, and imposing a set vision of it. This chapter will also identify why 
these resisters were more prone to carrying out violent forms of resistance, arguing that an 
intersectionality of factors needs to be considered between politics and capital in the 
Bourdieusian sense of the word,143 and looks at whether these resisters could be considered 
the subalterns of resistance.   
 Chapter two looks at resisters that preferred to fight the war, initially, by ways of 
propaganda and hearts and minds. Unlike the Communists, these resisters were not aiming 
towards a ‘grand soir’- politically, their allegiances were closer to the Socialists of the SFIO, 
and the political centre. Their inspiration was less the Revolution of 1789, and more the 
Popular Front of 1936, and where the Communists were revolutionary, the resisters in this 
chapter could be seen as being gradualist. As such, they saw the need to carefully prepare for 
what would come after the Liberation, and began to turn their attention towards this as the 
war progressed. This represents the higher echelon of resistance in Upper Normandy, who 
were determined to shape not just the alternative to Vichy, but the succession to Vichy. As 
such, intersectionality will again be used, this time to identify the possible existence of an 
‘aristocracy of resistance’, suggesting that their main aim was to gradually forge the polis.  
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The final two chapters will look at expression politics, or resistance action designed 
principally to express a refusal of both Nazism and Vichy. Chapter three looks at the idea that 
resistance was part of a patriotic struggle- serving the polis. This thesis does not aim to deny 
that many resisters engaged in resistance purely as a patriotic duty. What this chapter does do 
is examine the nature of that patriotism, and how it was constructed and how it manifested 
itself. In this chapter, we will identify the existence of multiple patriotisms. This will 
distinguish between those who resisted for the Republic, those who resisted for the Nation as 
Patrie, and those resisting for France as an adopted country. The gendered nature of both 
patriotism and resistance will also be considered here, and the nature of resistance as a 
manifestation of masculinity and identity, proposing that we understand patriotic resistance as 
part of a process of ‘remasculation’, or a restoration of masculine self-worth to a collective 
mentality, and proof of belonging and service to the polis as part of a process of social 
integration.  
 In order to understand the phenomenon of resistance in French society at that time 
beyond the Resistance, chapter four looks at resistance which did not directly engage with the 
enemy, but which was nonetheless a form of resistance to both Vichyite collaborationism and 
Nazi occupation because it challenged and/or defied their ideologies and regimes by helping 
other resisters, or by aiding the Allies, or by sheltering those who were at risk of persecution- 
a concept this thesis terms as ‘auxiliary resistance’. Their being on the edges means that these 
resisters are sometimes more neglected in resistance history, but this chapter will show that 
these resisters were in fact critical to the functioning of organised resistance, and will show 
that resistance can also be understood not just within the political and the military but also the 
everyday. It will also use an intersectionality of gender, location and age to show that the 
capacity to resist and resistance action was governed as much by environment and 
opportunity as what it was by politics and ideology. This will show that resistance was not 
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necessarily about direct confrontation, but instead could help those in direct confrontation, 
and also undermine collaboration and occupation more indirectly- thereby, this was resistance 
action as aiding the polis. 
Finally, the conclusion will answer the research questions outlined in this 
introduction, arguing that resistance should be redefined and understood as a manifestation of 
the political. This is based in personal and everyday life, framed firmly within the context of 
Aglan & Frank’s Guerre-monde, which affected everyone in wartime France.144 It needs to 
be understood via an intersectionality of factors, situating it within what Bourdieu termed ‘the 
social world’.145 Patriotism was a part of what resistance was about, and it would be wrong to 
ignore it, but resistance should not be seen solely through that prism. Patriotism was not the 
sum of resistance. Michel Baldenweck stated in 2015 that ‘the Resistance was not about 
disobedience, it was about patriotism’.146 But this is a generalisation that is not wholly 
supported by the evidence of resisters testimony, only partly. Jean Basille resisted in Rouen 
in the early years of the Occupation, and stated that for him, entering into resistance was not 
about defending France, but about defeating Germany and fascism.147 Other resisters have 
given motivations that conflict with and contradict with Baldenweck’s ideal-type of an enfant 
de la Patrie that informs his conception of resistance.148 
This thesis argues that if there was a common denominator to resistance, it was that 
resisters resisted because they believed that they were acting for the good of their country as 
they conceived it, their immediate environment, their cité. This involved two forms of the 
political, the politicised political, designed towards the eventual exercise of power, and the 
personalised political, action for oneself and for the common good. Resistance as a whole 
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was not always politicised, yet it was by its inherent nature political, action for, and the 

































 Towards le grand soir: Communism and Resistance 
 
Upper Normandy does not tend to feature highly in histories of the French Resistance on a 
national scale. But where it does feature is at the beginning, in June 1940.149 Etienne 
Achavanne was an agricultural labourer from the Eure-et-Loir. After the exode, he found 
himself in Upper Normandy. Working as a group of labourers charged with the upkeep of the 
Boos airfield just outside of Rouen, on June 20, he cut the phone lines to the airfield, which 
though a civilian base prior to the war (and after it too), was then being used by the Luftwaffe. 
The next day, there was an Allied air raid on Rouen. The kommandantur in Rouen attempted 
to warn the Boos airbase, and to scramble the planes, but was unable to do so. Twenty 
German servicemen were killed, a number of aircraft destroyed on the ground, the airfield put 
out of action for some time. It would not play any part in the Battle of Britain.150 
 Achavanne, according to Alain Alexandre, was denounced by a work colleague, 
arrested, and on June 28, sentenced to death by a German military tribunal sitting in Rouen. 
He was executed by firing squad at Bonsecours, at 5am, on July 4, his death being announced 
by the Kommandantur two days later. He was the first resister in France to be executed.151 
 Despite the best efforts of historians and chroniclers, Achavanne remains an elusive 
figure. He had only just arrived in the Rouen area, so knew virtually no-one- itinerant 
workers tended to keep themselves to themselves. Research in his home village uncovered 
slightly more, but also seemed to reveal more questions than answers. The youngest son of an 
instituteur-sécretaire de mairie, he worked as a farm labourer, having fought in the trenches 
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of the First World War.152 But his death certificate recorded a man who had never married, 
never had children, and was normally domiciled in the same village where he had born.153 
His trial was conducted in German, and as a military tribunal, would not have permitted 
much time for liberty of expression, which would not have exactly been willing to hear anti-
German, pro-French sentiments. It is not known whether he made a final patriotic gesture in 
front of the firing squad, such as singing la Marseillaise or crying out ‘vive la France!’.154 
Equally, there is no certain knowledge of what his motivations were. Speculation has hinted 
that Achavanne might have been incited to do it by a British officer, or was working for the 
British himself. Another version, cited by Raymond Ruffin, states that Achavanne had set 
himself up as a one-man Maquis- he was arrested for trying to resist a German soldier trying 
to confiscate a weapon.155 
 Achavanne’s action was isolated- the angry gesture of a loner. It shows that resistance 
was not necessarily born of the leadership of grand figures such as de Gaulle or Jean Moulin, 
figures for whom documentary evidence and contemporaneous accounts exist in abundance, 
but came, as much as anything, from the ignored of history. Yet it also shows the limitations 
of early resistance- the need for coherence and co-ordination. To write an account of 
resistance in Upper Normandy, it is important to understand the thoughts, actions, visions and 
reflections of individual resisters, both amongst its leaders and amongst some of its humbler 
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The long resistance: Communism in France  
The incident at Boos in June 1940 shows a clash of something much deeper than Nazi 
Germany against ‘free’ French. It reveals a social antagonism, a conflict between exploiter 
and exploited. Although there is no evidence to suggest that Achavanne was a Communist,156 
the struggle between exploiter and exploited was one in which the French Communist Party 
(PC) would have recognised themselves.157  
 The PC had been founded in 1921, after a split with the Socialists at the Tours 
Congress of the SFIO in December 1920. It allied itself firmly with the Third International, 
and over the course of the 1920s and 1930s, became increasingly Stalinist.158 It adopted the 
tactic of classe contre classe, and unlike other political parties, defined itself by its lack of 
capital, hailing the ‘people’ over the ‘elites’.159 What this translated as was that the PC was 
not so much a political movement as a social one. It was a working-class movement that 
sought not merely to capture the institutions of power, but to transform society. To that end, 
the PC at this time was an anti-system movement, and deliberately presented itself as such.   
 In the view of Philippe Robrieux, this would involve a revolution, to be achieved by 
violent means- the opposition of proletarian violence against capitalist violence. The aim 
would be to construct a ‘new Man’ and an ideal society. This was to be achieved via one 
direction (the Soviet Union) and one means (the PC).160 Bernard Pudal saw that the roots of 
this were not politically ideological, but drawing upon social stigmatisation and ostracisation; 
a development, particularly in the 1930s, of ouvriérisme, or ‘workerism’, which strongly 
attached itself to a working-class identity; and the vision of an alternative state and alternative 
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society.161 The words of Gustave Avisse, from a strongly non-conformist and left-wing 
background, who had left school at the age of eleven without qualifications, and went to work 
on the docks in Le Havre at the age of sixteen, convey this sense of ‘otherness’, and of 
viewing the Soviet system of a contemporary Eden. “For us, the USSR was above all a 
country of hope, a country that had succeeded in slaying its bourgeoisie.”162 
There was also a sense of longer-term injustice. Ronald Tiersky and Jean Touchard 
have both identified historical antecedents to the PC- Touchard, the revolutionary 
syndicalism of the Belle Époque,163 whilst Tiersky, writing in the 1970s, saw that the Tours 
congress, and the increasing hostility of the 1920s between Communists and non-
Communists, ‘has successfully continued the schism in the polity that broke open in 1789, 
and which has been renewed repeatedly over the next 130 years in different forms’.164 The 
PC was therefore an alternative Left, intended to be revolutionary as opposed to the 
gradualism of the Radicals and Socialists. 
Robrieux makes reference to the First World War in Communist mindsets, the 
memory of which was still alive and acute in the minds of those who had served in the 
trenches- but also points out the impact of both the Spanish Civil War and the events and 
strikes that brought the Popular Front to power between 1934 and 1936.165 This was reflected 
in the testimonies of former Communist resisters in the Upper Normandy region. Louis 
Eudier, a trade unionist and activist from Le Havre entitled his memoirs Notre Combat de 
Classe et de Patriotes, 1934-45.166 Oral testimonies by Christian Sénard, Gustave Avisse and 
Pierre Jouvin also talk about the 1930s, both in terms of the social struggles of industrial 
action and poverty, and also the political struggles in terms of the clashes of the 1930s and 
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the conflict in Spain.167 The presentation of their resistance was therefore one of something 
deeper than a straightforward Franco-German struggle- it was a deeper and longer struggle. 
Both Sénard and another resister, Jean Basille, talk about the importance of the Communist 
idyll in their vision and their action, and prolonging or continuing previous struggle.168 This 
shaping of the narrative could be seen as refuting the accusation of the Communists only 
resisting after Barbarossa, and the compromising of the Communist position by the Nazi-
Soviet pact of August 1939, but is also indicative of the Communist conception of their own 
engagement- their activities were presented as resistance before the Resistance.  
A final element was praxis, the putting into practice of theory. To this extent, 
resistance was the perfect means to realise this veneration of the Soviet Union and Marxist 
idealism, with the aim being the idea of le grand soir, the idea, dating from the era of the 
Commune, of the moment of profound transformation.169 Resistance by Communists would 
therefore be about praxis, and applying the theories that the party’s pedagogic approach in the 
1930s had expanded upon. This chapter will analyse the evolutions of this praxis in resistance 
over the course of 1940-44, and explain the approach of individual communists, as opposed 
to the Communists as a bloc, to resistance during this period, and how their beliefs and 
backgrounds impacted and shaped their trajectories within resistance.    
 
Accelerating Rhetoric- Communist Resisters, 1940-1941 
Le Havre had already established a reputation in the inter-war years and before for being one 
of France’s most strike-prone cities, a regular scene of industrial unrest, and the source for 
the unrest that occurred in 1936, when a strike in the Bréguet factories rapidly spread to the 
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rest of the country.170 Within four weeks, France had come to a halt. Le Havre was also the 
setting for much social deprivation, with an alarmingly high rate of alcoholism,171 and living 
conditions that were cramped owing in part to the city’s geography, trapped between the sea, 
the Seine estuary, and a steep range of hills to the east, and in part to the tight city boundaries, 
as well as an influx of workers looking to earn a living from the port. In addition to the 
notable implantation of Communist-supporting workers, the city’s politics still witnessed 
tensions from the era of the Popular Front- workers had come out strongly in favour, yet the 
city’s Mayor and Deputy, Léon Meyer, had not stood on a Popular Front ticket, and in July 
1940, during the emergency joint session of the two chambers of parliament at the Opera 
House in Vichy, had voted in favour of suspending the constitution of the Third Republic, 
and granting full powers to Marshal Pétain.172 
 Trade unionism in Le Havre had evolved differently to the rest of Upper Normandy, if 
not France. For whilst Le Havre had a tradition of revolt, trade unionism in the city, ever 
since the wave of strikes that hit the port in 1922, favoured anarcho-syndicalisme over the 
PC.173 The outbreak of the war accelerated this tendency. The Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 23, 
1939, took French Communists, and many others besides, by surprise. The party’s leadership 
in Paris vacillated for three days as to what line to take, only halted by Daladier banning the 
party.  
For André Duroméa, a young activist working as a metalworker, the pact came as a 
total surprise. ‘There was no warning’ he recalled ‘no sign that this was coming. We did not 
understand this pact at all. It didn’t make any sense to us.’174 The PC had, in its own peculiar 
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way, supported the Popular Front just three years earlier, formed to combat the dangers of 
fascism and national socialism. Now, the Communists were being asked to be friendly with a 
country in Germany that was avowedly National Socialist. This was a shift too many for 
many Communists in Le Havre. Members began to tear up their membership cards, and when 
Daladier banned the party, many more were only too eager to sever their ties with the party. 
Then, as France entered the war, and industrial activity began to centre on the war effort, the 
anarcho-syndicalistes shunned the PC, seeing it as the enemy within.175 Whilst Duroméa 
claimed to have no understanding of the pact, many more thought they did. Consequently, the 
underground PC in Le Havre, come the end of 1940, had as few as fifty members, falling 
from several hundred before the pact.176 Those who were once Communist now adopted the 
colours of the anarcho-syndicalistes, purely to keep their jobs and stay out of prison. Even 
Duroméa, who joined the party in 1936, and owed much of his education to it, admitted that 
he had remained a member at this time, but was virtually inactive, having little or no contact 
until the end of 1940.177 
 For Avisse, the role of the PC, and with it, the unions, had always been to defeat 
fascism- he recalled the simultaneous strikes against the far-Right leagues in February 1934, 
and in support of the Popular Front.178 To this end, though he supported the pacifist stance of 
the PC in 1939, he still answered the call-up papers, and fought in the French army until its 
defeat in 1940. Avisse admitted that the reception of the Pact was a very poor one, and that 
even most of those who remained disagreed with it. The leadership of the party’s rump in Le 
Havre instead focused upon the local nature of politics, and what the PC and the 
Conféderation Génèrale du Travail (CGT) had achieved in the city, and tended to espouse 
local causes rather than national ones. Though an illegal organisation, with Vichy 
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unsurprisingly choosing to uphold Daladier’s decree of August 26, 1939, the now-clandestine 
PC, together with the still legitimate CGT, pursued both legal and illegal activities. The legal 
activities were publicly led, albeit without the word ‘Communist’ being anywhere to be seen, 
by Louis Eudier, an activist before the war who worked in the docks, and had gone on strike 
in May 1936. These activities consisted of peaceful demonstrations, usually outside the sous-
préfecture, over social conditions, such as benefits for the unemployed, which Vichy had cut, 
and support for the homeless. There were also disputes over working conditions in the 
factories, against the perceived assault upon the rights won under the Popular Front.179 This 
early resistance was a continuation of the class struggle for Eudier. The demonstrations were 
small-scale, and the target of this early resistance was Vichy rather than the Nazi 
occupiers.180 Nonetheless, the illegal activities were targeted at both.181 Underground 
newspapers, such as L’Avenir Normand, began to appear at the end of 1940, capitalising on 
the first wave of disappointment with the regime- the notorious Montoire meeting between 
Pétain and Hitler, with the now-famous photograph of the two men shaking hands.182  
 The underground press was how André Duroméa became involved in resistance. ‘My 
role initially was the sorting and the distribution of the tracts. We made a master copy, and 
then turned out the copies through a roneograph.’183 Working as a metal-turner, operating the 
roneograph at the necessary speed was not a problem for him. Nor, perhaps surprisingly 
given that in terms of manpower and numbers, this was the PC’s nadir in the city, was 
distributing the papers a major problem. He cited as the biggest challenge at that time 
something altogether more basic. ‘Paper was in very short supply. For each edition, we 
needed 20,000 sheets.’184 This explains why the profession that gave the Francs-Tireurs the 
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most help during this stage of the Occupation, and who were the network’s most useful 
members in Duroméa’s view was lorry drivers- ‘they supplied us with a lot of material, not 
just in terms of weapons but mostly in providing the necessary paper for the tracts’.185 There 
was, however, no question of even sabotage at this time. Louis Eudier recalled ‘our resources 
were just too limited. It was difficult enough with the protests, the propaganda, the running of 
the party… to have effectively organised sabotage would have been giving me too much to 
do’.186    
 Communist resistance in Le Havre was thus firmly entrenched in the tradition of trade 
unionism. This was also the case in parts of the Rouen area- Henri Levillain recalled being 
asked by Paul Lemarchand to reconstruct the Communist base in Rouen firstly in the 
dockyards of the Chantiers de Normandie, and then within the suburb of Grand-Quevilly.187 
In this instance, the clandestine PC was almost indistinguishable from the still legal 
Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT). Their activities and personnel overlapped, but 
there were important nuances- the CGT rooted their activities within le social, the PC within 
la politique. Yet this distinction was one of complimentarity rather than diametrical 
difference- they were two sides of the same coin, motivated by the same desire, as early 
Communist resistance shuttled between the legal and the clandestine.188 
However, Communist resistance elsewhere had a wider set of roots. Philippe 
Robrieux showed that if French Communism at this time had a solid anchoring within the 
labour movements, it also had roots that were more intellectual, within the liberal 
professions.189 Though ouvriérisme was in the ascendancy within Communist circles and the 
structure of the PC, there was also an intellectual strand, distinctly apart from the working-
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class blue-collar ranks of the PC. Though still admiring of the USSR, it was based largely on 
readings of Marx and Engels, and in turn, influenced by the concept of the social sciences- 
what Isabelle Gouarné has called la philosoviétisme, and the development of a French 
interpretation of Marxism.190  This was reflected in Rouen and Dieppe, whereas a counter-
balance to the working-class wing typified by Eudier, Duroméa and Lemarchand, the liberal 
profession wing of Communist resistance revolved around two schoolteachers- in Rouen, 
André Pican, and in Dieppe, Valentin Feldman. 
Pican was a primary teacher in Le Houlme, whose involvement with the PC pre-dated 
the Occupation, and for whom Communist ideology represented the best critique of the state 
that France was in.191 However, for Pican, it was an approach that addressed the everyday as 
much as the elevated. The roots of Pican’s resistance were through what the French might 
term éducation populaire. He gave classes firstly at the Rue des Tranchées in Rouen (which 
according to Jean Basille, were ironically known as ‘catechism classes’),192 then, after the PC 
went into illegality in 1939, in private homes in Sotteville.  
Whereas many Communist-organised classes were about explaining the party line to a 
wider audience, Pican’s were about political awareness more generally.193 His approach was 
that in the wake of the summer of 1940, a national consensus had sprung up around the 
Pétainist myth, reinforced by Vichy’s propaganda, the state-controlled press, right from the 
Journal de Rouen to Radio-Paris, and the values of the National Revolution, a doctrine 
linking back to the triptych of ‘Work, Fatherland, Family’, and which was to be disseminated 
via a number of different channels, including education and the media. If Vichy, and with it 
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Nazism and Fascism, were to be defeated, then it would have to be done by firstly 
deconstructing, and then breaking, the cultural hegemony that it had established over the 
summer of 1940. Only then could the Communists begin to construct their vision of the 
future.194  
From then on, the Revolution could begin. It is telling that for Pican, the Communist 
uprising was envisaged in the terms and language of 1789- he made reference in his diaries to 
an ‘assault upon the Bastilles [sic]’.195 His diaries take a form that reflect uncannily his 
resistance- a passage from cultural critique to action. The action was to free Communist 
prisoners. As Pican wrote “COMMUNISTS IN PRISON, FRANCE IN CHAINS!”.196 In 
Pican’s eyes, the fate of France was irrevocably intertwined with the fate of Communism- 
because, using Marxist ideology, the Communist mode of production was the final 
destination, to progress towards when the old regime collapsed.197 Perhaps the most 
remarkable thing reading Pican’s account, written in 1941, is that in scope, it seems 
remarkably similar to Marc Bloch’s L’étrange défaite, with both works trying to find and 
offer explanations for the disastrous defeat of 1940. Yet neither had knowledge of the other, 
and Pican’s Communism, which begins by announcing ‘a struggle for peace and liberty’,198 
was incompatible with Bloch’s analysis, which was far less strident in terms of ideology, and 
relied more on an evidence-based method of ‘example and fact’.199 Pican saw the ideological 
anti-Communism of the authorities, and their supposed opposition to the ‘people’, as being to 
blame, whereas Bloch looked at the weaknesses of French military leaders. The first part of 
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Pican’s work analyses what took place in 1939-1940, the second part looks at the present 
time (1941), and then the conclusion envisages the day of the uprising.200  
Education was therefore the first step in accelerating towards this vision of the future. 
The second step was propaganda. Feldman, a secondary teacher of philosophy who had been 
at one time the youngest agrégé de philosophie in France, along with a young schoolmistress 
at Avremesnil called Marie-Thérèse Lefevre, started a resistance paper whose title indicated 
the horizons of the Communists- L’Avenir Normand.201 Literally meaning ‘The Norman 
Future’, it strove to widen the messages put across in the classes of Pican and Madeleine 
Dissoubray (the sister of Yvonne), but also strove to offer an alternative commentary on the 
war and on current affairs, which would not be found either in the Vichy-controlled press, or 
in the Free French broadcasts on the BBC, offering a critique of both Vichy and the Nazis.202 
Even before Barbarossa, it was clear that the Communists were striving to create a school of 
thought that rejected both Pétainism and Gaullism, after, of course, having rejected and 
overthrown Nazism.  
The testimony of Pierre Jouvin is telling in this regard- children of PC members 
belonged not only to the Jeunesses Communistes, but also to another youth organisation for 
pre-teens, les pionniers, which was meant to be an alternative to the Christian-based 
Scouts.203 The testimony of Albert Castelli shows that Communists met in their own social 
locations, such as his father Hilaire’s bar-tabac in Petit-Couronne.204 Jean Basille recalled 
that at the école normale, there were marked differences and disputes between those who 
supported the socialist SFIO and those who were communists as early as 1936.205 For many 
of these in the latter category, such as Basille, involved in the PC since 1937, resistance was 
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less about patriotism, and more about ideological cause and defence: ‘If we entered into the 
Resistance, it was not to defend France; it was to defeat Germany, and to defeat fascism’.206 
Right from the early days of the Occupation, the Communists were a breed apart from the 
rest of the French society, outsiders determined to convert others with zeal. This, along with 
the problems and constraints posed by the Nazi-Soviet Pact, explains why the doxa for 1940-
1941 was ‘politics, not weapons’, though Basille claims that the national Francs-Tireurs et 
Partisans (FTP) gave out an order for individual resisters to start collecting weapons before 
Germany’s attack on Soviet Russia in June 1941.207 This claim is reinforced by Duroméa, 
who stated that Organisation Sécrète (OS) was formed in Le Havre in early 1941. Initially, 
the arms collected were very small scale- ‘Nothing very much- just a few pistols’- but down 
on the waterfronts and in the factories, an illicit arms trade was starting to take shape. Over 
the course of 1941, this trade was only to accelerate, and lead to armed resistance.208 
Resistance at this time was therefore not engaged in violent action, but nor were the 
Communists blindly following the orders of their superiors in the hierarchy. Robrieux view is 
that Communists entered resistance before the PC as an organisation did, using the example 
of the miners’ strike of May 1941 in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais, where there were clashes 
between striking miners and German soldiers sent to break the picket lines at the pit heads.209 
Though there was no violent confrontation between Communist resisters as a mass and the 
occupying forces, even in Le Havre, the amount of activity up to this point indicates that 
rank-and-file people within the clandestine PC were not passive within this first year of 
Occupation, and that there were Communist resistance activities in Upper Normandy before 
June 1941. Resistance activity though at this time, if not violent, could be described as 
Gramscian- namely the shunning of violent action in favour of a critique and combat of the 
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socio-cultural hegemony upon which both the Vichy regime and Nazism was constructed. 
This could be seen as laying the groundwork for the idea of le grand soir, and provided the 
foundations for the future development of Communist resistance in the following years.  
 
Towards Action, 1941-1942 
The invasion of Soviet Russia was greeted as a turning point by many Communists, but not 
always a positive one. On the one hand, it opened up the second front, both in the wider 
context of the war, and in the narrower, localised context of the Resistance in Upper 
Normandy. The battle between fascism and communism was now starker and more apparent, 
and the Communists could come more openly into the Resistance as an organised group. 
However, for some, the news was a catastrophe, as it meant firstly that the repression would 
be increased, and secondly, for most of 1941, the news from the Eastern Front was not good. 
The Communists also met with increased repression in 1941, with the arrests of resisters such 
as Eudier, and the first executions of Communist resisters for sabotage in Le Havre, Joseph-
Louis Madec and Léon-Albert Lioust.210 Whilst Alya Aglan has shown that historical 
precedent was a tool much-employed by the Communists at this time, and the parallels that 
they drew between Barbarossa and Napoleon’s invasion of 1812 were not favourable- 
Napoleon reached Moscow in October, Hitler had yet to do so- the testimony of Yvonne 
Dissoubray indicates that this propaganda did not always convince even resisters and 
militants themselves.211  
The intensification of the war meant that a more violent, revolutionary attitude could 
be pursued, with actions such as sabotage, attacks, and robberies. André Pican, though still 
committed to a propaganda war via the mediums of education and culture, established a 
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section of the Front National before the end of June.212 An example of sabotage at this time 
included Quevilly, where a number of communication lines were cut. One of the linemen for 
the Poste, Télégraphes et Télécommunications (PTT) was Louis Jouvin, a leading member of 
the pre-war PC in Grand-Quevilly, who had served as an infantryman during the debacle of 
1940, and had been evacuated from Berck-Plage, eventually being repatriated by way of 
Bournemouth and Bordeaux.213 Rather than stay in England, he chose, along with the rest of 
his unit, to return to France to continue the struggle, and after the armistice, he made his way 
back to Grand-Quevilly, where his family lived, and where he, his wife, and several other 
former comrades revived the pre-war Communist rayon, and began to organise resistance not 
just along the lines of propaganda (an initiative organised mainly by the pre-war party 
branch) but also cutting cables- organised via his postal work.214 The phrase ‘chacun bricole 
dans son coin’ springs to mind, for linemen were highly mobile, and it was an easy way to 
identify which lines were of most importance to communications and infrastructure, whilst 
simultaneously providing an easy excuse for the resisters to cover their tracks.215 This form of 
action enjoyed a certain amount of success in the early years of the Occupation, but from 
1941-1942 onwards, the Nazis required French communities to guard installations that were 
within the boundaries of their communes, which made opportunities for sabotage harder to 
come by for PTT employees. In the case of Louis Jouvin, whose political sympathies were 
not exactly a mystery, and likely as not under some kind of surveillance, he was caught, 
arrested, then sent to Compiègne.216 
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At the same time, the Front National were beginning to make their military presence felt. In 
October 1941, they sabotaged the train tracks at Pavilly on the Rouen-Le Havre train line, 
causing a derailment, and putting the line out of action for some months.217 Then, in 
December, they carried out the first instance of armed action that was intended to directly 
damage life and limb, by attacking a German bookshop in Rouen city centre.218 By bringing 
resistance onto the streets of Rouen, the Front National were very publicly undermining both 
the nature of occupation, via one of its means of cultural diffusion, and also Vichy’s status as 
a bulwark and guarantor, of public security. 
Such a challenge drew a stinging response. Within a week, nine activists had been 
arrested in raids across the Rouen area, including one of Pican’s closest associates, and 
leading member of the Communist-affiliated Union des Femmes Françaises (UFF), a 
schoolteacher called Lucie Guérin.219 Whilst many of those arrested between 1940 and 1941 
for Communist activity were sentenced to just a year or two in prison, or were even acquitted, 
Lucie Guérin was found guilty, sentenced to eight years, and transferred to Rennes to serve 
her sentence.220 The arrests forced Pican and his wife Germaine to go into hiding in Paris, and 
the front page of the Journal de Rouen on December 22, 1941, showed his photograph, along 
with a description, and that of Paul Lemarchand, underlining the threat that they were 
perceived to be to the regime and their idea of public order.221 It was the end of Pican’s 
activities in Rouen. In February 1942, he was arrested, along with his wife, in Paris. Mme 
Pican was sentenced to detention for having aided terrorism, and from there, she was 
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deported to Germany.222 André Pican was found guilty of terrorist activity, and executed by 
firing squad on May 19, 1942, at Mont Valérien.223 
There was also an intensification of the situation in Le Havre. The arms trade of 1941 
that Duroméa evoked was successful enough for the first armed attack to be carried out in 
December 1941, followed by a more daring attack on February 23, 1942, when two 
Communist resisters opened fire on a Kriegsmarine parade.224 The Nazi response was not 
long in coming- two days later, they arrived en masse at the Pont de la Barre, near to the port, 
and went round the working-class district of the city, one of the poorest, dependant 
economically and socially on the port, rounding up anyone who got in their way, arresting 
known troublemakers and raiding houses and properties believed to be housing equipment 
and those wanted by the counter-terrorist brigades. A large number of arrests were made, out 
of whom thirty-two were deported to detention camps within France, and later, the 
concentration camps. They were nearly all sailors, dockers, or factory workers.225 If anyone 
had doubted that this was linked to the class struggle and the socio-economic disputes of the 
previous twenty years in the city, then these doubts were dispelled- leaving the Communists 
with a ready-made audience for their language and rhetoric of class struggle and workers’ 
solidarity.226 The rhetoric of a final struggle, of exploiters against exploited now had a 
tailored audience.  
 This resulted in the formation of a Francs-Tireurs et Partisans (FTP) unit in the city, 
in April 1942.227 From then on, also emboldened by news of German retreat on the Eastern 
Front, they turned its attention in Le Havre towards violent action, as well as sabotage. The 
notorious speech by Pierre Laval on June 20, 1942, where he stated that he hoped for German 
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victory ‘because without it, Bolshevism will be everywhere in Europe’,228 further 
strengthened their resolve, and meant that Vichyist symbols and public buildings were now 
legitimate targets for violent action. Thus, there were two attacks on German soldiers in April 
1942 alone, but there was also an attack on a garage owned by a branch secretary of Jacques 
Doriot’s Parti Populaire Français (PPF) in October of that year, and on December 3, the 
employment office for the Service du Travail Obligatoire (STO) on the Boulevard de 
Strasbourg had a brick thrown through its window, with a hammer and sickle drawn onto the 
brick.229 
 All of these actions were carried out by the FTP, and all had common features: 
brevity, symbolism, violence, and a desire to cause fear amongst the enemy. This becomes 
clear in the oral testimony of Duroméa: ‘The strategy for our networks was clear- we struck, 
then we fled. It was practical- we did not have the means for long guerrilla warfare because 
we simply weren’t strong enough to resist for very long.’230 By strength, he meant not just 
physical, or even numerical, but financial too. Later on in 1942, he became the leader of the 
FTP in Le Havre, after his predecessor, Fernand Chatel, was called to Rouen following the 
arrest and execution of André Pican. He found the biggest problem faced by all resistance 
groups was resources, and in particular, money: 
 
Obtaining money was always a problem. We had no resources because we 
were declared illegal in 1939, and it was a tight era. Eventually, we had 
some 106 members of the clandestine party who were willing and able to 
give financial support. The only problem then was that we couldn’t keep 
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lists of these members and supporters, as we were illegal, and it was a 
breach of internal security. As leader, I was responsible for collecting, 
organising and then distributing the money. I had to have a good memory to 
remember all the faces and addresses of our backers!231 
 
1941-42 saw a shift in the emphasis from Gramscian-style critique (in part because of the 
execution or arrest of most of those who had led the critique in the first year of the 
Occupation) to occasional actions which were more violent and more visible. There was, 
however, a more symbolic value to these forms of resistance rather than a military-style 
planning in the choice of targets- resistance at this stage was more about expressing the 
deeply-felt anger felt by Communist resisters than about leading a guerrilla-style war against 
Nazi occupation with the intention of defeating and overthrowing the enemy, even if that was 
still the long-term aim, along with realising le grand soir. As such, this period can be 
regarded as a transitional phase in the history of Communist resistance in Upper Normandy. 
 
Maquis or not Maquis? Guerilla warfare and insurrection, 1942-1944 
In parallel to the FTP in Rouen itself, a separate cell of Jeunesses Communistes (JC) started 
in October 1940 in Petit-Couronne, where the aim of defeating the Germans was almost, 
according to one of its members, Albert Castelli, a secondary aim. ‘Our first aim was to 
revive the Communist machine, and then we felt that we could defeat the Germans.’232 To 
this end, the JC in both Petit-Couronne and in Quevilly concerned themselves with tracts and 
propaganda between 1940 and 1942.233 
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It would be a combination of factors that would lead this approach to be jettisoned in favour 
of a very different approach. Firstly, the older generation of Communists, who, given the 
nature of Communist social relations and structures that we have already looked at, were 
often the parents, or sponsors, of the younger resisters passing by the JC, had largely been 
arrested. Both Pierre Jouvin and Albert Castelli’s fathers had been arrested and deported, 
whilst their mothers were either on the run, or under close surveillance. André Duroméa’s 
father had also been deported, never to return.234 Secondly, the course of the war had turned 
again by the spring of 1943. Though the Allies’ attempt at a landing at Dieppe had been 
unsuccessful in May 1942, the Wehrmacht had suffered defeats in North Africa, and most 
notably of all, Stalingrad. Thirdly, the STO relève specifically targeted their generation. By 
now having to provide much-needed wages for families increasingly feeling the economic 
hardship of the Occupation, they had become breadwinners. That bread was now threatened 
by a conscription to aid an enemy that many of them had spent much of the last two years in 
some cases resisting, and who they had been brought up to consider, in ideological terms, the 
personification of a diametrically opposed ideology and thought system.  
This coincided with the agreed need for an FTP unit in and around the Rouen area, to 
facilitate their operations in the Seine Valley. Henri Levillain recalled at the end of 1942 
being contacted by Paul Lemarchand to discuss the creation of an ‘action unit’ in the Seine 
Valley, the geographical feature which, as we have seen in the introduction, is key to the 
functioning of Upper Normandy as a territory.235 Added to this was the fact that some of the 
members of the JC were now coming of age, and into the party proper, meaning that these 
resisters needed a new role. The JC had primarily been responsible for propaganda, but in 
Grand-Quevilly, had begun to turn to direct action thanks to the resourcefulness of their 
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leader, Albert Lacour.236 From a family that had belonged to the pre-war rayon in the 
commune, and a metal worker in the docks, Lacour had been in resistance since the summer 
of 1940, was considered to be faithful and able by the local party hierarchy, and had been 
carrying out, where possible, sabotage missions in local factories.237 His attitude impressed 
Chatel, and the latter felt that it was time for Lacour to take on board new missions, and lead 
a group responsible for carrying out sabotage of installations and infrastructure in both the 
area around Rouen, and the Seine Valley, which in parts served as the boundary between the 
two departments of Seine-Inférieure and the Eure, and held a strategic importance for both 
the local economy and the Nazi war effort. The Seine axis was vital to infrastructure, with the 
number of small ferries, or bacs, key to transport, and contained Le Havre & Rouen, two of 
France’s biggest ports.  
Whilst this thesis wishes to avoid any geographical determinism, it should nonetheless 
be stated that it was very difficult to constitute a Maquis unit in Upper Normandy, and in 
particular the Seine-Inférieure. Whilst the Eure, and in particular the west of the Eure, with its 
landscape and sparse population, could lend itself towards a Maquis struggle, the Seine-
Inférieure had several disadvantages. Naturally, it is comparatively flat, with a lack of 
mountains, or anything approaching a mountain.238 There are some woods and forests, but 
nothing on the scale of the Landes or the Ardennes. Demographically, there are a large 
number of small villages, two major cities (Rouen & Le Havre), and a third medium-sized 
city in Dieppe. Finally, the department had a heavy German military presence, especially in 
coastal areas, but also further inland as a consequence of the V1 sites. All of these were cited 
as good reasons by Benjamin Remacle, the leader of the Front National in the department in 
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1944, as to why a Maquis was both difficult and pointless.239 An extra reason, not cited by 
Remacle, might have been that rural Normandy had not been pre-disposed kindly towards 
Communism in the Inter-War years.240 Even within the FTP, it seems that there were doubts. 
André Duroméa recalls the organisation’s leadership in the region tried to discourage 
resisters, in particular young ones, from setting up a Maquis unit, because of the risks 
involved.241  
Barneville-sur-Seine is a small commune in the Eure. Though near to the river Seine, 
it is not on a main road to anywhere significant. To get to the caves in the hillside above the 
village, which overlook the river, there is only one road, which peters out into a track, and 
then a path into a wood.242 Its choice seems to come down to a simple fact- Lacour’s sister 
had married and was living on a farm near to the caves.243 Even the caves themselves were 
scarcely viable for the purposes of running a Maquis- Christian Senard recalls re-visiting 
Barneville many years later, and being amazed that the caves could accommodate as many 
maquisards, and as much ammunition, as they did.244 
 Lacour firstly constituted a group, consisting of eleven young men, including himself, 
mostly from the rive gauche of Rouen, in particular Petit-Quevilly.245 Most had been 
members of the JC, so were already known to him, even to the point of having grown up with 
them- virtually all were fleeing the relève, as only one of them was over the age of 22.246 
They had also tried to form a maquis in the area around the Bois de la Garenne in Sotteville, 
which was short-lived.247 Three more had been FTP in Picardy or in the north-east of the 
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Seine-Inférieure, and were also fleeing the draft.248 The youngest out of the fourteen was just 
18.249 Having constituted a group, and checked that Barneville was a suitable location, in late 
April 1943, Albert Lacour led them out of Rouen, and into the Eure, and into a tunnel of 
caves just above Barneville. Such was the relative remoteness of the location that the 
villagers never saw them. They left exclusively under cover of darkness, except to go to 
Lacour’s sister’s farm to pick up rations.250  
The following month, they recruited possibly their most unlikely member- Rudolf 
Pfandhauser, an anti-Nazi Austrian deserter from the Wehrmacht. Though the exact 
circumstances of how he came to find out the group’s existence are a mystery, he joined them 
in May 1943, convincing them of his genuine anti-Nazi sentiment, bringing his army uniform 
with him, ammunition, and Wehrmacht intelligence.251 Pfandhauser practically became one 
of the leading resisters, after Lacour himself, and was a considerable advantage to the group. 
Not only was he able to inform them as to what installations were of particular importance to 
the occupiers, he was also able to act as a decoy. He would apparently dress up in his 
uniform, and walk behind the other resisters, who would be walking hands above their heads, 
making it seem as though he had taken them prisoner.252 Another way was for him to enter a 
police station, and requisition bikes- on more than one occasion, when it was seen that the 
bicycles were going to people who were neither German nor soldiers, police officers who had 
the temerity to intervene found themselves pistol-whipped.253 
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The motivations were common- opposition to Nazism, opposition to Vichy and both what it 
symbolised and those who symbolised it, a loyalty to their friends and communities, and the 
desire to defeat Nazism as quickly as possible.254 Those who had had pre-war links to the PC 
were also motivated by the idea that they were taking part in the realisation and building of a 
Communist France. However, whilst it may well be concluded that Pfandhauser was a 
pacifist and an anti-Nazi, and therefore in all likelihood opposed to the Anschluss, it is not 
known whether his outlook was as fundamentally Communist as that of Lacour’s for 
example. 
It would seem likely that one way or another, Pfandhauser provided the information 
that led to the biggest single attack by the Resistance on the Wehrmacht in Upper Normandy 
prior to D-Day. On June 18, 1943, the Barneville maquis successfully derailed in the Eure a 
German train full of soldiers and sailors travelling from Cherbourg and Caen on leave back to 
Germany. The train left the rails, four carriages crashed into one another, and a fire broke out. 
24 German soldiers were killed, many more injured.255 
 Actually determining what actions they carried out is complicated. The Vichy 
authorities and the Nazis put out a list in September 1943 in the Journal de Rouen claiming a 
long list of actions, stretching back to the autumn of 1942.256 Raymond Ruffin, in his 1977 
book La Résistance normande face à la Gestapo took this list at face value, claiming that it 
showed the enormous success of the group, and that given the attitude towards censorship in 
the Vichy-controlled press at the time, that this was probably a list that was ‘far from 
exhaustive’.257  The trouble with this source is that it was provided by the enemy, at a time 
when the war was not going well, and when Resistance activity was becoming more 
commonplace. The authorities needed a success to triumphantly proclaim, and appear to have 
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added other crimes in the area where they were operating to the charge sheet. This was seen 
as a way of demonstrating that they had crushed the Resistance in Upper Normandy.258 
However, it was both counter-productive and inaccurate. Firstly, because the Barneville 
Maquis, though highly active, was no more than the tip of the Resistance in Upper 
Normandy; secondly, this inspired other FTP networks, especially in 1944,259 and thirdly, 
because, as Fernand Chatel points out, the group was not fully formed until May 1943.260  
Whilst some of the acts prior to those dates may well have been committed by resisters who 
went on to join the Barneville Maquis (some small, local FTP cells had been helping the 
groups of Duroméa & Leroy in the autumn of 1942),261 they cannot be credited to the Maquis 
de Barneville as a group, because they did not exist. Were the list cited in Ruffin’s book to be 
correct, a comparison over the same time frame would have made the FTP of Barneville both 
busier and more successful than the Maquis FTP brigades of Georges Guingouin in the 
Limousin. This was despite the Limousin providing an environment that was, geographically, 
ideologically and culturally, far more favourable than the Eure, notwithstanding the fact that 
Guingouin’s Maquis, even in 1943, numbered far more than Albert Lacour’s group in Upper 
Normandy.262  
However, in the much shorter timescale identified by Chatel, who was in theory their 
commanding officer (even though Duroméa says that virtually all contact was lost after the 
spring of 1943),263 the Barneville Maquis were, according to him, responsible for 
approximately 50 actions, including arson, theft, sabotage, derailments, attacks on German 
forces (Wehrmacht & Feldgendarmerie) and on the Vichy police.264 Whether or not this is an 
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exaggeration, the Barneville Maquis’ credentials as an active Maquis were certainly well-
established come the summer of 1943.  
This could explain the reaction of the authorities in the summer of 1943. One of the 
maquisards was arrested in Rouen, having been recognised as being part of a hold-up two 
days previously. Having been tortured in the Gestapo headquarters on the rue du Donjon in 
Rouen, he divulged the location of the group.265 The testimonies of those who were arrested 
earlier in the Occupation, such as Jean Basille, Yvonne Dissoubray or Marie-Thérèse 
Lefevre, indicate that arrests were usually carried out by the counter-terrorist brigades of the 
Vichy police, led by Louis Alie, or by the Milice.266 Rarely were the Gestapo or the SS 
heavily involved until much later on in the Occupation, unless there had been a direct attack 
on the occupiers. However, on August 24, 1943, the effort to flush out the Barneville Maquis 
was a co-ordinated one, and one that caught them by surprise. Though Alie was there, and 
nominally in charge, the presence of a deserter, as well as the damage caused by the group, 
meant that whilst there were 100 miliciens et policiers under Alie’s command, they were 
outnumbered and outarmed by the 200 Germans present.267 
 A shoot-out followed, which lasted several hours, punctuated by a number of 
explosions. Albert Lacour & Rudolf Pfandhauser were killed outright. The rest, after running 
out of ammunition, with two of their number wounded, and nowhere to flee to, 
surrendered.268 All thirteen of those arrested were taken firstly to Bonne-Nouvelle prison in 
Rouen.269 After the trials, seven were executed by firing squad, whilst the others were sent to 
Buchenwald, except for Christian Senard. Another former member of the JC, he said that he 
would have been executed as part of the Nazi reprisals against attacks by the Resistance, had 
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he not staged an escape from the prison in November 1943, and rejoined the FTP. The 
escape, as he put it, was not planned, but pure circumstance- he saw a chance to break out 
using the chair in his cell and removing the bars, and duly took it.270  He returned to 
resistance, describing the morning after his escape, and his first moments of regained liberty 
(albeit in clandestinity), as a rediscovery of purpose and of the meaning of existence. His 
resolve strengthened, he duly took part in the Liberation of Rouen in August 1944.271  
 The fate of the Barneville Maquis shows the problems linked to maquisard action. 
Though effective, it was difficult to sustain for a prolonged period of time, for the 
circumstances of the day in Upper Normandy made it difficult to be both an active resister 
and in hiding. André Duroméa, though critical of their approach, tempered this by adding 
‘but one cannot question their bravery and courage’.272 Chatel, writing in L’Humanité in 
1968, also paid tribute to their bravery, and to their ‘intrepid youthfulness’.273 Even Benjamin 
Remacle, critical of the counter-productiveness of prolonged direct action, recognised the 
success of their short existence.274 Yet as Croguennec has pointed out, although the 
Barneville Maquis were far removed from the maquisards of the Vercors, and cannot really 
be compared to them, they do show a certain resourcefulness amongst resisters in the Rouen 
area, and the presence of armed combat, even if it was ultimately limited and doomed to 
being defeated in a battle with the enemy’s forces.275  
The decision to pursue violence as a means to combat Vichy and the Nazis inevitably 
led to a heavy toll in Le Havre as well. There, the FTP killed their first German officer in 
November 1942; predictably a wave of intense repression followed that winter. Jean Hascoet, 
a working-class leader from the docks, was arrested on suspicion of terrorism. He was found 
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guilty and executed by firing squad in 1943. Duroméa, and fellow leaders Gustave Avisse 
and Charles Tinel were forced to go into hiding.276 The new generation of leaders were all 
workers, and all favoured violent action, and even more violent rhetoric. The press, typified 
by publications such as Le Franc-Tireur, now made ever more dramatic references to the 
uprising of 1789 and the Commune of 1871.277 That both historical events, as anyone with a 
basic knowledge of French history from the elementary syllabus of the day knew, involved a 
Germanic power invading France to put down and quell the people (slightly erroneous in the 
case of the Commune it should be said, but not something to trouble the francs-tireurs),278 
was no coincidence. In the fevered climate of 1943-1944 for the Communists, Pétain came to 
represent the ghosts of both Louis XVI and Adolphe Thiers; the Nazis representing the 
Habsburgs’ and Bismarck’s armies. Ultimately, this would be counter-productive for the 
FTP. By May 1944, their desire for revenge and bloodshed would not only lead to their 
leaders being either executed and deported (Duroméa being wounded and captured in a 
shoot-out in early 1944, Jouet arrested in 1943 and then executed as a hostage in August 
1944), but to the local Comité Départemental de Libération (CDL) reining them in.279 This 
partly explains the very small role played by the FTP in the liberation of Le Havre in 
September 1944, which consisted of liberating just a handful of minor infrastructure and 
installations, mostly in the suburbs rather than the city centre.280 
By contrast, the reaction of the Communists in Rouen after 1943 leaned more towards 
prudence. Though sabotage was still very much an activity, and as Benjamin Remacle 
testified, occasional attacks on collaborators,281 the organisation was to have smaller units, 
operating more infrequently, and not living together permanently as was the case with a 
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Maquis. Resisters instead dispersed after their actions, which were in any event more co-
ordinated from this point onwards, with the FTP and Front National in Rouen coming 
increasingly under the orbit of the CDL- even more so after the capture and arrest of 
Duroméa in January 1944.282 Only with the combat for the Liberation in August 1944 would 
Communist resistance in the Rouen area begin to take a semblance of semi-permanence 
comparable to the Maquis de Barneville. 
When Georges Guingouin liberated Limoges in August 1944, he was told by someone 
that his peace was well-earned. He replied that his peace would not come until the day of the 
grand soir.283 The shift towards ouverture, caused in part by the fact that many Communists 
were now in captivity, reveals something similar in Upper Normandy. If liberation was 
achievable, the grand soir was still distant, and violent combat against Vichy and Nazi 
Germany would not deliver it. Whilst violent overthrow had a certain rhetorical appeal, the 
period 1943-44 shows in reality its limitations. The Communists who were left in 1944 would 
either work in small groups, or in co-operation with non-Communist resisters.284  
 
The Countercommunity  
The identities that come through in testimonies are that the Communists were separate from 
the norms of French society, and Norman society, at that time. Their backgrounds were either 
non-religious from the outset, or they rejected religion early on, and were strongly left-wing. 
For those with a Communist background, resistance was too important to be regarded as 
juvenilia. It was associated with ties of kinship and community- except that it was really a 
community within a community. The testimonies of Pierre Jouvin and Jean Basille indicate 
this- his father did not have high opinions of other resisters from Quevilly who were not 
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Communists.285 Resistance amongst Communist sympathisers was also more likely to be 
grounded not just within communities based upon communes, but also upon much smaller 
micro-structures, such as circles of friends, or workshops within factories or dockyards, as the 
testimonies of Henri Levillain and Louis Eudier show,286 as do the studies currently being 
undertaken by Rebecca Shtasel and Michel Croguennec.287  
 The difference between these testimonies and others is even further marked in terms 
of reference points. Whereas many resisters, especially outside of the Communist ranks, 
conceived their action as acting for France, Jean Basille stated that ‘we did not fight to free 
France; we fought to defeat fascism and Nazi Germany’.288 Many of them were inspired by 
the call of July 1940, carried in the clandestine press, from Maurice Thorez, the Communist 
leader in exile, and not the appel du 18 juin of de Gaulle.289 The Gaullists were even 
distrusted- Benjamin Remacle can recall being told to keep well away from the Gaullists, and 
their determination to press on with direct action, even after de Gaulle had called for a halt to 
it in 1941, shows how little they thought of de Gaulle.290 If he was accepted in 1944, it was 
with resignation, and following the party line, which now embraced some sort of co-
operation with other resisters. 
Whereas for many other resisters, the real turning points came elsewhere in the 
Occupation, such as disgust at the reprisals of the German occupiers, or the introduction of 
the STO, for most of these resisters, their motivation came from the earliest moments of the 
Occupation, and even before- there was an emphasis on what could be called ‘resistance 
before the Resistance’. There was a concern with both events within France, and the 
                                                             
285 Author’s Interview with Pierre Jouvin, op.cit. 
286 Eudier, Notre Combat…; Interview with Henri Levillain, op.cit. 
287 Croguennec, op.cit.; Rebecca Shtasel, ‘Syndicalisme et résistance ouvrière à l’usine Bréguet du Havre 1943-
1944’ in Feiertag (ed.), op.cit.  
288 Interview with Jean Basille, op.cit. 
289 Interview with Christian Sénard, op.cit. 
290 Interview with Benjamin Remacle, op.cit. 
81 
 
inspiration of continuing, even finishing, the French Revolution, and also the war in Russia, 
the success or failure of the much-admired Soviet model.291 The balance of home and abroad, 
and the interaction between these two wars and conflicts (the conflict between Nazism & 
Communism and the conflict between Vichy and the Resistance) is vital in understanding 
these resisters and what Reinhart Koselleck termed Erwartungshorizont, or ‘horizons of 
expectation’- the sum of visions of the future based upon the twin domains of hope and 
memory.292 The Communist horizon of expectation was the grand soir, but one that mixed 
both the Bolshevik model and the conclusion that 1789 was a bourgeois revolution, thereby 
inscribing resistance and Communism, as François Furet saw it, within a longer tradition of 
Jacobinism.293  
All of this shows that amongst these acts were the strongest manifestations and 
sentiments of what could be called la mentalité résistante. Emmanuel d’Astier de la Vigerie 
said many years later that he had always felt like a mal ajusté.294 Within the context of what 
was both a conservative society, and subject to the cultural hegemony of the Vichy regime, 
this sentiment of inability to adjust, to fit in, to conform, characterise both the accounts and 
the identities of these resisters. This in its turn led them to carry out actions that marked them 
out most firmly as resisters and as non-conformists, which resulted in an emphasis on more 
violent action.  
This leads to a reflection upon the role of these resisters within the social fabric of 
Upper Normandy. They either had outsider status because of controversial political views, 
such as in the case of Pican and Feldman, or were at the bottom of the social scale because of 
a lack of either economic, cultural or social capital. This lack of capital also reduced their 
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agency, and their capacity of expression, almost bordering upon ‘subaltern status’. An essay 
by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak poses the question ‘Can the subaltern speak?’ This is based 
on the fact that women who committed suicide in colonial-era India by throwing themselves 
upon their husbands’ funeral pyres (a practice known as sati) exist as historical sources only 
via the sources of the British colonialists. They do not exist independently as historical 
sources, agents who can speak for themselves.295 For the likes of Jean Hascoet and Albert 
Lacour, and Rudolf Pfandhauser, violence was the only way that they could speak, the only 
way in a society where democratic rights had been suppressed that they could perform the 
political. 
The irony of this, which would not be lost on readers of Spivak, or of James C. Scott’s 
Weapons of the Weak, is that their existence is thus largely known because of their short-term 
failure- i.e. the fact that they failed to survive the war.296 So ultimately, in histories of 
resistance, which were often dependent on written sources by resistance leaders such as 
Duroméa and Fernand Chatel (whose survival of the war and slightly greater cultural and 
social capital, having benefited from the party’s political education classes and held more 
senior positions within the PCF, gave them a greater agency and greater capacity of 
expression), the subaltern, the most oppressed of the classes, does not speak, or at any rate, 
not for themselves. The question that this begs is that when an agent loses the agency to write 
their own history, do they also lose their voice? Can the franc-tireur truly speak? The 
response, ultimately, is that they do not speak directly. They become characters in the 
interpretations and versions of others. They become a sort of arlèsienne- oft-mentioned, but 
never appearing. Only the survivors truly speak and truly appear. In the writing of history, as 
in this period itself, their role is defined, shaped, and limited by their lack of agency.   
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Writing in the 1970s, Ronald Tiersky defined the French Communists as a 
‘countercommunity’.297 He argued that the ‘countercommunity’ did not truly come into 
existence until 1947, but that the 1930s and the experience of resistance marked a 
foreshadowing of it.298 Whilst Communism was not as well-implanted within France as it 
would be in the post-war period, the experience of Communist resisters in Upper Normandy 
at this time indicates that Communist resistance was a form of ‘countercommunity’, with its 
own set of goals, its own set of visions, its own set of structures and social codes, existing 
and functioning at one remove from the remainder of French society.  
Indeed, resistance, and the sacrifices that accompanied it, became one of the symbols, 
one of the defining factors, of this ‘countercommunity’, both during and after the war. Pierre 
Jouvin lost eight of his comrades either at Barneville, or in Buchenwald.299 Their sacrifice did 
inspire other resisters, as can be seen by the frequent references made by other resisters to 
them in testimony, and there is today a street named in the group’s honour in Petit-
Quevilly.300 Another example of this is the fate of Valentin Feldman. After having resisted 
peacefully for the first year, wrestling between restrained and constraining personal 
circumstances, and trying to make sense of the situation around him,301 he too passed towards 
direct action in 1941, as part of the Organisation Sécrète (OS) in Dieppe. In February 1942, 
he was arrested after a sabotage on a metal factory in Déville-lès-Rouen. Prior to that, his 
resistance activity had caused the death of a German soldier in Dieppe. Consequently, he was 
tried by a German military tribunal, and sentenced to death. He was executed by firing squad 
at Mont Valérien on July 27, 1942. His last words before the peloton opened fire were an 
appeal to his executioners. “Imbéciles, c’est pour vous que je meurs!”302 The giving of life in 
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attempting to construct a better society was an idea that entered the mythology of French 
Communism, and showed that the ‘countercommunity’ had its own martyrs, in a narrative 
that hailed le peuple over le pays.303   
The belief of Communists in resistance as revolution, as a step towards the forging of 
‘new Man’, shows that there was a political engagement that went well beyond the narrow 
conception of la politique, and politics in the sense of polis. Communist resisters, in their 
critiques, actions and expectations went well beyond simple liberation and the exercise of 
power, and towards a profound transformation of society. This vision of the polis was, as 
Alya Aglan has indicated, fixed and definite.304 So what distinguishes Communist resistance 
apart from non-Communist resistance is this very existence of ‘countercommunity’, and 
aiming to impose a set vision of the polis, a goal that went much further than simple 
liberation and defeat of Nazi Germany. In essence, for Communist resisters themselves, 
resistance was not simply about liberation; it was about revolution, and going towards it. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown the origins and developments of resistance amongst Communists in 
Upper Normandy. The origins of resistance, and much of the violence perpetuated by 
resisters during this period, lay in social ostracism and their lack of social capital. Violence, 
both rhetorical and actual, was the only way by which these resisters, whom in relation to the 
paradigm of résistance-organisation could have been seen as ‘the subalterns of resistance’, 
were able to manifest their anger, the only way, realistically, that they could deploy what 
Henry Pickford calls ‘the capacity to resist’.305 This meant that Communism had a ready 
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audience for its vision of a war pitting ‘exploiters’ against ‘exploited’. Communists saw 
resistance as part of a much bigger struggle than France against Germany, a war of causes 
rather than a war of states. This would also explain why, both in terms of rhetoric and in 
terms of testimony, they tended to draw upon historical events in both the distant and more 
recent past. Resistance was simply a continuation of a longer struggle. 
 This ‘long’ resistance, or ‘resistance before the Resistance’, also shows why to 
understand the involvement of Communists in resistance, it is perhaps more accurate to talk 
about ‘Communist resisters’ than ‘the Communist Resistance’. Individual Communists 
entered into resistance well before the PC as a national force and apparatus entered the 
Resistance. As such, this chapter has shown that Communist resistance (i.e. resistance carried 
out by those with Communist beliefs) began well before the Nazi attack upon the USSR in 
June 1941. It is true that it was not as active or as visible in the first year of the Occupation as 
what it was to be later on, but as we shall see in subsequent chapters, this is a characteristic 
hardly unique to Communists. 
Developing from a pre-existing critique of society before the Occupation, Communist 
resisters engaged in a cultural and political critique in 1940-41, before moving more towards 
violent action after Barbarossa, with the FTP becoming a paramilitary wing of the 
Communist countercommunity, until eventually in 1943, the FTP attempted, with the 
Barneville Maquis, to mount a guerilla war against Vichy and the Occupier. The dismantling 
of the Barneville Maquis, and anti-Communist repression elsewhere (in particular Le 
Havre),306 showed the limits of such an active insurrection, and explains the relatively 
marginalised role of the FTP at the Liberation. 
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Robert Paxton wrote of resistance that ‘there lay the division between those who wanted only 
to chase the Germans out and those who wanted also to change French society root and 
branch.’307 At the outset, Communists found themselves at the far end of the latter. They 
were, until events in 1944 made them, as far as Upper Normandy was concerned, too weak to 
function alone, and at times even marginalised within the larger make-up of the FFI in the 
Liberation, a ‘countercommunity’ that was committed to revolutionising the polis and 
imposing a set idea of la cité. In the same way that in the 20th century more widely, 
Communism represented the revolutionary element of French politics,308 we can see that in 
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An aristocracy of resistance? Gradualism and Resisting 
 
We have seen in the previous chapter the nature of resistance amongst Communists, which 
was guided by both a firm vision and conception of resistance. This, though, was not 
universally true either of the Resistance, or even of left-wing resisters. Violent resistance 
action was likely to provoke equally violent reprisals, as we have seen not just in chapter one, 
but also in looking at the Occupation in other parts of France, such as Nantes and the reprisals 
after the assassination of the Kommandant, Otto Hotz.309 But there was also a critique of the 
position of Communists. As the clandestine newspaper Libération phrased it in January 1941: 
 
Friends have asked us to make clear our position in relation to communism. 
It is simple. For us, there is no communism. On the one hand, a Head of 
State, Stalin, and his people, who are pursuing an essentially Russian 
policy, for the moment Germanophile. On the other hand, in France, several 
thousand imbeciles who call this policy ‘Universal Socialism’, and expect 
from Stalin bread, peace, liberty, and much else besides. For the French, no 
problem. If they are enamoured by social progress, they are not expecting a 
socialism imported from Russia; if enamoured by liberty, they do not 
expect from Stalin their liberation. In both cases, they are counting above 
all on themselves. 310       
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The critique of the PC as being dominated by Russia was a powerful one in the early part of 
the Occupation, but also, as Ronald Tiersky has shown, a successor to the schism in left-wing 
polity perpetuated since 1789.311 As such, rather than divide left-wing resistance into 
‘Socialists’ and ‘Communists’, this thesis prefers to view the division as being between 
‘gradualists’ and ‘revolutionaries’. This follows a similar pattern to that of Alya Aglan, and 
the divide between planificateurs and accélerateurs- the former believing that resistance was 
something that had to be carefully planned along with a slow forging of the future, whilst 
accélerateurs believed in more violent action in order to advance towards a set vision of the 




In his 1996 work La France à l’heure allemande, Philippe Burrin put forward the concept of 
‘accommodation’ to describe the reaction of the French population to the German occupation. 
It was used to describe an attitude of neither collaboration nor resistance, merely continuing 
daily existence with the occupiers.313 
Shortly after the defeat of 1940, it became clear that the liberation of France was not 
likely to arrive any time soon- something recognised by Tony Larue when he said in 1985 
“We knew that Britain would not be liberating us soon, and neither would America. It was for 
that reason we distrusted de Gaulle.”314 The resulting dilemma was neatly summed up by 
Larue, who stated that the now clandestine SFIO took the decision not to show any dissent 
openly towards the German occupiers, as there were such a huge number of Frenchmen being 
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held prisoner in Germany.315 For Larue, France in 1940 was a divided society, coloured by a 
generation clash between those who had survived the war of 1914-1918, and those who were 
younger, and did not remember the previous conflict.316 Furthermore, those who might have 
seemed obvious candidates to lead resistance were being closely watched. Larue believed that 
both the mairie in Grand-Quevilly and his own home were under surveillance. When pressed 
in 1985 as to whether or not his attitude, and that of the population at large, was one of 
indifference in the early years of the Occupation, he responded that “The political situation 
[of that time]- as well as the cultural and social situation- was one of the utmost 
prudence…not indifference”.317  
 This prudence also seems to have informed Marcel Baudot in the Eure. Baudot was 
one of the department’s most outstanding civil servants. He had been sent to Evreux in 1925 
to oversee the running of the archives départementales as chief archivist, after graduating 
from the Ecole Nationale des Chartes in Paris.318 His influence had already extended to re-
organising the archives, and overseeing its move into a new purpose-built building, chosen 
specially by Baudot, in 1937.319 He had regular contact with politicians and officials at the 
departmental level. His post did not have regular contact with the German occupiers, but he 
was a relatively well-known figure within Evreux, and his absence would have been noticed. 
Therefore, he remained in his post, and as a civil servant, took the oath of obedience to Pétain 
in late 1940.320 Simultaneously though, he appears to have begun planning ways of dissent 
against the Vichy regime, to plan the undermining of the new order from within. For 
example, from the autumn of 1940 onwards, Baudot, with the help of one or two others, 
began to identify and collate documents with the local administration of the Eure that might 
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be useful to the German occupiers from a military perspective.321 These documents were then 
separated from other documentation, both before and during the archiving stage, and hidden 
away from the normal administrative repositories where such documents might be expected 
to be found.322 
Remaining in post, seemingly supportive of the Vichy regime, and accommodating, if 
not supportive, of the Occupation, is not an uncommon aspect of some resisters. Michel 
Corroy, of Darnétal, remained a police inspector, coming into contact through his work with 
Louis Alie, a fellow inspector, who quickly became responsible for the ‘counter-terrorist’ 
brigade in the Seine-Inférieure. Corroy pledged allegiance to the maréchal, in his capacity as 
a civil servant. So too did Jean Capdeville and Georges Brutelle, both instituteurs. The latter 
pledged his oath after he had begun his resistance activity, by collecting ammunition left 
behind in the Allied retreat earlier that year.323 Realistically, given the amount of surveillance 
that the teaching profession was under (police, school inspectors, colleagues, parents), overt 
resistance at this stage would, as Larue hinted, have been counter-productive in the long term. 
The testimony of Paul Le Goupil shows that though the teaching profession had a merited 
reputation for supporting the Left, there were plenty of Vichyites and pétainistes inside it 
during the Occupation to make prudence the best course of action. This was particularly true 
in Le Goupil’s case, who was a young trainee, and then a probationary teacher, dependant on 
the favourable opinions of inspectors and directeurs d’école to secure a teaching post, and the 
social status and guaranteed pension that came with it.324 
 None of the resisters wanted Nazism and a German occupation of France, and very 
few wanted Pétain. In Larue’s opinion “he was never a republican, but a soldier, who 
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favoured order before all else”, and Larue’s conviction from the outset was that Pétain was 
partly to blame for the bloodshed of Verdun in 1916- and that with him receiving pleins 
pouvoirs in 1940, “a second Verdun”, of whatever kind, seemed “certain”.325 There was thus 
this twin rejection of Nazism and Vichy’s National Revolution, and yet it was impossible to 
deny its existence. This situation meant that there was little that could be done to defeat it 
immediately, in the short-term. The only way that it could be beaten, in their view, was in the 
long-term, and that meant adopting long-term tactics, such as undermining, limiting and 
sabotaging the État français and its initiatives, and likewise the Nazi war effort.  
For both Tony Larue and Raoul Leprettre, there was also a twin rejection of both 
Catholicism and Communism. Tony Larue described Communism as being ‘too rigid’, but 
also considered himself a révolté, appalled by social injustice in Quevilly, and the lack of 
ability on the part of the Church to address this.326 For Leprettre, there was a rejection of 
Communism for its inability to comprehend the market economy, but also a recognition that 
the economy needed to be fairer, and needed a greater degree of central planning, and less 
laissez-faire liberalism.327 This was shaped in part by his travels in 1930s Scandinavia, where 
the Nordic model of social democracy that would dominate the 20th century history of those 
countries was beginning to take shape. In Leprettre’s case, a lack of strong political beliefs 
seem to have been added- though a member of the SFIO, he said that he was only ever active 
at election time, and although a freemason since 1937, and belonging to the same lodge as a 
number of city councillors (including the future mayor under the Vichy regime, Maurice 
Poissant), he disapproved of the mixture between freemasonry and politics as undemocratic 
and “not [fitting] my conception of freemasonry”.328 
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Though they may have seemed the embodiment of the status quo, tending to be in privileged 
positions (Larue was elected Mayor of Grand-Quveilly in 1935, and was a qualified chartered 
accountant, Leprettre a manager within a printing firm), this appearance concealed a critique 
of those in powerful positions. If there was an event which reinforced this perception, it was 
the experience of 1936, and the twin events of the Popular Front and the Spanish Civil War. 
For Tony Larue, there was a clear link between the two: 
 
Of course the bourgeoisie supported Franco and the fascists… It supported 
their interests… They were opposed to the Popular Front in France, as they 
were in Spain…  Francoism was the forerunner to Nazism, to Vichy.329 
 
Another person who went on to play a considerable role within the Resistance in Upper 
Normandy who was appalled by the events in Spain was the Head of the Ecole Supérieure de 
Commerce in Rouen, Césaire Levillain. Levillain organised collections for Spanish refugees, 
and aid for those fighting for the defence of the Second Spanish Republic. In the view of 
Raoul Leprettre, Levillain was a humanist, who was sympathetic to the Soviets and, in 
principle, the PC (or at any rate, more so than either Larue or Leprettre), but whose 
humanism was grounded in the Declaration of the Rights of Man rather than Marx and 
Engels, the values of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution as opposed to 
Communism and the Russian Revolution.330 Like Larue, he seems to have viewed the events 
of Spain as a harbinger of what might come to France.  
 Consequently, we can see that gradualist resisters positioned themselves as a sort of 
‘third force’. The ‘resistance against’ of these resisters identified two enemies- firstly 
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Nazism, which posed a threat to French values and French sovereignty, then the moral and 
social conservatism of Vichy. But it also saw a further danger- that of Communism, which 
they viewed as a threat to France firstly by its alliance to Nazism, and also by its ideological 
rigidity, and also judged that their tactics were too violent to achieve a peaceful 
transformation of society (seeing the contradiction in the avowed aim of ‘violence to end 
violence’) but also the conservatism of de Gaulle. Gradualism was built therefore on a triple 
refusal- of Nazism, of conservatism, and of Communism. Though of course this did not 
translate into actual ‘resistance against Communism’, their very existence and resistance 
against both occupation and collaboration would establish them as a clear alternative to the 
Communists. This ‘triple refusal’ was at the heart of the aims of gradualist action, which 
believed that the defeat of both occupier and collaborator could only be achieved over a 
passage of time. 
 
Starting resistance: 1940-41   
But although Tony Larue may not have entered into resistance until later on, others were 
beginning their trajectories in 1940. Marcel Baudot has already been cited (though his actions 
in 1940 could be seen as being less about resisting and more about not collaborating), but 
there were other examples too. On a sunny Sunday in July 1940, ten friends gathered in an 
apartment on the rue Léon Malétra in Petit-Quevilly. Ostensibly, had a police officer passed 
by and enquired as to the nature of the meeting, the reply would have been that a group of 
friends were celebrating the forthcoming end of the school year, or enjoying Sunday lunch. 
This concealed, however, an earnest discussion about what had befallen France, and what 
could be done. The apartment was rented by Georges Brutelle.331 From Picardy originally, 
and working-class in origin, Brutelle gained his certificat d’études in 1935, aged thirteen. 
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From there, he went on to the école normale in Rouen in 1935, and joined the SFIO. He 
helped with the 1936 election campaign, and was an activist within the normale right through 
until 1940. Just too young to be called up, he had only experienced the defeat from a civilian 
perspective.332  
 Brutelle’s aim was to bring together all those that he knew within the SFIO cell at that 
time, as well as others who might be sympathetic, and discuss firstly how France had been 
defeated.333 The causes of the defeat as diagnosed by Brutelle and his friends lacked the 
perspective that Marc Bloch had (who was engaged in precisely the same exercise at around 
the same time, with the writing of L’étrange défaite), as none of them had been on the front 
line, but the idea of a country that had failed to modernise was one that they were broadly in 
agreement with. From this, there was an agreement that Vichy, and the reactionary Marshal 
Pétain, was not the direction that France should be taking.  
These consensuses were easy enough to reach. De Gaulle himself in London held both 
views. But Brutelle states that he and his friends were not at this time Gaullists. Where was 
the difference? The difference was post-Vichy, and what should follow once Pétain had been 
removed from power. Brutelle and his friends were for a ‘New Popular Front’. “We desired 
the attachment to ideals, to the great figures of socialism”.334 For Brutelle, who had cut his 
political teeth in 1936, the Popular Front was unfinished business. This was shared by his 
fellow friends, eight of whom were normaliens like him. The only exception was Brebion, 
who was also from Grand-Quevilly, but who was a docker, and had been a fellow member of 
the SFIO.335 
 The next question was by far the most difficult to answer. What could be done? Léon 
Blum was under arrest, accused of being one of those responsible for the defeat. The one 
                                                             
332 Interview with Brutelle, op.cit.  
333 Ibid. 
334 Interview with Brutelle by Lancestre. Cited Lancestre, op.cit, p.5. 
335 Lancestre, op.cit., p.3. 
95 
 
SFIO deputy for the Seine-Inférieure, René Lebret, had voted in favour of Pétain in the 
extraordinary session at Vichy earlier that month.336 Even the one parliamentarian for the 
department who had voted against pleins pouvoirs, Octave Crutel, was a Radical who was 
actually a Pétainist- he simply opposed the dissolution of the legislature, and presumably the 
accompanying loss of a part of his salary.337 Pierre Mendès-France had fled to North Africa. 
Tony Larue was still an inexperienced politician at this stage, and as we have already seen, 
unwilling to do anything that might provoke a chain reaction. The culte maréchaliste was at 
its apogee. In the face of this, Brutelle and his friends could not even agree on a name for 
their group.338 The only thing that could be agreed upon was that there should be no direct 
action for the time being, as that would be counter-productive, and unnecessarily endanger 
themselves. But neither was doing nothing, the course of action that Larue and others seemed 
to be favouring, an option. The only option that seemed open was propaganda. So the 
meeting broke up, with a loose agreement to resist in some way, to do something, but no-one 
was terribly sure what, how, or really who for.339  
 The meeting could be seen as the roots for what one might call the Socialist resistance 
in Seine-Inférieure- if it were not for the fact that the SFIO was actually moribund at this 
time, and that considering the fact that the SFIO had largely voted for pleins pouvoirs in July 
1940, ‘socialist resistance’ may seem like something of an oxymoron- 340 but the truth is that 
little tangible came from this meeting. What the meeting tells us is that in the first weeks and 
months of Vichy and the Occupation, the desire and decision to resist posed more questions 
than answers for all but the most dogmatic of resisters. Much resistance action focused 
around individual acts at this time for those not belonging to Communist networks. Brutelle, 
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it seems, had started to collect leftover weapons in the autumn of 1940, yet he himself stated 
that it was not done with any great purpose or intention until 1942- and then only to carry out 
sabotage.341 
 The slightly hesitant, not terribly co-ordinated approach to resisting is a characteristic 
of much of the résistance nébuleuse at this time.342 In Nonancourt, a small town at the very 
southern tip of both the Eure and Upper Normandy, an account written by the town’s leading 
resister, Dr Raoul Dauphin, describes resistance as “early, active, and solidly organised”.343 
The events described in the account that follows show that whilst all three of those 
descriptions were to some extent true, they were not necessarily simultaneously true at the 
same time.  
In late 1940, a small group of men, who could have been qualified as notables within 
the community of Nonancourt, began to meet in private to discuss the political and military 
situation, both locally and nationally. These conversations, after a few months, began to turn 
towards the need to do something about the Occupation, whilst naturally recognising that 
there was little that Nonancourt itself could do, and that there was no real alternative that they 
could propose for the time being. “The only combat to pursue was the battle of ideas” was 
how it was justified retrospectively in 1947.344 Consequently, the group, though still without 
a name, produced propaganda that discouraged efforts in favour of helping the German war 
effort.345 The propaganda appears to have had some success in undermining morale and 
encouraging disenchantment with both the Nazi war effort and the Vichy regime.346 
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But for two years their resistance virtually never went beyond that, and there was no 
organised collection of weapons until 1942, and in any event, there was never enough to arm 
everyone in the group, even when the numbers were only in single figures.347 For virtually all 
of the Occupation, violent confrontation was something gradualists considered to be a 
suicidal option, one guaranteed to result, sooner or later, in bloodshed, unless highly planned, 
and well-calculated. 
An example of this attitude towards violence comes from the only instance in 
Nonancourt of an action deliberately designed to harm German forces rather than irritate or 
hinder them. Dr Dauphin stressed that it had nothing to do with this early group collectively, 
but was planned and carried out solely by one member, a local engineer called André Pone. It 
occurred in July 1941, at a Luftwaffe base at St-André. Pone sabotaged the switch box so that 
it failed- before coming back on again, and then, a few minutes later, failing again. It would 
have seemed as though the box was tripping out, but would not have seemed like an obvious 
sabotage to the ground crew. During one of these power cuts, three German bombers came in 
to land. The third one failed to stop in the darkness, crashed into the other two, and caused a 
huge explosion and ensuing fireball that also damaged other aircraft on the ground. Thirteen 
airmen were killed, several auxiliary ground crew suffered smoke inhalation and/or burns.348 
It seems that the Luftwaffe did not suspect deliberate sabotage. There is no record of 
reprisals in the area at the time, or in Evreux.349 However, at no other point during the 
group’s existence was any equivalent activity undertaken, even after D-Day. The group’s 
later structure meant that even countenancing such action was not considered seriously.350 As 
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action widened, it became more planned, and the more planning meant the greater the danger 
to a larger group of people. Ultimately, this instance was an exception that proved the rule 
with regards to the approach of gradualists towards violent combat at this time.  
The gradualists and resistance at this time was usually much about refusal- from its 
genesis and even before, one can detect a ‘triple refusal’- but less in the way of concrete 
action. The opportunities for action from a gradualist perspective were few and far between, 
because although they knew what they were resisting against, their visions of a post-
occupation society were unclear, in part due to the absence of any convenable major figures, 
either nationally or even locally, and in part because of the nature of the war and the ‘sur-
occupation’ in Upper Normandy. Although ‘resistance against’ was clear at this stage, 
‘resistance towards’ was less certain, and there was little ability to manifest resistance into a 
coherent ‘resistance as’ at this stage. The lack of full development of the full range of what 
Henry Pickford has called ‘criteria of resistance’351 meant that for the gradualists, the early 
resistance of 1940-41 was restricted and frustrated by both the force of the enemy and by 
their own shortcomings.  
 
A War of Hearts & Minds? Resistance Propaganda & Action, 1941-42 
1941 saw two developments- the entries of both the Soviet Union and the USA into the war. 
For Tony Larue, the situation had begun to seem desperate. A Nazi defeat of Soviet Russia 
would have closed down the second front- seen as the only way to defeat Germany. Larue 
admitted that as Germany penetrated deeper and deeper into Russian territory, he began to 
make contingency plans: 
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The news from Russia was getting worse every day… From some of my 
contacts, I began to enquire about going to Argentina. When I was at 
school, I had learnt some Spanish, and could speak the language a little. My 
wife could not- I did Spanish, she took English, but I can hardly speak 
any… Well, we discussed it, and I looked into the possibility… and it 
would be possible, eventually, to work in my field… Not straight away, I 
would have taken any work I could to start with on arriving, but we knew 
people who had settled in Buenos Aires, and we would have gone there first 
of all, and from there…352 
 
Larue had privately been critical about de Gaulle fleeing to England in 1940, yet 
approximately eighteen months later, he was considering uprooting himself and his step-
family to the southern hemisphere.353 The idea seems far-fetched, and how Larue thought that 
he could have maintained the cause of resistance in Buenos Aires is not something he 
explains- nor was it something he was asked by the interviewers carrying out his interview in 
1985. Larue used the story, he said, to illustrate just how low morale amongst resisters had 
become.354 By now, he no longer had public service to worry about- the decree of 1941 had 
resulted in the prefect sacking Larue as mayor of Grand-Quevilly, and replacing him with 
someone more obedient. Larue continued to work as a chartered accountant, which became 
his front, with resistance firmly remaining a clandestine activity. Though no longer burdened 
by electoral obligations, full-time clandestinity within France was still not an option that 
appealed to him.    
                                                             





The effects of Barbarossa were particularly traumatic on those who had belonged, prior to 
1940, to the SFIO. Though many cited here had been Socialists, or of a socialist leaning, 
there was never a ‘socialist resistance’ as such. When the PC was outlawed in 1939, the SFIO 
did not pick up any disaffected ex-Communists.355 When Marshal Pétain convened an 
extraordinary joint session of parliament in July 1940, most of the SFIO parliamentarians 
who took part voted in favour of pleins pouvoirs.356 Barbarossa saw ‘bolshevism’ become the 
enemy- and some of the individuals who belonged to the SFIO prior to 1940 decided that the 
old maxim of ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’ counted here. Whilst Larue was sacked in 
Grand-Quevilly, his former fellow SFIO mayor, René Lebret, in Elbeuf, remained in post, 
and supported the Vichy regime.357 According to Larue, many former Socialists followed 
him.358 It was an added difficulty for resisters to contend with. 
 Another difficulty was material conditions. The small group of resisters who met at 
Georges Brutelle’s flat in Grand-Quevilly became more organised, and began to identify 
more strongly with a national network called Libération-Nord, a network of socialist-leaning 
resisters. Drawing upon the regular discussions of politics that took place in private, they 
began to produce a newspaper called Jaurès, which appeared for the first time in February 
1941.359  
 The editorial line of Jaurès was not one that reflected the majority of French opinion 
in 1941. Those who contributed were almost exclusively instituteurs or training to join the 
teaching ranks.360 In some ways, its outlook was quite parochial. After the closure of the 
école normale in 1940 by Vichy, there remained the problem- what to do with those training 
                                                             
355 Interview with Larue, op.cit. 
356 Robert Paxton, Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order (New York, Columbia University Press, 1972), 
p.41. 
357 Lecouturier, op.cit., p.219. 
358 Interview with Larue, op.cit,; Interview with Georges Templier, ADSM AV09/084, 1981. 
359 Georges Touroude, Les Braconniers de l’espèrance (Royan, Editions de la Langrotte, 1995), pp.48-49. 
360 Letter from Georges Brutelle to Claude-Paul Couture, August 3, 1987. Cited in Couture, op.cit., p. 11. 
101 
 
to be teachers? Vichy’s solution was to integrate them into the lycée system. Ironically, this 
was a solution in line with some of the more radical elements of the Third Republic (the 
Popular Front Education minister Jean Zay had envisaged the baccalauréat as compulsory for 
all instituteurs),361 but at the time, it created tensions. The normaliens were incorporated into 
Lycée Corneille, where they were ‘tolerated’.362 The school was already overcrowded, and 
suffering from material shortages, and the welcoming of teenagers from mostly working-class 
backgrounds was not a popular proposal.363 The memoir of Georges Touroude and the oral 
testimony of Bernard Lawday indicate an environment of political tension, divided between 
those hostile to Vichy, and those who fervently supported it.364 Consequently, the paper spent 
most of its space attacking not the Occupation, or even Nazism, but the Vichy regime and the 
révolution nationale.365 
To understand the Vichy regime and its internal workings and how it managed to 
govern with the consent, or perhaps the indifference, of the population, and to understand the 
difficulties faced, the concept of ‘hegemony’, as defined by the Italian anti-fascist thinker 
Antonio Gramsci, needs to be understood. Gramsci used this concept to explain a position of 
dominance by an elite (which in 1920s Italy, tacitly meant the fascist regime of Mussolini) 
not just from a political perspective, but also considering cultural, economic and social 
factors.366 Vichy never created a single governing party in the way that other fascist and 
totalitarian regimes did. Instead, the regime rested entirely upon le culte du maréchal. This 
personality cult saw Pétain everywhere- street names, currency, stamps, busts, sports 
trophies, to name but a few.367 The de facto national anthem was called ‘Maréchal, nous 
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voilà!’. Pétain appointed not just all ministers, and had the right to name his successor, but 
also all civil servants, who pledged allegiance to him. Children read comics about him, 
bottles of Burgundy wine and roses were named after him.368 The regime had a degree of 
cultural hegemony that was almost unprecedented in living memory. It controlled all of the 
radio, local and national newspapers, the cinema, publishing, education and of course, the 
state propaganda machine. Resistance, already a difficult cause, was not helped by directly 
taking on what seemed to be the regime’s main trump card- Pétain himself. Le culte du 
maréchal was the myth upon which Vichy built its political, social, cultural and moral 
legitimacy.369 Though some were scornful of Pétain, the vast majority of the French 
population were not. His personal popularity long outlasted that of the Vichy regime- even in 
1944, he was greeted by cheering crowds upon his visit to Rouen.370 
But from the outset, the language of Jaurès was not only disrespectful, but violent.371 
The virulence of these attacks though would have likely shocked many readers who did not 
belong to the social circles in which many of these resisters moved, and it is difficult not to 
conclude that much of the paper’s content was a mixture of crude rhetoric, meant deliberately 
to shock and preaching to the already converted. But there was also a defence of the values of 
the Popular Front in the face of the ‘National Revolution’, and it is interesting to note the 
outlining, even in 1941, of a ‘nouveau front populaire’, to be engaged in the common 
struggle against Nazism.372 It would be another two years before Jean Moulin would achieve 
something along these lines at the national level, with the foundation of the Conseil National 
de la Résistance (CNR). Even in resistance circles though, this call for unity fell on deaf ears, 
and in the end, even Brutelle found limits. From late 1941 onwards, he opposed unifying with 
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the Communists because of their use of physical violence- which he considered ‘unjustified 
and unbeneficial’, as opposed to the verbal violence of the clandestine press.373  
Engaged in the battle of ideas, it seems that Brutelle was fighting much of the same 
terrain as André Pican and his political education classes. But the developments of the war 
around them meant that the early hopes for unity were dashed. More and more normaliens 
and lycéens were attracted by the more strident rhetoric of Communist-leaning networks, and 
Jaurès found itself isolated- too virulent for the mainstream, and too hollow for many in the 
Resistance underground counter-culture.374 Numbers and finance became a problem, and the 
inevitable problem of paper also bit. With less people being willing to draft and print the 
paper, and material scarcity increasing, the regularity of publication became erratic, and 
eventually, the paper ceased publication after less than a year of existence. The group around 
Brutelle, who was now in a teaching post, concentrated on tracts and posters instead.375 
Though Barbarossa was, as we have seen in chapter one, a turning point for resisters 
on the revolutionary Left, it would appear that it was less so for gradualist resisters. This was 
in part because of the distance that they kept from Communist resisters, but also because of 
their ongoing difficulties in finding an effective means of resistance. Although in 1941-42, 
they had begun to find and establish a common purpose around the idea of a ‘new Popular 
Front’, they were still finding it difficult to find a form of expression- in essence, though they 
now had a ‘resistance towards’ to accompany ‘resistance against’, their ‘resistance as’ was 
still unclear. An examination therefore of gradualist resistance in the period 1940-42 reveals 
the difficulties in establishing an effective ‘third force’ both in resistance and amongst the 
French political spectrum as a whole. It may also help to explain why when referring to this 
period in his speech at the Panthéon in December 1964, André Malraux called it the ‘pre-
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history’ of the Resistance- a period when many resisters may have felt the will to resist, but 
had not yet found the necessary means. Whilst the gradualists at this time did not collaborate, 
their stance during the period of 1940 to 1942 seems to have oscillated between an 
‘accommodation’ of sorts and covert displays of resistance. 
 
Towards a co-ordination of resistance: 1942 
These first two years show the roots of a left-wing, non-Communist resistance in Upper 
Normandy. They also show the difficulties that they encountered, quite apart from the 
repression of both Vichy and the Nazis, in being effective. Finding a message and finding an 
audience receptive to that message were matters that were far from straightforward. In order 
to achieve either (and both), it became clear that two characteristics were needed above all- 
organisation and co-ordination.  
So in 1942, throughout Upper Normandy, the planification of resistance in Upper 
Normandy began. The two figures essential to this were Césaire Levillain in the Seine-
Inférieure, and Marcel Baudot in the Eure. Levillain had been Principal of the Ecole 
Supérieure de Commerce in Rouen. However, in 1941, he had been revoked from his post for 
his political leanings. To Tony Larue, this was not a surprise: “Levillain’s colleagues wanted 
him out ever since 1940- they had been bought by the Germans in 1936, and they were all 
pro-Nazi, pro-Vichy, Francoist”.376 Levillain earned a living giving private lessons in English 
after his dismissal, but his dismissal did allow for more time to resist. Described as a 
‘humanist republican’, his contacts made him an excellent choice to set up a resistance 
network. He had trained as, and been, an instituteur, so had contacts within the teaching 
profession, but also had contacts within the local business community and industry as a 
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consequence of his work, and also on account of his freemasonry.377 He also had an 
international perspective- the school had links outside of France, and he had seen at first-hand 
the consequences of the Spanish Civil War. He therefore appreciated that liberation was not 
going to be achieved in France alone, and believed that resistance would require working 
with the Allies.  
At the end of 1942, he founded not one, but two resistance networks.378 Libération-
Nord consisted of propaganda and sabotage. The sabotage element was led by Brutelle, and 
also involved Jean Capdeville, who had engaged two mechanics with a view to carrying out 
sabotage in 1941- though actual sabotage did not begin until later the following year, the 
targets being principally vehicles that were used by the occupiers and by the Vichy regime. 
Cohors-Asturie was officially separate- it was charged with evasion and intelligence, and had 
the most contact with England. This was led by Levillain himself (who was also in charge of 
Libération-Nord) and by Raoul Leprettre.379 However, as Leprettre noted, the two did not 
have much separating them, and as well as sharing a leader, they also shared members- most 
of the members in one were also in the other, and Brutelle was a member of Cohors-Asturie, 
but as opposed to Libération-Nord, he did not hold a leadership position.380      
In 1941, Marcel Baudot had founded a network of Libération-Nord in Evreux, along 
with a headteacher called Auguste Azémia and an engineer called Leon Larouge.381 But until 
1942, it was highly localised, and varied from one part of the Eure to the next. Evreux 
resisters were likely to be from the liberal professions, but in the east, around Rugles and 
Gisors, Libération-Nord was led by local notables, firmly linked to the Third Republic 
(Albert Forcinal in Gisors had been a deputy) and mostly consisted of working-class men. In 
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the south and west of the Eure, around Nonancourt, Pacy-sur-Eure and Pont-Audemer, 
resisters were likely to be artisans and skilled tradesmen.382  
The east and the south of the Eure and Evreux both appear to have been 
comparatively favourable to the idea of building a new Popular Front, to the extent that even 
the local Communists, and Le Patriote de l’Eure, favoured a more conciliatory, rassembleur, 
approach.383 It would be using this consensus that Baudot created a departmental apparatus 
for Libération-Nord in 1942, concentrating, as it had done previously, on intelligence and 
propaganda, although the purpose of the departmental apparatus appears mainly to have been 
to co-ordinate and support the local committees on the ground, which were small, unarmed, 
but well-organised.384 
 
La Résistance des Notables? The Comité Clandestin de Résistance de Nonancourt  
Many committees did not leave behind a huge legacy, other than a short document summing 
up their actions after the war.385 However, one of the exceptions to this was the Comité 
Clandestin de Résistance de Nonancourt (CCRN), which was formed in March 1943, where 
their leader, Dr Raoul Dauphin, wrote a detailed account of the group’s activities in a 
testament submitted to the CH2GM in 1947.386 The formal organisation of resistance in 
Nonancourt was in reaction to circumstances, both local and national. In late 1942, some 
individuals who had been meeting as part of the group of friends cited earlier began to make 
contact with emerging cells, and in particular, Marcel Baudot in Evreux.387 One or two were 
also making contact with the FTP. The presence of two contrasting networks, with 
contradicting means of action, and contradicting aims in what was a small town, had the 
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potential to create tension. On the larger scale of the war nationally (and internationally) 
momentum was shifting towards the Allies, and as 1943 progressed, the German military 
presence increased. The context was also becoming more urgent- the Service du Travail 
Obligatoire (STO) began to impact upon daily life and society, the front line closer to home 
with the increase in Allied bombing.388 
At a meeting at Dr Dauphin’s house in Nonancourt, fourteen men formed the CCRN, 
drawing upon tradesmen, liberal professions, and the white-collar managerial class.389 The 
aim to co-ordinate the different networks in the Nonancourt area, and to ensure that the 
Resistance worked together. Intelligence was shared, as were resources- in the first few 
months, the greatest call upon their services was to aid those fleeing the STO.390 In the course 
of 1943, several dozen réfractaires were helped to escape by the CCRN, or provided with 
false papers that enabled them to avoid being drafted. This, incidentally, resulted in the only 
other piece of direct action that the CCRN condoned prior to D-Day- three raids on mairies in 
neighbouring villages.391 Even then, the raids were planned for the night time, so as to avoid 
anyone getting hurt. 
All action was calculated, planned, designed to harm the Nazi war effort, but not the 
local populace. Likewise, all of the intelligence was collected with one destination in mind- 
France Libre in London. Equally, the sabotage that was carried out was not meant to annoy 
the population, but the occupier. For the most part, sabotage was intended to be an irritant, as 
outright destruction carried the risk of reprisals, though this changed in the last months of the 
Occupation. But it was a source of satisfaction for Dr Dauphin that in the period of 1943-
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1944, not one munitions train that left Nonancourt, having been manufactured at the town’s 
weapons factory, left intact.392 
Even the storage of weapons was designed to cause the maximum amount of 
difficulty to the Gestapo and the Vichy anti-terrorist brigades, but the minimum for the civil 
population. Though weapons were scarce, after the spring of 1943, individual resisters had to 
keep their weapons in one place, with one member of the CCRN acting as the committee’s 
quartermaster. This quartermaster was also the manager of the town gasworks. To retrieve the 
weapons, a delicate procedure had to be followed correctly involving the regulation of the air 
pressure and the volume of gas being treated. Failure to do so would have resulted in the 
immediate asphyxiation of everyone in the chamber. Orders existed that should the Gestapo 
raid the gasworks, that this procedure be sabotaged- though the Resistance in Nonancourt 
would have been crushed, the local Gestapo brigade would also have suffered a large number 
of fatalities.393 
The CCRN can be judged as having more success where Jaurès, in the Rouen area, 
and at an earlier stage, had failed. The approach was more co-ordinated, better organised, 
better directed towards an avowed aim- the defeat of Nazi Germany- and better aimed at the 
local audience. Its political rhetoric, though strongly orientated towards a new Republic, and 
supportive of the Popular Front, and opposed to Vichy, was less dogmatic. The CCRN were 
emblematic of the reconciliation of idealism and pragmatism in resistance action, and 
demonstrate how, at a local level, gradualist resisters began to eventually find a sustainable 
‘resistance as’ in 1943, one that gave voice and action to their aims and reflections. In this 
period of 1942-43, they were finally able to become an effective resistance. Gradualism was 
now able to both clearly identify not just whom they were resisting against, and what they 
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were resisting for, but also able to identify a way of manifesting their resistance, by drawing 
upon the skills of individual resisters, who as we have seen, often had privileged positions 
within local society, which enabled them to carry out actions such as propaganda, sabotage, 
and collating intelligence. As a consequence of being able to function across these three 
criteria of resistance, the gradualists were beginning to be able to forge a third force within 
both resistance and politics as an alternative to both the Communists and Vichy, and disprove 
Pierre Laval’s claim that the war was a straight choice between collaboration and 
‘Bolshevism’, and a different pathway and vision to the above two.   
 
Towards l’après-Vichy: 1943-44 
Resistance networks began to recruit within the civil service from 1941, and increasingly in 
1942-1943.394 Two factors were vital for this- the resurrection of the Communists, and the 
discrediting of Vichy. The first threatened to bring a revolution that would radically 
transform French society; the second was now showing signs of being chronically unable to 
govern France. Yet if both Vichy and the Communist grand soir were unacceptable, then 
there was no question of simply returning to the Third Republic and the Popular Front.395 So 
it became necessary to create (bricoler) a third way, between Nazism & Vichyism on the one 
hand and Communism on the other.  
This was essential to the planning for the future, which we shall look at shortly, and 
which involved civil servants. But this potential liberation posed opportunities and 
challenges. The opportunities were obvious- the chance to re-shape France and liberate the 
nation from Nazi occupation. But there were also challenges to be faced, and these had to be 
addressed at the same time, if not before turning attention to the future. Although some civil 
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servants had resisted, and the Resistance had been able to undermine the Vichy regime from 
within, these civil servants were never anything approaching a majority.396 
Thus, it was clear that revolution was in itself not sufficient- it needed to be followed 
swiftly by reconstruction and even rehabilitation. The civil service would need to be rid of the 
most violent collaborators; the local and national press would need to begin from scratch. The 
political infrastructure (i.e. the mayors) would need to be trusted by both the population and 
the Resistance, and above all suspicion of Nazi sympathies.397 This would be particularly 
acute if the battle of liberation turned out to be a protracted one.  
So what happened after the Liberation required careful planning. The exode of 1940 
had shown the potential for chaos if ever there was a power vacuum.398 Add to that the 
rancour that a decade of political turbulence, starting with the riots of February 1934, had 
brought, and it was clear that there was enormous potential for bloody anarchy. With the 
intention of preventing this, came firstly, at a national level, the formation of the CNR in May 
1943, and then in late 1943 and early 1944, the Comités Départementaux de la Libération 
(CDL). 
 1943 had been a turbulent year for Libération-Nord in the Seine-Inférieure. A 
réfractaire, provided with false papers in Darnétal in the May of that year, was arrested in 
Dax in the south-west of France during a police check. Under torture, he divulged the names 
of Suzanne Savale, who had produced the papers, and Césaire Levillain, who had led the 
network.399 They were both arrested, and Michel Corroy and Henri Savale followed not long 
after. Cohors-Asturie was practically dismantled, as was the centre de Darnétal. Libération-
Nord was suspended for a time, as although the groups under Brutelle’s direction were still 
active, they had no real contact with either the national direction of Libération-Nord or the 
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CNR.400 Raoul Leprettre and Tony Larue were both keeping a low profile, and Larue left 
Normandy after a warrant was issued for Larue’s arrest, for what might translate into English 
as ‘seditious assembly’. He was taken ill with an “arranged” stomach ulcer, operated upon, 
and then “kidnapped” from the hospital.401  
However, in late 1943, Henri Ribière made contact with Raoul Leprettre, who had 
returned to Rouen to take over the Wolf printing firm. According to Leprettre, Ribière was 
astonished to learn that the network was practically moribund, and his report to the national 
direction reflects the view that Libération-Nord in Seine-Inférieure was far behind their 
counterparts and homologues in most other French departments.402  
 A reduced activity was embarked upon, principally intelligence, but also working 
with other groups. Libération-Nord, according to Leprettre, had talked about the importance 
of renewing France after the Liberation, and now was the time to make these plans more 
concrete, and to follow the example set by Moulin, as well as de Gaulle’s call for working in 
unity to defeat the Nazis. Consequently, contact was made with the leaders of other networks, 
and at the end of 1943, the CDL for Seine-Inférieure was formed.403  
 Though resistance in Seine-Inférieure encountered many difficulties, there appears to 
have existed in 1943 a relative desire for many of the different strands of resistance to co-
operate with each other. Normally, Libération-Nord might have expected to encounter 
difficulties in working with Communist-leaning networks or the Organisation Civile et 
Militaire (OCM), a network perceived to have a more conservative leaning outlook. But the 
leaders of both the FN and the OCM in the department were atypical.  
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The FN was led by Benjamin Remacle. Born in 1914 in Le Havre, his family had moved to 
Rouen when he was five. He trained as an engineer, graduating in 1936. He had sympathised 
with the SFIO, but never actually joined. He received a religious upbringing- as a 
Protestant.404 Later on, he would convert to Catholicism, but was never an atheist.405 In fact, 
he said later on that he was not opposed to Daladier’s decree outlawing the PC in 1939.406 He 
began resisting individually in 1940, helping prisoners of war to escape, but in 1941, made 
contact with the organised resistance, and the FN via a Communist friend in April 1942. 
Strangely, he found his initial resistance work to be menial: 
 
I turned to sabotaging vehicles that the Germans were using in 1941…it 
was in carrying out sabotage that I was finally able to do something, to fully 
apply my creative mind, and start finding ways to sabotage different 
installations.407 
 
Remacle was in favour of direct action, but also against the idea of favouring a maquis. In his 
view, the Diables Noirs at Ry were ‘a farce… there was hardly a village in the department 
that didn’t have any Germans’. Furthermore, he did not subscribe to a Soviet-style future, but 
‘France first- the liberation of the territory’.408 Everything had to be planned around this, and 
to that end, he was willing to co-operate with other resisters.  
So too was François Fagot. Leader of the OCM in the Seine-Inférieure, although it 
was acknowledged that most of his fellow members were conservative, Fagot himself was a 
former member of the SFIO, and still held to be a ‘fervent socialist’.409 His wife Simone 
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recalled him as being left-leaning, without actually being gauchiste as such, and a firm 
believer in the ideals of the Republic and republicanism, such as the separation of Church and 
State, or la laïcité.410 The finer nuances of his politics were, in any event, largely considered 
to be irrelevant- many of the members of the OCM in the area around Rouen were civil 
servants, and were prepared to put politics to one side for a greater good.411 Fagot had been 
sent from Paris after the previous leader, Candelier, had been forced to go into hiding, so was 
there to enforce a national line. From this perspective, it was scarcely surprising that he 
should favour working with other groups.412 So in all, the conditions for Libération-Nord to 
co-operate with other groups were more favourable than what they had been previously under 
the Occupation.  
In parallel to the other groups adopting some of the ideas of Libération-Nord, 
Libération-Nord adopted some of the tactics of the other groups. They had increased their 
efforts of sabotage in 1943, but became more favourable to armed action in 1944. In Grand-
Quevilly, on January 3, 1944, this resulted in the death of a German soldier- what appears to 
be the only instance of them carrying out such an attack in four years.413 Leprettre says that 
armed action was only as part of the planned nature- building towards sabotaging Nazi 
installations and hardware ahead of the D-Day landings. The nature of the armed groups 
though was limited, as Brutelle was arrested after being denounced in December 1943- 
responsibility went to Christian Desjardins from this point onwards, and after June 1944, the 
Forces Françaises de l’Intérieur (FFI).414 
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The minutes of one CDL meeting, on April 8, 1944, survive. Most of the subjects discussed 
are linked to resistance activity in the department- but not all.415 The FTP, for example, 
proposed a motion calling for the lowering of the voting age from 21 to 18, in recognition of 
the bravery of the young fighters in the Resistance. No vote is recorded in the minutes, and it 
was simply a motion that would have called upon the CNR to lower the voting age at the 
Liberation.416 Leprettre also said that other meetings touched on not just who would take over 
as mayors of the communes, but how the local economy would be structured, how rationing 
would work, public transport (the testimonies of Bernard Lawday and Tony Larue indicate 
that links between the centre of Rouen and the rive gauche were far from satisfactory, and 
after the heavy bombardment of April 1944, the two rives were practically separate 
communities in all but name),417 reconstruction, and how local media would work.418 All of 
these would be important things in the immediate post-war landscape.419  
Hand in glove with this was the Noyautage des Administrations Publiques (NAP). Its 
role was never meant to be one that was open, as its name suggests. Leprettre appears to have 
been linked, and this would seem to have been the intelligence arm of Libération-Nord during 
his time in charge. They gathered intelligence purely within the local administration, with 
two aims in mind- preparing the Liberation, and gathering data on how the local 
administration worked.420 This second mission had a dual purpose- the apprenticeship of 
power, and also the elimination of the more zealous collaborators. All along, the NAP was 
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intended to smooth the transition from Vichy to Provisional Government, and in the shadows 
of what was commonly called ‘the army of the shadows’.   
However, quite how hand in glove this was is unknown. There appears to be some 
debate as who was actually in charge of the NAP. The archives nationales would suggest that 
it was a M. Schweitzer from the Eure, from the Ceux de la Résistance network, who was a 
close friend and associate of Henri Bourdeau de Fontenay, the man who would go on and 
take charge of the FFI in Upper Normandy after D-Day,.421 Oral testimony from Leprettre 
and Larue cites Edmond Dauzet, head of financial affairs at the prefecture in Rouen, as the 
leader.422 The historian André Combes names Jean Capdeville, yet Capdeville makes no 
mention of being a member of the NAP in his own testimony.423 Furthermore, the oral 
testimonies of both Remacle and Leprettre claim responsibility for leading the CDL.424 The 
minutes that survive, perhaps diplomatically, as well as from a security perspective, omit who 
was chairing the meeting.425 All of this is perhaps indicative of the slightly murky and 
secretive nature of the NAP and their activities.  
The formation of the CDL in the Eure was slightly easier, although their history tied 
in closer to that of the FFI. Marcel Baudot chaired the CDL in the department, formed the 
NAP unit that worked in Evreux, and then became head of the FFI within the Eure.426 The 
last position had both an advantage and a disadvantage. The advantage was that it enabled 
him to finally bring the west of the Eure into the mainstream Resistance orbit, in particular 
the Maquis Surcouf but also the FTP.427 The Resistance (now FFI) would play a critical role 
in the battle for Normandy. However, this required a military discipline, and Baudot was 
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forced to desert his civil service post and go into hiding on June 6, 1944, when the Allies 
landed on the beaches of Calvados and the Cotentin peninsula on D-Day.428 From here until 
the Liberation, Baudot’s role was much closer to that of a guerrilla leader, directing the FFI 
from hiding. 
Whilst this day had been the subject of extensive preparation for some time by 
resisters who chose to carefully plan and co-ordinate their action, and in the case of the Eure, 
most resistance networks experienced substantial growth (roughly half of all members of 
organised resistance in the Eure who were active at the time of D-Day had joined in the six 
months prior to D-Day),429 the results of this planning and co-ordination were mixed. In the 
case of the Seine-Inférieure, organised resistance was severely affected by the arrest and 
break-up of the CDL in Grand-Quevilly on May 8, 1944. This decapitated the main resistance 
networks, including Libération-Nord.430 The Allied landings just four weeks later meant that 
there was little time to build up a replacement- organised resistance in the department passed 
officially onto Henri Bourdeau de Fontenay, who had been named as the Free French 
commissaire de la République, who operated out of clandestinity for much of the Battle of 
Normandy, and a base in the vicinity of Louviers in the east of the Eure.431 Libération-Nord 
nominally passed into the departmental control of Capdeville, although it would seem that in 
practice, each of the local areas of Libération-Nord did their own thing.432 
In the Eure, Marcel Baudot managed to avoid capture, and along with Bourdeau de 
Fontenay, managed to ensure a reasonable orderly transition of power.433 However, many 
networks that had embraced preparation over direct action over the course of the previous 
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four years showed themselves to struggle with the demands of battle. In the case of the 
CCRN in Nonancourt, despite copious security measures, such as changing the location of 
their radio, their signal was still traced, and that, along with the discovery of a resister with 
false papers, was the source of their dismantling by the Gestapo in July 1944. They did not 
even have time to put into effect the sabotage procedures planned at the gasworks.434 
In both the case of the CDL of Seine-Inférieure, and the CCRN in Nonancourt, the 
members were arrested. But whereas the members of the CDL were deported, only one 
member of the CCRN was deported, Joseph Le Ledan, who died in Mauthausen just before 
the liberation. The others managed to escape in the chaos of the Nazi retreat in August 1944, 
whilst awaiting transfer.435 It showed that for all the preparation necessary for effective 
resistance, luck, chance and opportunity were also important factors in its successful 
realisation.  
The gradualist approach to resistance was able to bear more fruit in the period of 
1942-44, because during that time, the three criteria of resistance that Pickford has talked 
about were more reconciled to one another than what they had been previously. Through 
growing dissatisfaction with Vichy, continuing enmity to Nazism, and the relative weakness 
of the Communists, whom, as we have seen in chapter one, bore the brunt of reprisals against 
the Resistance, as well as a lingering distrust of the apparatus of the PC, they were able to 
identify a moderate audience for their message of reformism rather than revolution. They 
were also able to elucidate their message via clear organisation, and by profiting from the 
general evolution of circumstances, namely the weakening position of the Axis Powers in the 
war at large. Their flexibility enabled them to organise the Resistance more generally. Indeed, 
the period of 1942-44 could be seen as the period where the gradualists built resistance into 
                                                             




the “Resistance”, eventually constructing a more unifying approach to resistance than the 
more sectarian attitude of both Communist resistance, and indeed earlier resistance efforts of 
their own. Whereas the Communists and those on the revolutionary Left had tried to impose 
their own vision and conception of resistance, the gradualists forged and realised a broader 
vision and organisation. There were, however, limitations to the success of their approach. 
Despite all the planning of the CDL and the FFI, as well as the influx of numbers in the early 
months of 1944,436 they were never able to convert their resources into that of a successful 
mass army able to independently take on the Wehrmacht in armed combat. Figures for the 
Seine-Inférieure show that in 1944, the average length of time for a resistance leader was 
three months between assuming command and either arrest or death.437 For all the care and 
precaution taken by gradualists to avoid violently provoking the Occupier, they still 
encountered, as they became more threatening to both the Nazi occupation and the Vichyite 
hegemony, the full force of the enemy. Though able to ensue some sort of orderly transition 
at the Liberation, from a military perspective, the gradualists were no more able to deliver 
their own liberation without aid from the Allies than what the Communists had been.  
 
From exit to voice: An evolution of gradualism 
A philosophical device frequently credited to the German philosopher Leibniz is ‘to resist is 
to act’.438 Yet that device could be challenged by referring to the work of Albert O. 
Hirschman, and his theory of ‘exit’ and ‘voice’.439 Hirschman’s theory is originally meant to 
be applied to a business environment, but can also be applied to political situations, as a 
choice between withdrawing from civic or political participation (‘exit’) or actual protest 
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against the regime (‘voice’). In Hirschman, there is also a third option, ‘loyalty’, which would 
be used here to explain the attitude of collaboration, or even just passive support for Vichy. 
But by ‘exit’, is one really showing resistance? The truth is that it depends as much as 
anything on the context of the situation, and of course, the situation was highly dependent on 
location and on the individual. René Coty, the Radical deputy for Le Havre, who went on to 
become President under the Fourth Republic, for example, voted pleins pouvoirs in 1940, but 
never participated in political life until after the war, even refusing the mayorality of Le 
Havre after Léon Meyer was stripped of public office. Nor did he engage with the Resistance, 
though he remained a keen observer of the situation around him.440 Coty could be seen as an 
example of ‘exit’, but he never claimed to have been a resister. Much of Tony Larue’s 
activity between 1941 and the end of 1942 easily falls under the category of ‘exit’, yet his 
engagement afterwards meant that he came to be considered as a resister, a status that was 
certainly helpful in his long post-war political career.441 Generally, one can say that ‘exit’ is a 
precursor to resistance, and the first step towards it, but only if followed by further actions- in 
essence, one can only see ‘exit’ as resistance if it is then followed or accompanied by ‘voice’.  
To many of those who saw themselves as being on the non-Communist Left, ‘exit’ 
was the only strategy left open in 1940, because ‘loyalty’ would have meant adopting the 
antithesis of their values, and ‘voice’ was not an option- as Brutelle’s early attempts in 1940-
1941 showed, ‘voice’ is only an option if you have something to say. After the so-called 
‘strange defeat’ of the previous summer, even the most eloquent could be forgiven for being 
lost for words. But to facilitate that ‘exit’, the only arrangement that was realistically open is 
what Burrin called ‘accommodation’; recognising the Nazi occupation without ever really 
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accepting it.442 Thus, Larue did not resign in 1940,443 and Brutelle & Capdeville remained in 
post as instituteurs- thereby taking an oath of loyalty to Marshal Pétain.  
 Yet in many ways, it was a false ‘exit’ that these resisters made. They were not 
disengaged with the political process- they were simply temporarily withdrawing from it in 
order to reinvent it. The meeting of the group on the rue Léon Malétra shows this- anyone 
who is seriously engaging with the questions of the defeat of 1940 and how to react is not 
truly in ‘exit’ mode. So we can argue not only was ‘accommodation’ a form of ‘exit’, but also 
that ‘exit’ was a form of ‘accommodation’. Either way, both were temporary states of being 
until the right time presented itself for ‘voice’.  
Gradualism can therefore be seen as being about slowly forming and forging a form 
of action, as well as the creation of a viable ‘third force’ within resistance and within French 
politics. Initially, gradualist resisters did not resist overtly because although there was a will 
to resist, there was a lack of means. Neither willing to collaborate nor able to quite properly 
resist, they adopted a form of ‘accommodation’ and ‘exit’. Over the course of four years, this 
slowly evolved, first from accommodation to critique and ‘voice’, and then to outright 
resistance. This position of resistance though refrained from violent combat (with one or two 
rare exceptions) until the landings of June 6, 1944, at which point the waiting ended, and the 
war of liberation began. During this final year of resistance, the uncertainty and the waiting 
that characterised the action and thoughts of many of these resisters gave way to a clearer 
sense of purpose in preparing for the Liberation, both militarily and politically. This is not 
dissimilar to the process identified by Aglan when examining the planificateurs.444 Similarly, 
just as Aglan concludes her chapter in the winter of 1943-44, so it can be seen that the climax 
of gradualism was D-Day. After that point, action for these resisters was not just about 
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resisting the enemy, it was about liberating the territory and assuming some sort of power, to 
be exercised in the immediate aftermath of Vichy’s end and reverse the politics of the 
National Revolution. 
 
Resistance aristocracy?  
In sociology, agency is the capacity to act of individuals as agents of their own destiny.445 To 
many of those from the lower strata of society, as we have seen in the previous chapter, direct 
action was the only form of action left open to them. But many of those resisters that we have 
examined in this chapter were from higher echelons of society- civil servants, business, 
industry, and the liberal professions. It seems as though, by virtue of having a greater form of 
cultural capital, in the Bourdieusian sense of the term,446 they were able to have greater 
choice of what forms of action they took. Perhaps this could be called ‘hyper-agency’, an 
enhanced capacity to act, the luxury of choosing what sorts of action one carried out, a choice 
of forms of resistance available. They did not merely choose to resist, but also chose when to 
resist- an important choice. 
Eric Hobsbawm identified the importance of ‘the aristocracy of labour’- a stratum of 
the working-class that benefited from being more skilled, better-salaried, and consequently a 
better status.447 One can adapt this concept in an analysis of resistance and resisters to 
identify that the resisters in this chapter were the ‘resistance aristocrats’. They provided, as 
often as not, the leadership of many local resistance networks, were amongst the earliest 
resisters, and played major roles in determining the shape and direction of local resistance 
networks and movements- what action was taken, what members were recruited, what causes 
to fight for and espouse. 
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The definition of ‘resistance aristocrats’ that is being advanced here is slightly different to the 
idea outlined by Hobsbawm, and rests upon a means that is neither exclusively political, nor 
exclusively capital. The definition of ‘labour aristocracy’ is of a well-paid, even salaried, 
working class, benefiting from exploited workers elsewhere in the world, and used as an 
instrument to appease revolutionary demands amongst the proletariat.448 Yet both the 
clandestine newspaper edited by Brutelle and the Communist organisation ran by André 
Duroméa in Le Havre suffered with financial difficulties.449 Besides, the ‘resistance 
aristocracy’ was hardly being used as an instrument by the Vichy regime to undermine the 
Gaullist or Communist causes. Nor were they exclusively left-wing- Benjamin Remacle 
represented the FN, but was Catholic, and in later life, would support the Gaullist 
Rassemblement du Peuple Français (RPF).450  
The advantage held by the ‘resistance aristocrats’ lies exclusively upon the 
Bourdieusian concepts of cultural capital and social capital. They had better cultural capital 
because of their secondary and tertiary education, and they had better social capital because 
they had more contacts, with other people of similar backgrounds to themselves, who could 
provide assistance to their resistance activities.451 Hence in Nonancourt, Dr Dauphin and the 
CCRN could call upon the local gasworks in which to hide their rudimentary arsenal.452 The 
problems faced in producing clandestine newspapers were solved, to some extent, by Raoul 
Leprettre taking over the running of a printing firm.453 This social capital also made the 
business of networking to find like-minded resisters easier. It also reflects the social standing 
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of those resisters who had been in, or linked to, the SFIO in the inter-war years; namely that 
they formed, in the words of Marc Sadoun, ‘une élite du savoir’.454  
Consequently, it is they who have a more privileged voice in shaping resistance 
historiography. Tony Larue’s oral testimony is the longest and most detailed in the Seine-
Maritime- it lasts for over eight hours.455 Marcel Baudot became the unofficial historian- and 
archivist- of the Resistance in the Eure.456 Paris-Normandie, the regional paper which started 
life initially as Normandie parle Français, and which provided many of the early impressions 
of resistance history, acting as a vehicle for the new post-war hegemony of résistancialisme, 
was ran by Pierre-René Wolf, Raoul Leprettre and Georges Brutelle between 1945 and 
1982.457 These resisters had the greatest formal training- teachers, civil servants, accountants, 
engineers- and so were the most able resisters. This thereby gave them a certain superior 
standing within the networks that they ran. After the war, when the time came for testimony, 
it was they who were the most able to talk to historians or to take up the pen themselves, and 
so, for seventy years or so, it has been the ‘resistance aristocrats’ who have shaped our 
knowledge of the Resistance in Upper Normandy.458 
This concept of resistance aristocracy can also be used to explain further the 
differences in debates around resistance historiography and memory at the local level. Just as 
the ‘labour aristocrats’ are sometimes seen as agents of the ruling classes,459 some 
Communist-sympathising resisters see them as figures not just responsible for showing less 
resistance,  but also as being responsible for carrying out an épuration that was not as 
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thorough as it should have been.460 This was particularly felt in Grand-Quevilly, whereby 
Louis Jouvin saw both Césaire Levillain and Tony Larue as having been ‘invisible’ during 
the era of resistance.461 So the concept of ‘resistance aristocracy’ can be used both positively- 
for understanding the leadership and the co-ordination of resistance- and critically- for 
understanding the divisions that emerged amongst anciens résistants. 
The concept can also be used critically because arguably, as John Barzman has 
suggested recently, whereas Jean Basille had stated that Communist resisters were engaged in 
the defence of a cause,462 the ‘resistance aristocracy’ could be seen as having engaged in 
defending their own social privileges and status.463 The defence of the resistance legacy and 
‘French values’ then becomes an appropriation, which both serves as a meta-narrative for 
their interpretation of resistance, and also marginalises both the Communists and the 
Gaullists in their representation of the resistance story.464 Whilst it is impossible to prove 
definitively that self-interest was the sole motivation of the ‘resistance aristocracy’, we can 
see that they had a privileged role in the immediate post-war era, and had a privileged role in 
the shaping of the historiography of resistance.  
The idea of ‘resistance aristocracy’ therefore allows us to understand the shaping of 
resistance not just at the time, but also in history and memory. A category of resisters 
possessing a greater than average amount of agency, shaped by reserves of political, cultural 
and social capital, emerged as the leadership of resistance inside France, as opposed to the 
militarised structure of France libre that has come to sometimes be known as la résistance 
extérieure. At a regional level within Upper Normandy, this shaped the direction and 
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organisation of resistance, the projects upon which they focused, thereby ensuring that 
organised resistance steered clear of aiming for some sort of ‘revolution’ that would not 
merely end the Occupation, but also radically alter society. Instead, the social projects of the 
Resistance would ultimately become more reformist than revolutionary. At a local level, 
these projects would be put into place thanks to the impetus of this ‘resistance aristocracy’. 
Likewise, it would be the ‘resistance aristocrats’ who would take the lead in the writing of 
resistance history, and whose voices would be felt the loudest across the post-war years- and 
the voices that some of those who felt disenfranchised by the politics of the Liberation would 
sometimes blame the keenest.465  
  
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how a group of socially and culturally privileged resisters turned their 
greater share of capital within these domains to engage in resistance against both the Nazi 
occupation and the Vichy regime. It was founded upon a triple refusal of Nazism, 
conservatism and Communism, all of which were conceived as threats to their vision of 
France, and their idea of the polis. Yet unlike the resisters in chapter one, there was no pre-
conceived or fixed vision of what the polis should look like. It was something that had to be 
slowly crafted, based pragmatically on the wider political situation both regionally and 
nationally. To this end, the gradualists, for the greatest part, did not engage in violent 
provocation, but instead in forms of resistance that undermined the enemy without exposing 
the populace to reprisals, and instead aimed to convince their fellow French citizens, by way 
of propaganda, that both Nazism and Vichy were fundamentally wrong in both creed and 
action. 
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Nonetheless, it was not simply about waiting for the time to be right militarily; it was also 
about reforming society. To that end, the difference between the resisters analysed in chapter 
one and the resisters seen in this chapter is akin to the split in the polity identified by both 
Tiersky and Touchard- namely the difference between revolution and reformism.466 There 
was therefore a dual motivation for many of these resisters- they were motivated by both the 
desire to combat Nazism and restore French sovereignty (and with it, la République), but 
also, perhaps more surreptitiously, a defence of their social privileges within the fabric of 
Upper Normandy against both the National Revolution and the hypothetical grand soir. 
This is why although both of these chapters cover the idea of the ‘politicised’ political, or 
what Moses Finley called ‘instrumental politics’,467 and both forms of resistance had, as an 
aim, the exercise of power, their intentions were different. Those who subscribed to the 
Leftist, Communist outlook believed in an uprising to result in a revolutionising of the polis, 
but those who were Left-wing yet non-Communist and more gradualist in outlook wanted an 
organised, planned resistance that would defeat the enemy, but only reform the polis, with 
both their conceptions of resistance and their conceptions of society being forged over a 
lengthy period of time.              
 Whilst in purely military terms, the impact of the ‘resistance aristocrats’ could easily 
be seen as negligible- their comparative lack of impact upon the wider military context of the 
Battle of Normandy has been shown both in this chapter, and perhaps even by Marcel Baudot 
himself-468 the role played by the ‘resistance aristocrats’ within the social context was 
anything but, as their plans played a key part in the restructuring of both the administration 
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and the cultural vectors of Upper Normandy in the immediate post-war period.469 In fact, the 
opposition between ‘resistance aristocrats’ and ‘resistance subalterns’ could be seen as 
indicating the different attitudes of resisters within the framework of organised resistance, or 
résistance-organisation. The ‘subalterns’ saw themselves as a countercommunity of 
insurgents who wanted to rise up from their positions and overthrow the existing order, 
revolutionising the polis, whilst the ‘aristocrats’ saw themselves as a social category whose 
positions were to be defended, and that from their privileged positions, they were the best-
placed to reform and shape the polis.  
Finally, this has not only influenced the resistance actions that were carried out at the 
time, but also shaped the writing of resistance history and the memory of resistance. Just as 
Jean Touchard has suggested that some of the most critical divergences amongst those on the 
Left in France come about as a consequence of their varying interpretations of historical 
reference points such as the Enlightenment, or the Revolution, or the events of 1848,470 so we 
can see that resistance to Nazism and Vichy has been interpreted differently by those on the 
Left who were gradual reformists, and those who saw their role as that of revolutionaries. 
Each strand has their own appropriation of the resistance legacy; each has their own Histoire 
de la Résistance.     
 We have seen resistance through two strands so far- revolutionising the polis and 
reforming the polis. In the next two chapters, we will move towards a personalised sense of 
the political and the relationship between resisting and the polis, closer to the idea of 
expressive politics, beginning in the next chapter with an examination of the link between 
resistance and patriotism.  
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National Identities? Resistance and Patriotism 
 
In 1883, the Minister for Education, Jules Ferry, wrote to the nation’s instituteurs. In his 
letter, he stressed that teachers were, to some extent, the substitute of the father.471 This 
example reinforced an aspect already visible from viewing the war memorials to the dead of 
the Franco-Prussian War or by listening to La Marseillaise- the citizens of France were also 
its children- les enfants de la Patrie.472  
 By 1940, this was already ingrained into the rhetoric of the Republic. Behind it was a 
centralising mentality, one that placed the state at the heart of national values, and one that 
made France and being French into an identity above all others. It was also a mentality that 
betrayed not merely a patriarchal system of society, but also a society that was hierarchised, 
structured, and encouraged family values. It was not just parental ties that bound the family- 
the nation itself was a family of sorts in terms of ties and structures.  
 The kinships bound up in this were confirmed by education, work, and for young 
men, military service. These acted, for many, as rites of initiation into adulthood.473 As such, 
French national identity and French masculinity were implicitly linked. Men had to play 
masculinised, gendered roles within society, and one of these was to act as defenders of the 
nation. Needless to say, these rhythms were upset by the defeat of 1940- Vichy discouraged 
La Marseillaise, and replaced Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité with Travail, Famille, Patrie. The 
Armistice agreement effectively emasculated the armed forces, thereby ending, by default, 
military service.474 It was a further sense of disorientation, of social disorder. Philippe Buton 
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has shown how the defeat of 1940 was not just the crisis of France as a nation, but also the 
crisis of French masculinity.475 
 Yet if this was France’s darkest hour, this also created an opportunity for those who 
wanted to serve France to do something. In the first two chapters, we have looked resistance 
informed by the politicised political, and instrumental politics, but this chapter will examine a 
shift away from this conception of the political, and towards resistance as a political action as 
first and foremost an expression of beliefs rather than a desire to exercise power, which could 
be seen as the personalised political, or expression politics.  This chapter proposes to examine 
those resisters for whom the act of resistance was motivated principally by the idea of 
patriotism. 
 
A Certain Idea of France? 
‘Ever since my first days, I have always had a certain idea about France’. This statement 
opens the first volume of Charles de Gaulle’s Mémoires de Guerre.476 But what was that 
idea? What de Gaulle then goes on to say seems almost semi-mystical.477 Ultimately, there is 
nothing actually fixed- it is the sentiment of the statement that one is invited to agree with. 
 This conception of patriotism is critical to the understanding of resistance. It was not 
uncommon, across all shades of opinion in the clandestine press, to see fallen resisters 
referred to as patriotes.478 Yet if most claimed to be patriotic, the definition that lies behind 
the usage of these terms is not always the same. The resisters that we have seen in chapter 
one saw themselves as the true defenders of la patrie, and many saw their mission, 
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ultimately, as completing the Revolution of 1789. The resisters in chapter two would have 
seen themselves as patriotes, but theirs was a patriotism informed by a humanist tradition, 
and motivated by a desire to reform France and French society- which was also the case with 
some of the resisters in this chapter.  
 But many other resisters who we will analyse here had an idea of France that was 
guided, to varying extents, by nationalism. Their idea of France was a patriotism that was less 
closely tied to a firmly identifiable political ideology than resisters in either of the previous 
two chapters. It was formed by works such as Ernest Lavisse’s 1913 work on French 
history,479 and a belief in the mythical power of France. In many ways, it was not far removed 
from the same ideals that informed the resisters in chapter two, but the key difference was in 
terms of motivation. Beyond the certain idea of France, and the restoration of an 
uncompromised sovereignty, there was little that was concrete that united them. There were 
no grand projects for the future, though this was perhaps understandable- for most of the 
period 1940-1944, even removing France from Nazi occupation seemed a tall order. 
 Finally, there was a small minority of resisters who came from outside of France, but 
rather than necessarily have an internationalist outlook, conceived resistance action as 
evidence of integration within France. They conceived France as the country which 
welcomed them, and they conceived patriotism, and with it resistance, as part of a process of 
integration towards becoming French, not just legalistically, but also practically- proof that 
they were truly French, and that naturalisation was more than just a process of acquiring a 
passport.  
 Rather than talking about patriotism as a single concept, this chapter aims to show 
that in resistance, there co-existed multiple patriotisms. Maurizio Viroli has distinguished 
between patriotism and nationalism, with the first being closer to service for a common group 
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of people, and their cause of shared and mutual liberty, which he also terms as ‘republican 
patriotism’, whilst he traces nationalism’s emergence to the late 18th century, and the striving 
towards a chauvinistic kind of homogeneity of a people, based on cultural, linguistic and 
ethnic lines.480 The patriotisms being examined here are firstly, republican patriotism, in the 
sense identified by Viroli, and applied to those defending the French republican legacy. Then, 
what we have chosen to call national patriotism, which though not necessarily nationalistic, 
does draw upon a narrative of France as a providential state,481 and not far removed from 
what Eric Hobsbawm called ‘state patriotism’.482 Finally, we will look at the patriotism of 
those immigrants using resistance to prove their Frenchness, which we will call integrational 
patriotism.     
 
Serving the Republic 
François Furet wrote that the commemorations in 1880 of the fall of the Bastille were proof 
of ‘The Republic sailing into port’.483 For Furet, this marked the climax of social acceptance 
of republicanism, the end of a process over the course of certainly the previous decade, 
whereby the Republic ceased to become a subject of contention, and accepted as the form of 
governance that divided France the least.  
 The keenest defenders of republican values were those who owed much to the école 
républicaine. For those born after the First World War, a new possibility opened up- 
education in both the primary & secondary systems. It should be noted that until the reforms 
of 1959, the two systems tended to run in parallel, rather than sequentially. The vast majority 
of French people were educated in the primary system, but a small minority entered collège at 
six or seven years of age, then progressed onto lycée upon getting the certificat d’études, or 
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school certificate. This system then allowed, upon getting the baccalauréat (usually at the 
age of 18), entry to the liberal professions.484 
Lycées were fee-paying prior to 1930, but the fees were then abolished, breaking 
down the traditional barrier. In 1937, having passed his school certificate a year early, 
Bernard Lawday left his primary school in Sotteville, and enrolled at the age of twelve at 
Lycée Pierre Corneille, the city’s main secondary school for boys, which traced its history 
back to the 16th century, originally being run by Jesuits, but having long since converted to 
the state sector by this time.485 Lawday recalled being only the second boy of his generation 
from the less-favoured rive gauche to go to the school, situated near to the city hall, on the 
rive droite.486 For him, crossing the river five days a week (the exceptions being Thursdays 
and Sundays) was almost like entering a different society, of different norms and culture. But 
prior to just a few years before, this universe would have been totally impossible for Lawday 
to accede to- he came from a working-class background, and the family had only just moved 
up from ‘lower’ Sotteville, the less-privileged areas of the commune centred on the railway 
station.487 The chance to go to ‘Corneille’ allowed Lawday to move into new social circles- 
one that further developed his knowledge and offered a humanist alternative to the Catholic 
upbringing he had received. Despite being an altar boy until the age of 13, he said, in 
response to the question when he stopped believing in God “I don’t think that I ever really 
did believe [to begin with]”.488  
For Georges Touroude, the social tension was also present, but the Republic also 
provided him with the opportunity to go on and better himself. Born into a rural family in 
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1924, Touroude seemed to describe himself as being a schoolboy who was good at learning, 
but not always the most committed.489 It was not until 1940, aged 15, that he finally passed 
the entrance exam for the école normale; no sooner had he gained admission to the school in 
Rouen than the écoles normales, the training colleges for primary teachers (instituteurs), were 
abolished, and so, in 1941, Touroude and his fellow normaliens were forced to go to the 
Lycée Corneille.490 For Touroude, who described no strong political sentiments with regard 
to his upbringing, going to Rouen represented a culture shock, both in terms of environment 
and in terms of the social milieu.491 1941, and the transfer to “Corneille”, represented a 
further shock still- for though the pupils were of the same age, the primary and secondary 
sectors were different socially. 
Despite the reforms of the 1930s, few families from working-class backgrounds took 
advantage- at this time, only 3% of French children acceded to secondary education.492 Their 
cultures were different- whilst the primary sector was designed to instill republican values 
first and foremost, as well as basic literacy and numeracy skills, the secondary system drew 
upon the classics, early modern French literature, mathematics that went well beyond the 
usual basics taught at primary level, and philosophy.493 Republican values were still at the 
heart of the system and its ethos, but it was a different set of codes and mores. For Touroude, 
there was another factor that amplified the sense of shock- the scale of Nazi occupation was 
more intense than in the countryside, and the girls lycée, known as the Lycée Jeanne d’Arc, 
was being used as billeting. Such was the situation that Touroude was unable to lodge himself 
within the school, and he had to board with friends of his parents in Sotteville.494A situation 
where there was already considerable social antagonism added to political antagonism, with 
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education becoming one of the key areas of reform for Vichy’s National Revolution, and the 
curriculum becoming a vehicle for le maréchalisme.495 One of the examples of this at Lycée 
Corneille seems to have been the appointment of a new History/Geography teacher, referred 
to in Touroude’s account as ‘Lucien M.’ Upon arriving in his new post in January 1942, he 
announced to his classes that he was the representative of the maréchal, before proceeding to 
read aloud Pétain’s official New Year message, and then setting as homework the task that 
each student write a personal letter of thanks to Pétain, expressing their gratitude for ‘his 
unfailing service to France’.496 With many of the boys staying in accommodation where 
heating was scarce, where food was rationed, and with the Nazi occupation of France 
showing no signs of ending soon, one might understand why this was enough to make a 
number of them feel aggrieved.  
 The ‘outsider’ upbringing combined with a secondary education was something that 
inspired the early resistance of Benjamin Remacle, whom we have seen in the previous 
chapter. Remacle’s upbringing was particular to put it mildly. He was brought up as a 
Protestant,497 a minority often marginalised within French society, and only really numerous 
in the south of France in and around the Cévennes.498 His upbringing though was left-wing, 
and, as he saw it, ‘strongly influenced by the memory of the First World War’, which he 
pointed to as making him a pacifist, and anti-fascist.499 Yet unlike other resisters, he never 
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quite made the step from political sympathising to political militancy. He said that he was 
opposed to Léon Blum’s Spain policy in 1936, but did not support an intervention to help the 
Spanish Republicans.500 He was sympathetic to the Popular Front, but never joined the SFIO, 
and was not opposed to Daladier outlawing the Communists in 1939- yet still saw himself as 
left-wing.501 Another contradiction was that he supported the Armistice, but was firmly 
opposed to Pétain, and began resisting before the end of 1940.502 His background contained 
another contradiction- despite being educated in the secondary system, he shunned the 
pathways into the liberal professions and instead opted for a technical education, qualifying 
as an engineer in 1936. Thus, prior to 1940, by which time Remacle was 26, his political 
engagement was one of interest, but not involvement.  
The principal difference between Remacle on the one hand and Lawday & Touroude 
on the other was age.503 It was this difference in age that informed both the difference in entry 
dates into resistance and differences in forms of action. Remacle’s action started quite early, 
but in the same vein as his pre-war political engagement, there was initially no formal 
adhesion. Firstly in the summer of 1940, he helped French POWs who had not yet been sent 
to Germany to escape and then used his position as an engineer to sabotage work being 
carried out for the Nazis at the Chantiers de Normandie based in Rouen.504 It was not until 
March 1941 that he made formal contact with the organised Resistance, and not until April 
1942 that he actually became a member of a network.505 As the war progressed, the nature of 
his resistance action evolved, and began to engage him not necessarily politically, but 
certainly intellectually. As he put it ‘It was in sabotaging vehicles that I was able to fully 
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apply my creative mind’.506 From simply producing shoddy work, he progressed in 1941 to 
sabotaging military vehicles, in a manner that did not actually harm any servicemen, but 
forced the vehicles to come in for servicing time and time again, and also helping resisters 
within the mairie at Petit-Quevilly to forge papers. Then, from 1942, some more violent 
action was undertaken, principally against Vichy and collaborators.507  
For Lawday & Touroude, their entries into resistance came later. Touroude said that 
the turning point for him came in October 1941, with the execution of Guy Môquet, a 17-
year-old Communist resister interned at Châteaubriant near Nantes. It came on top of the 
social tension that existed already, and the thought that Môquet was the same age made some 
boys of Touroude’s social class realise the nature of the Nazi occupation, and of Vichy.508 
There had already been two resistance networks in Lycée Corneille in 1940-41, both of which 
had floundered after the leader of the Communist network had been expelled, and the 
Lessertisseur boys narrowly escape a prison sentence for gun-running.509 Action could neither 
be too radical nor even hint at violence- the authorities were instructed to counter any 
political activity within the corridors.510 
 This would explain why a meeting of twelve boys, interested by the idea of setting up 
a resistance network within the school, met some distance away from the buildings, in the 
municipal gardens behind the city hall, after lessons on November 10, 1941.511 The 
discussions centred on the war, their views, and how to manifest them. Like the forerunners 
to Libération-Nord at Grand-Quevilly the previous year, whom we have discussed in the 
previous chapter, there was an agreement to do something, but uncertainty as to do what 
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exactly. Unlike the meeting at Grand-Quevilly though, there was an idea though of what 
action they might carry out in the meanwhile in order to give voice to their discontent. 
The very next day was the anniversary of the armistice that ended the First World 
War in 1918. Commemorations were not totally outlawed, but they were certainly 
discouraged. Classes took place as usual, but during morning break, the same twelve boys 
gathered by the school’s war memorial, and left a wreath reading ‘Ceux qui n’ont pas 
oublié’.512 It was deliberately ambiguous- not outwardly political in a party politics sense, not 
directly opposed to the Vichy regime, or even the Nazi occupation, but equally, it showed a 
certain discontent with the present and a recognition of previous sacrifices in wars against 
Germany. It also achieved its aim of drawing attention to a cause- in the weeks that followed, 
despite the reluctance of those who had been involved in the Lessertisseur group, the small 
gathering of boys had found themselves a name- albeit the not terribly original Normale- and 
by the spring of 1942, contained fifty schoolboys, whose initial activity centred upon the 
distribution and displaying of tracts- most of which were homemade, but others had been 
dropped by the RAF, and then collected and displayed by boys, aided by Maurice Reynaud, a 
teacher who was sympathetic to resisters, taught English, and was married to an 
Englishwoman.513  
 It was shortly after this time that Bernard Lawday joined the group. Rather like 
Touroude, Lawday was also someone for whom the sense of social antagonism was acutely 
felt. His motive for resistance was partly out of patriotic sentiment, but also partly out of 
frustration against the Nazi occupiers. He described having to walk up the hill that led to the 
school, and crossing over the road because the Wehrmacht were coming in the opposite 
direction, as French civilians were not supposed to share the pavement with German 
                                                             
512 Touroude, op.cit.,, p.26. Translates as ‘those who have not forgotten’. 
513 Touroude, op.cit, p.29; Author’s Interview with Lawday, op.cit. 
138 
 
soldiers.514 Lawday said that the humiliation of having to cross the street to make way for a 
foreign invader in his home country was something that played on him mentally, and led to a 
sense of injustice that led him to want to do something. It was via contacts within the school 
that he joined Normale, although his resistance activities were initially limited to just 
propaganda.515 
1942 represented a turning point. Resistance action began to become broader, and 
now targeted not just the Nazi occupiers, but also Vichy and collaborationists. In part, this 
was a response to the change in attitude amongst the regime- Carcopino was replaced as 
Education Minister in April 1942 by Abel Bonnard, who though perhaps less inclined 
towards Pétainism, was certainly a partisan of collaboration.516 Whereas previously the 
attitude of the educational authorities had been one to keep schools free from politics, the 
attitudes after the summer of 1942 were ones that targeted actively Resistance activities, 
whilst leaving pro-Vichy, even collaborationist, activities unchecked. Bernard Lawday, along 
with four other boys, was expelled in early 1943 for “subversive political activities”.517 
However, no charges were brought against him, and if anything, the expulsion brought him 
further into resistance. Officially, he enrolled at the Lycée annexe in Elbeuf, but owing to its 
distance from Sotteville (the only way to get there was by train), Lawday used this to spend 
more time carrying out resistance activities- only that by now, the resistance activities were 
less about propaganda, and more designed towards sabotaging installations.518 
 For Benjamin Remacle, resistance became more organised. Despite not being a 
Communist himself,519 he joined the Front National in 1942.520 Action up until now had been 
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along the lines of propaganda, but now it turned towards the possibility of armed action, such 
as collecting arms. But at this time, there was no action against people, only property, 
although arson attacks were amongst the activities carried out.521 Interestingly, from this 
point, actions were taken more against Vichyites and collaborationists than against the 
Nazis.522 The term ‘Front National’ was meant to be a national, cross-party organisation, 
designed to unite France under a loosely Communist banner.523 Invoking again Revolutionary 
rhetoric (and in particular l’esprit du Valmy), this meant waiting for the right moment to 
strike against the occupant, but to make sure that nothing undermined national unity when 
that came, the collaborationists had to be either eliminated or marginalised.  
This action conceived the Republic as being an integral part of resistance activity, and 
considered there to be no difference between the values of republicanism and the values of 
France. But whilst this was also true of many francs-tireurs, the difference was that France 
was prioritised over any kind of partisan ideology. What is notable about all three cases- 
Benjamin Remacle, Bernard Lawday, Georges Touroude- is that all three belonged to what 
Jean Quellien terms ‘la Résistance d’obédience communiste’.524 Yet all three rejected 
Communism as an ideology- Remacle stressed the nature of une et indivisible in the 
Resistance,525 Lawday said that he did not consider himself to be Communist, and later on 
joined the Parti Socialiste,526 whilst Touroude, though admitting to being sympathetic to the 
Communists in his memoir, always wanted to keep separate from other resistance networks 
partly for reasons of security (justified by the reprisals suffered by resistance networks in 
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1944 after the infiltration of the CDL), and partly because of wanting to keep politically 
independent, maintaining a stance that was neither Communist nor Gaullist, but which was 
definitely republican rather than being blindly patriotic.527 Fear of being compromised by 
other cause and other ideologies was paramount, and this explains both Touroude’s singular 
stance and the secretive nature of his group.528  
The other noticeable aspect was that even after the D-Day landings, attacks against 
the occupier was not something taken lightly. Whereas other networks, including those in 
chapter two, took June 6 1944 as their signal to enter into a more active fray, neither 
Touroude nor Lawday condoned direct attacks upon the Nazis- Bernard Lawday stressed, 
before saying anything else about his resistance activity ‘I never once fired on anyone’.529 His 
gun was meant purely for self-defence. This was based on the same view held by de Gaulle 
that such actions resulted in reprisals that could only harm and affect the local civilian 
population.530 With the motivation of France above the motivation of a political ideology, the 
safety of the French population was considered paramount, and not worth compromising. 
Although these resisters inscribed their action as the defence of values, these values were not 
held dogmatically above all other factors, and were also quite prepared to be satisfied with 
the Liberation of France. Lawday stated that his own role in the Liberation, and the one that 
he was proudest of, was that he delayed the retreat of the Nazis by several hours by 
continually changing the direction of the signposts at a series of different road junctions 
across Rouen and its suburbs on the rive gauche during an entire afternoon on August 30, 
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1944.531 Touroude and Lawday returned, after the Liberation, to daily life, and to their 
studies, after having fought for a short while with the FFI, which in Lawday’s case, involved 
working as an interpreter.532 Shortly after the Liberation, Bernard Lawday was re-admitted to 
Lycée Pierre Corneille- where he recognised his old History teacher, Lucien M., who had set 
as homework nearly three years earlier a thank-you letter to Pétain. He was now an ardent 
Gaullist, and on the welcoming committee for General de Gaulle’s visit to Rouen later that 
year.533  
Yet despite Lawday’s sense of bitterness about what he considered to be the failed 
nature of the épuration, there was no sense of disappointment with his resistance action- it 
was based on a value of republican patriotism- pride in defending France, and more 
specifically, the liberal republican France. This sentiment was shared by Touroude, and also 
by Remacle, whose later political journey would have marked him out as a gaulliste de 
gauche, albeit his political activities after the war being much more limited.534 This was 
slightly different from the love of a more mythical France, as we shall see in the next section.  
 
Resistance- a French destiny? Starting points, 1940-42  
The irony about what we have chosen to call national patriotism is that it is an ideology that 
refuses to see itself as such- in fact, an ideology whose precise appeal is not being 
ideological. Instead, faith is placed almost providentially in the nation, the love of one’s 
country. The ‘state patriotism’ identified by Hobsbawm was something that he also identified 
in looking at Tudor England, which he referred to as a ‘proto-nationalism’.535 Nationalism, by 
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the definition of Benedict Anderson, is an ‘imagined community’, impossible for most of 
those who live within this community to ever meet each other, and yet the communion that 
links them binds them together and shapes them as a common people with a common 
purpose.536  This deep belief in France as a providential nation drew upon a historical 
narrative that long pre-dated the Revolution of 1789- this imagined France was not that of the 
Republic and its triptych, but the France of Clovis, Charlemagne and Capet, a nation of 
francs that could find its roots within the early Middle Ages.537 
 This belief in a providential history of France was of course badly shaken by the 
defeat of 1940. Two consequent behaviours can be identified in reaction to this. The first was 
to accept the thesis of the defeat being a direct consequence of French failings in the years 
immediately before. The thesis of a decadent, declining France would go on to be the 
ideological starting point in Vichy’s Révolution Nationale.538 But if the first reaction 
provided a root for and a route into collaborationism, then the second reaction was to be a 
root for resistance- the idea that France, although it had been led catastrophically into defeat 
as a consequence of past mistakes, needed to be restored to former glories, and needed to 
repel the Nazi occupiers.539 That the same sentiment should produce two such violently 
opposing reactions and trajectories is striking, and ultimately shows the individualistic nature 
of reactions to the situation. 
 Even more striking is that this sentiment, one that often ignored traditional party-
political considerations, was sometimes also at the heart of the earliest resistance activity. 
Jacques Hamon was born in 1920 into a family that had a markedly anti-German sentiment, 
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owing to his father having been taken prisoner in the First World War. However, there was 
no traditional political ideology in the family, and Hamon never joined a party either before 
or after the war, stating “I have always wanted to keep my liberty of thought and action”.540 
Having been based at Caen from 1939-40, he was demobilised, and returned to Le Havre, 
where he heard de Gaulle’s radio broadcast of June 18. It was at this point that he said he 
decided to refuse the Vichy acceptance of the Nazi occupier.541 
 Unlike others, Hamon was not in a position whereby he was directly in professional 
contact with the occupiers- he had qualified, and was employed as, an accountant.542 The first 
resistance network he was involved with had, much like Georges Brutelle’s own experience 
of early resistance in Grand-Quevilly in the previous chapter, no name, and concentrated 
upon discussion of the Occupation, and occasional acts of mechanical sabotage- principally 
with the radiators of vehicles intended for German military use.543 It had one particularity as 
well which could be interpreted as a usage of Hirschman’s concept of ‘exit’- namely that one 
of its principal aims initially was to try and find ways of escaping to England and join the 
Free French.544 However, this idea quickly became seen as non-viable, due in no little part to 
the fact that the entire port had been requisitioned by the Kriegsmarine.545 When contact was 
finally established with Britain by radio in December 1940, they discovered that actually 
what the Free French and the British really wanted of them was to stay in France and provide 
intelligence, as well as begin collecting arms.546 This was then their first task, and they 
quickly managed to amass an arsenal of twenty mines, several rifles, and somewhere, 
according to Hamon, in the region of 3,000 bullets.547 
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However, for some resisters, the idea of making contact with the British was not one that they 
found particularly appealing. The Nivromont family was a family who considered themselves 
patriotic, at the service of France, but with a military tradition that respected the rule of law 
and kept party politics and the army separate.548 Pierre Nivromont admitted that the family 
had conservative leanings, but were never tempted to join the Croix de Feu.549 The long 
military tradition meant that Pierre had done some military training as a young man, paid for 
by a great-uncle who wanted him to go on to Saint-Cyr, and also meant that the family had a 
deep distrust of the Germans- one great-uncle of his, born in 1859, could remember the 
Prussian Occupation of 1870-71, and his father had been in the army in 1914-18.550 However, 
his father was also employed as the financial director of the Normandy division of the 
British-owned manufacturing company Davey Bickford. His regular dealings with them left 
him with a profound sense of Anglophobia, and convinced that the British were generally 
unreliable- firmly in the traditional perception of la perfide Albion.551 
 Pierre Nivromont’s entry into resistance activity was chaotic and accidental. It began 
with weapons collecting, initially by stealing from his father, who in turn had confiscated a 
revolver off an elderly great-uncle on the brink of committing suicide during the exode. The 
family returned to their home in Bihorel in the autumn of 1940, and a couple of months later, 
whilst out in the countryside near Fontaine-le-Bourg, he found a rifle. Rather than hand it in 
to the gendarmes, he took it home, and hid it in a cupboard.552 Prior to this, he and his family 
had listened to the BBC’s French broadcasts, where they heard de Gaulle, but knew next to 
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nothing about him. By his own admission later on ‘We were in the most complete and utter 
fog as to the Resistance…all we knew was that in resisting, we were only a tiny fringe of the 
total population.’553 There was no contact with the Free French- Nivromont’s resistance 
activity was inspired purely by his own initiative, and his own sense of patriotic duty. The 
collection of arms was intended for use when the Allies landed- but he had no intention of 
using them whatsoever until then.554 
 What is striking about this instance is both the precocity and the certainty. The 
precocity because it was at a very early stage of the Occupation- within months of the 
armistice. Public opinion was still largely Pétainist, the National Revolution had not yet 
encountered the widespread disillusion that it would.555 The certainty of the action is more 
striking still- the idea that there would be a liberation in 1940 must have seemed improbably 
unrealistic to many French people, yet not only did Nivromont expect it, he also seemed to be 
actively preparing for it. It was a form of resistance that was easy to carry out, for ‘there were 
all kinds of weapons available within the countryside, where the battles and skirmishes had 
been in June.’556 One can only state that this particular case can be seen as an example of 
Gaullist ideology in action- the belief in France, the belief in the future bringing a liberation 
by what de Gaulle referred to as ‘the immense forces against the enemy’,557 the belief in 
providence- the restoration of France’s sovereignty as part of its destiny. That de Gaulle was 
able to persuade at this stage even just a committed but significant minority of French people 
of the unshakeable ability of France to defeat the occupier shows how persuasive the Gaullist 
myth could be- its power lay in its simplicity, in its reassurance, in its rich, evocative 
language. 
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This power can also be seen in the way that it managed to persuade those who might not 
usually be thought of as sympathetic to Gaullism. Raphaël Mallard described his upbringing 
as patriotic, but not especially conservative.558 If anything, his father was rad-soc, a supporter 
of the Radical party. Although this was a centrist party (‘Radical’ being one of the great 
misnomers in French politics), in the rural Normandy village of Saint-Antoine-la-Forêt, near 
Yvetot, it was considered to be left-wing according to Mallard’s recollection. He recalled the 
farm next to his holding meetings in support of both the Croix de Feu and Dorgères’ 
chemises vertes in the period around 1934-36.559 This reflected the identification of the Pays 
de Caux as being profoundly conservative.560 
 Yet Mallard’s family heard the speech by de Gaulle on June 18, 1940. The speech 
was not in itself enough to inspire Mallard and his father to resist, but it appears to have had 
some sort of resonance. For Mallard père, a veteran of the trenches, it was a reminder that the 
Germans remained the enemy, and when they returned from the exode, which had taken them 
as far as the banks of the Loire, he instructed his son, who had been working in Le Havre as a 
steelworker, to give up his job in the factory, as he would otherwise be helping the Nazi war 
effort.561 Instead, Raphaël Mallard went to work on his father’s farm, helping the family 
tractor repair business.562 His father declined any possibility of work for the occupier, 
therefore avoiding any possibility of aiding the Wehrmacht. So though de Gaulle may not 
have inspired resistance in everyone who heard him speak, many others were at least inspired 
into a refusal to accommodate, a refusal to actually collaborate or to do anything that would 
assist the occupier.563  
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For Raphaël Mallard, this was to be the first step towards resistance, although he maintained 
that the decision to resist was taken by him alone.564 His motivation stemmed in part out of 
anger at the deteriorating economic situation, and in part at anger against the increasingly 
collaborationist nature of the Vichy regime.565 However, the population of his commune was, 
in his recollection ‘overwhelmingly Pétainist’, and he also recalled the Occupation there as 
being largely uneventful.566 Therefore, though he had pro-resistance sentiments, it was not 
until hearing about the Resistance via word of mouth in 1942 that he decided to join. Even 
then, to make contact with a network, he had to cycle to the Pays de Bray (a round trip of 
over 100 kilometres), and formally join a network- and apart from sheltering a resister in 
1942, he recounted that virtually all of his resistance activity took place not in Saint-Antoine-
la-Forêt, but instead in the region around Dieppe, working for Libération-Nord.567 
 So for the early resisters inspired by de Gaulle, the decision to resist required both 
fortune in terms of circumstance (ability to resist, to find arms), but also a leap of faith. De 
Gaulle’s call for patience in October 1941 was not universally well-received- though 
understandable with hindsight, it was not what many would have wanted to hear on the brink 
of what would be the second winter of the Occupation, with both Britain and the USSR not 
doing terribly well in the war.568 Waiting for Liberation in 1941 would not have felt terribly 
dissimilar to waiting for Godot in Beckett’s famous post-war play.569 In terms of action, it 
was resistance at its most pragmatic; in terms of vision, it was resistance at its most mystical. 
Yet none of these resisters seem to have considered the idea of giving up. Indeed, in 
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Mallard’s case, 1942 was very much a case of redoubling efforts, and formally integrating 
into the structures of the Resistance. 
In 1960, the British novelist Lynne Reid Banks referred to religion as ‘the pinning-up 
of faith across the ugly vista of logic to fulfill a need’.570 In these early years, where logically 
it seemed difficult to see how liberation could come, the faith in de Gaulle, in France, in its 
destiny, at least fulfilled a need for resisters to envisage an alternative to perpetual servitude 
to Nazi Germany. But from 1942 onwards, the need would be to take this idealised vision and 
carry out more concrete action. From myth disguising reality, myth would now have to re-
shape reality. 
 
A Conservative Resistance? Actions, Positions & Evolutions 
In terms of recent history, the legacy of the First World War cast a long shadow over 
collective memory- the long list of fallen names on each village’s monument to the dead saw 
to that.571 Therefore, the rapid defeat by the Germans was taken particularly badly, even more 
so by some elderly inhabitants who could remember the Prussian Occupation of 1870. The 
preparations for Operation Sealion meant that some communes were literally outnumbered- 
Ancretiéville-Saint-Victor had 250 inhabitants in 1940- and found itself lodging 300 German 
soldiers.572 To a rural society not used to dealing with outsiders even if they came from 
within Normandy, the mass of Germans descending was a shock, and they quickly earned the 
name of les doréphores, or Colorado beetles, for their grey uniforms resembled the insects 
that devastated many a potato crop.573  
 But if anti-German, then many locals were essentially pro-Vichy. An investigation 
into an allegation of a Communist sympathising schoolmaster in the small village of 
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Beaumont-le-Hareng revealed the allegation to be unsubstantiated- the schoolmaster was, if 
anything, ‘strongly in favour of the Maréchal’ but the report did concede that he had a 
reputation for ‘forthright and plain talking’ that did not always endear him to his fellow 
villagers- and that furthermore, there was ‘no terrorist activity in the commune… no 
dissenting opinions against the Maréchal.’574 
 This may have over-estimated the popularity of Pétain in 1941-1942, but it was 
certainly true that in 1940, it would have been very difficult to find anyone in rural 
Normandy with a bad word to say about him. He was seen largely as a saviour, even by those 
who had fought the Germans, such as André Gosse, who fought in the Battle of Biville-la-
Baignarde, where the village was destroyed in a German assault, killing 31 villagers.575 
For a leader of a resistance network, Gosse’s background seems so atypical to that of 
many resisters, that it seems difficult to believe that he ever joined the Resistance. Born in 
1909 into a rural, Catholic family, his father was a gendarme. Fervently Catholic, he was a 
strong supporter of traditional values. “I have always been a patriot, and have always been in 
favour of order and the family” he said, explaining his opposition to the Communists.576 That 
he saw them as being contrary to all three explains his political journey in the early 1930s. He 
supported Colonel de la Rocque’s Croix de Feu whilst he was stationed in Vernon doing his 
military service, and took leave to go to Paris to take part in one of their demonstrations in 
February 1934- though as he was at pains to stress, it was not the demonstration-cum-riot of 
February 6.577 After being demobbed and returning to Seine-Inférieure, becoming a 
smallholder in the Pays de Caux, he remained committed to the leagues, and took part in an 
anti-Popular Front demonstration in 1936. Even after the war started, his far-Right 
sympathies were still evident- he admitted to relief when Pétain became Premier, and saw 
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this as the beginning of the era that he had hoped for some years earlier. He confessed in 
1983 to expressing Anglophobic sentiments in the wake of the bombing of the fleet at Mers-
el-Kébir, and anti-Russian sentiments for much of this period.578 
 The figure of Pétain, by contrast, seems largely absent from the testimony of Raoul 
Boulanger. But then again, Raoul Boulanger was another atypical resister. He worked as a 
farmer in the Pays de Bray, between Ry and Saint-Denis-le-Thiboult, but was a farmer who 
also worked as an engineer to make ends meet.579 At the outbreak of the war in 1939, he was 
called up, and saw out the ‘phoney war’. His regiment was hopelessly outmanoeuvred in 
1940, and went into retreat. He was wounded, and taken prisoner in La Rochelle. However, 
having recovered from his wounds, he escaped, but did not report back for duty, instead 
going AWOL from the army prior to the armistice.580 Thus, he was simultaneously wanted by 
both the French and the Germans. With the breakdown of all infrastructure, Boulanger took 
advantage of the ensuing chaos, and hitch-hiked from the Charente-Inférieure in the west to 
Isère, an Alpine department near the border with Italy. Here, he took refuge, and managed to 
meet his wife again, who had fled there during the exode of June 1940. With the zone libre 
returning to something approaching normal, they then travelled from the Alps to the southern 
Languedoc region, where they spent the summer working in odd jobs until September 1940, 
when the wine harvest finished, and the situation had settled down to the point where 
Boulanger could feel safe enough to return to his farm in Normandy and not be arrested by 
either the French police or the Germans.581  
 Upon return, Boulanger used his engineering skills to tunnel underground and build a 
rudimentary shelter, for use as a hiding place.582 Then, in early 1941, with armaments left 
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lying around from the retreat, he began to collect various weapons. He solicited some of the 
casual farm labourers to help him. Most of these weapons consisted of bayonets, but they did 
find a few revolvers, which were gratefully accepted. These were hidden in a shallow trench 
on farmland.583 Though this might be interpreted as preparation for violence, Boulanger 
stated that the revolvers were only for self-defence- it was the bayonets that were more 
interesting, as they could be used for other purposes, such as sabotage, as ‘bayonets were 
very useful for cutting phone lines’. 1941 saw an active resistance network take shape under 
Boulanger, albeit with just five or six men.584 
 There appears to have been two turning points for this rural resistance. The first had 
been in the autumn of 1940, and the photographs of Pétain and Hitler at Montoire. This seems 
to have started the process of disenchantment with Vichy, compounded further by the 
material hardships experienced, and the realisation that Vichy was hardly any better at 
delivering than the discredited and distrusted Third Republic.585 None of this though served 
as an actual catalyst for resisting- Boulanger’s group appears to have been far more anti-
German than anti-Vichy at this time.586 The catalyst did not come until 1942, and the 
introduction of the Service du Travail Obligatoire (STO), which represents a second turning 
point, and one with arguably more consequences for actual acts of resistance. 
 The Eure was especially threatened by the STO, and a large number of Eure resisters 
appear to have come, in terms of socio-economic categories, from agriculture. That they also 
had the means to provide shelter also explains the predominance of farmers in resistance 
there- they made up just 3.8% of the Eure’s population at this time, but 21.3% of all resisters, 
second only to artisans, who made up 25% of the resisters, and who were similarly threatened 
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by the introduction of the STO.587 Resistance in the Eure had been limited until then- in 1941 
and 1942 put together, there were only four attacks against Nazis and Vichyites put together, 
and not one single derailment.588 But after the introduction of the STO draft, a number of 
groups took root in the rural western Eure.589 
 Similarly, the STO draft also spurred Raoul Boulanger into widening his resistance 
activities. He made contact with an American agent, and the group widened to become a 
network, and to provide intelligence as well as carry out sabotage, and Boulanger began to 
welcome a large number of réfractaires.590 It was at this point that one of the most 
unorthodox resistance groups in Upper Normandy came into being- Les diables noirs. 
Because of the increasingly large numbers of men in the network, and the fact that they were 
carrying out more and more derailments and sabotage, the need arose for disguises. 
Boulanger took his inspiration from 1930s American gangster movies, and so the maquisards 
wore balaclavas with holes cut out for the eyes, nose and mouth, dressed entirely in black, 
and wore the wide hats favoured by Al Capone and his contemporaries in Chicago during the 
late 1920s and 1930s. Boulanger then christened his alter ego ‘Fantomas’, because he only 
appeared at night.591  
It was a curious form of engaging in resistance. On the one hand, Boulanger’s 
activities seem redolent of the ‘outlaw’ culture identified by H.R. Kedward, or one of the 
‘bandits’ of Eric Hobsbawm.592 Boulanger cultivated a reputation as an outlaw, man of the 
people, for the people, more like Robin Hood than a robbing, thieving hoodlum. Yet on the 
other, Boulanger argued strongly against the use of violence: 
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Attacking the boches was stupid. All it achieved was a hundred hostages, 
and even more killing… Killing en masse, like what happened at 
Oradour… Even when our people were being arrested and tortured, we did 
not kill Germans- it served nothing but get more people killed… We would 
have had another Oradour…It was the one thing that we never did.593 
 
But unlike the outlaws of southern France that interested Kedward, Boulanger represented 
order. He saw his resistance activity as purely the defence of the nation.  Raoul Boulanger 
considered that this was far greater, and far more important in the development of his maquis 
than politics and ideology: 
 
We had no links at all with either the Socialists or the Freemasons. All 
politics and ideology was forbidden- except for General de Gaulle of 
course, whose appel du 18 juin had all given us much hope… and there 
were no links with Communist movements. We did have some [resisters] 
with Communist links, but I felt that 27 months of living together 
underground was more important [than political affiliation].594 
 
The ‘living together’ that he mentions was the consequence of the continual revisions and 
extension to the shelter that Boulanger created. In a territory that was not topographically 
favourable to maquisard activity in the same way as much of the Midi was, Boulanger 
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created a network that for over two years functioned as a maquis.595 This was because the 
shelter had been widened so that come 1944, it had become an underground bunker. Though 
it only accommodated twenty or so maquisards, it could have welcomed up to seventy. Also 
included apart from dormitories were a kitchen, a dining room, a lounge, and a gym allowing 
resisters to maintain their strength underground when unable to roam outside- they 
maintained their strength by weightlifting. Altogether, the network consisted of some eighty 
people.596  
 By 1944, they had derailed an express train between Amiens and Rouen, destroyed a 
bridge, severely limiting German train movements for the remainder of the Occupation, and 
raided a 250 hectare weapons dump at the Château de la Haye.597 It was perhaps this audacity 
that was their undoing- Alie’s counter-terrorist brigade arrested them in March 1944 in a 
dawn raid that consisted of Alie himself directing operations, fifty French police officers, and 
the same again in German soldiers.598  
 The STO also drove André Gosse from a state of being dissatisfied with Vichy, to 
active resistance. He joined a network based in Auffray in 1942 consisting of a newsagent 
and an engineer. By 1943, this became the network Léopard. From a humble start consisting 
of a handful of members, it had 121 come the Liberation, across two cantons and twelve 
communes.599 Like Boulanger, violence was rejected, as the network was not really a maquis 
unit, though it did shelter réfractaires from the STO draft, and he later recognised the role of 
them in the network.600 Gosse’s military background advised him of the folly of engaging the 
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Germans in armed combat. Léopard instead made contact via radio with London, and sent 
intelligence on the railway lines between Rouen and Dieppe, and the line running across from 
Bosc-le-Hard to Serqueux.601 Railway workers in rural Normandy, who were more isolated 
and less exposed to left-wing propaganda than their urban counterparts in areas such as 
Rouen, helped and carried out their most daring raid when on April 9, 1944, they broke into 
the sidings at Dieppe during the night and put fourteen trains out of use.602  
 Like many of the resisters in the Eure featured in chapter two, they had an attentiste 
attitude, waiting until D-Day to take up arms, when conditions were more favourable. Unlike 
their counterparts in the Maquis Surcouf or Nonancourt, they did not suffer heavy losses. 
After the Canadians and the British crossed the Seine at Caudebec and at Mantes-la-Jolie, the 
Wehrmacht retreat generally was quite rapid, and though there were some skirmishes, leading 
to a handful of resisters being killed, by the time Léopard had to fight, the retreating 
occupiers were disheartened and willing to surrender.603 Over the course of three days 
between August 31 and September 2, 1944, Léopard, now part of the FFI, took 229 Germans 
into custody, almost double their own number, before handing them to the Canadians and the 
British.604 
 Gosse returned to farming, but found himself besieged with offers of military 
commissions and safe seats and posts from a number of political parties. Gosse, though, was 
interested in none of these, and did not approve of the petty politicking that characterised 
French politics from late 1945 onwards. In a ceremony to mark the Liberation of Biville-la-
Baignarde, the same commune where he had fought in vain against the Germans in 1940, and 
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which had been destroyed by the German onslaught, killing thirty-one civilians, he turned to 
face those gathered, and made the following speech: 
 
From now on, today, August 31, 1946, I will no longer accept either any 
further military or any further civil honours. Those [honours] of my 
brothers-in-arms who fell or who were tortured was their blood that flowed 
from their wounds. I will belong to no political party or affiliation. I will 
remain, if God is willing, for you all, le Léopard. The people of the Pays de 
Caux know me. [They know that] I keep my word.605 
 
For Gosse, as for many resisters who belonged to the agrarian and rural working class, 
ideology, and politics, was something to be rejected. Community structures and identity were 
far more important to defend, as well as a sense of national identity. For them, they had 
always had what would later be called ‘a certain vision of France’.606  
 The resistance networks of rural areas often incorporated notables, and this respect of 
existing society, the ties and links that bind, was what the most successful resistance 
networks of the countryside was built on. This was exemplified in the existence of the 
Organisation de Résistance de l’Armée (ORA). This was a resistance movement that did not 
exist even nationally until the beginning of 1943.607 For the first two years, many of its 
resisters had been loyal to Vichy, seeing itself as part of the armistice army that had 
surrendered in 1940, and which was following the orders of what it considered a legitimate 
regime in Vichy. It was only the events of November 1942, whereby the Allies arrived in the 
French territories of North Africa, and the southern free zone had consequently been 
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annexed, that many of those who would make up the ORA joined. This was the case for 
Robert Flavigny, a young cadet at Saint-Cyr, who found himself, along with the rest of his 
class, demobilised in his fresherman term in the autumn of 1942 after the Wehrmacht moved 
to occupy the whole of l’Hexagone.608 Flavigny duly returned to his mother’s home in 
Evreux, from where he was drafted into the forestry service in the east of the Eure around 
Lyons-la-Forêt. He initially joined a resistance network created by a former classmate, before 
joining the ORA in the summer of 1943, which was firstly under the command of Captain 
Folio, and then, when Folio moved onto take the regional command, an artillery captain 
named Michel Multrier.609 
 The ORA was a resistance network that was always to one side of much of the 
internal resistance.610 Firstly, they rejected politics ostensibly. Resistance, Flavigny recalled, 
was conceived purely from an angle of national defence.611 The ideological motivation was 
clearly one of patriotism, but firmly what we have chosen to call national patriotism. It was 
the country rather than any values per se that counted, and again, a faith in a providential 
interpretation of France. This tension meant that resistance was conceived differently to many 
of the other resistance networks and movements in Upper Normandy because there was a 
stress upon patria rather than the community of peoples. Another tension was that military 
action was designed entirely about the preparation of the battle for Normandy- liberation was 
conceived uniquely around a military objective rather than a civic objective, that is to say the 
battle for hearts and minds via propaganda and the clandestine press. The ORA made no 
attempt to engage in any kind of political debate, or even to offer any fixed modelised 
conception of the polis and French society. A final tension was that whereas the 
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hierarchisation of many resistance networks was more informal, amongst the ORA, 
hierarchisation was governed by army grades, and the ranks held prior to 1942.612  
   To this end, there was a certain amount of corporatism, which had been a key 
element of the ideological aspects of the National Revolution led by Vichy. Laurent Douzou 
and Denis Peschanski, and later, Johanna Barsasz, identified a category of resister called 
‘Vichysto-résistant’, a label to identify resisters who had supported the Vichy regime earlier 
on in the Occupation, but who took part in resistance later on, without changing their own 
opinions.613 In Barsasz’s study, she focused upon resistance networks that had drawn upon 
the military and on Vichyite institutions, and in particular the officer class.614  
 This particular case is slightly different, as neither Boulanger nor Gosse were officers, 
or even career soldiers, but their trajectories could be identified as bearing similarities to that 
of many Vichysto-résistants. They identified with the image of a strong, sovereign France, 
and had a certain belief in the Pétainist thesis of a moral decline, but the identification of 
Vichy as a collaborationist regime, both in terms of ideologies and its policies, caused them 
to turn away from Vichy, and to take up the struggle once again. 
 Initially, the ORA identified itself as being giraudiste, or loyal to General Giraud, 
who had escaped to North Africa in 1942, and whom, for a while, was seen by the Allies as 
an alternative to de Gaulle. Giraud himself did not have a rigourous doctrine, but was both 
opposed to Nazi Occupation and broadly supportive, at least until 1942-43, of the National 
Revolution. He proclaimed himself to be above party politics, and acting in France’s 
interests. 615 Yet the repudiation of political parties, and of politics in its broadest sense, was 
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an element of Vichy ideology and its rhetoric- the National Revolution and the dissolving of 
the legislature, followed in 1941 by the replacement of most municipal councils with 
délégations spéciales, ensured this. 
 It was the exhalting of the nation above all else. Resistance was thus conceived in a 
nationalistic sense- the sense that had also led to an acceptance of Vichy and Pétain in 1940. 
Boulanger and Gosse can be interpreted thus as having not changed sides, but simply having 
modified their means of expression- their ideals remained the same, but by 1942, they felt 
that resistance best channelled their ideals, whereas in the summer of 1940, they felt as 
though their beliefs were best expressed by Marshal Pétain. Equally, that nationalistic sense 
would also lead many away from Giraud, and then onto de Gaulle, after Giraud was 
marginalised. This can be seen in the Seine-Inférieure, where despite the ORA being 
dismantled by the Gestapo and the Carlingue in May 1944, two former resisters from its 
ranks were able to play an important role in the Liberation- Michel Multrier became 
commander of the FFI in Seine-Inférieure, and Jacques Chastellain became a Gaullist who 
was elected Mayor of Rouen in 1945.616 Rather like Boulanger & Gosse, both Multrier and 
Chastellain after the war adopted a Gaullist stance, conveniently forgetting any embarrassing 
previous support for Vichy and the maréchal. If resisters such as André Pican represented 
resistance as a revolutionary element,617 determined to change society, Raoul Boulanger and 
André Gosse saw resistance as defending their nation and their immediate surroundings, for 
whom resistance was the natural outlet for les déçus du maréchalisme.  
 To this end, although their resistance and their ideological beliefs could be seen as 
being conservative, and there can be little doubting that these resisters held views that were 
politically on the Right, what Barasz terms vichysto-résistance was actually remarkably 
                                                             
616 Michel Baldenweck, La Résistance …, pp. 62-63. 
617 See chapter one. 
160 
 
malleable in practice.618 Over the course of four years of occupation, their trajectory went 
from one extreme to another seemingly. But in another way, their beliefs remained 
remarkably the same. National patriotism, similarly to the kind identified by Hobsbawm,619 
could override any change in ideological direction, provided that the constant of all action 
remained the defence and the interests of the Nation, and that all political considerations and 
resistance action were subservient to the Nation. This was the principal difference in 
resistance between national patriotism, which exalted France, and its providential destiny 
from the time of les Francs, and republican patriotism, which exalted France and its peoples 
and values.  
 
Not the certain idea of France? Immigrants & Resistance, 1940-44 
The 2010 film L’Armée du Crime opens with a roll call of different names. Each name is of 
differing ethnic origins, whether it be Russian, or Romanian, or Polish. Yet after each name, 
the chorus is the same- ‘Mort pour la France’. The effect is to remind the viewer that not 
every resister was called Dupont or Dubois.620  
This was shown in Normandy in 2004, when as part of a series of fact sheets on the 
history of Rouen and its surroundings, Alain Alexandre wrote a pamphlet on resistance and 
liberation. In the introduction, there is a photograph of ten people in civilian clothes, 
consisting of nine men and one woman, five sat around a table, containing three visible 
glasses of beer. The caption informs us that this was a group of Spanish resisters, 
photographed in 1943 in Rouen.621   
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In numerical terms, immigrants were only a very small minority- Catherine Blanquet’s study, 
based on a sample of over 800 files at the departmental anciens combattants office, found 
that just 2.6% of resisters were from outside of France. Of these, no one nationality is 
predominant, although the largest single nationality is Belgians, followed by Spanish. 
Altogether, nine nationalities other than French are identified in the study, with perhaps the 
most surprising being an American fighting with the FTP.622  
 Resistance in the Eure contained a number of people from immigrant backgrounds, 
who felt threatened by the STO, as they had fled to France to avoid fascist regimes in Italy 
and Spain. There were Spaniards, in Simone Sauteur’s recollection, working for the forestry 
service as lumberjacks, who joined the maquis as combatants. The Spanish refugees however 
did not join en masse- instead, they joined individually the maquis nearest to them.623 This 
was also true of Italian resisters in the Eure, 624 who were implanted in the south-east of the 
Eure in and around Vernon, and tended to be economic migrants rather than refugees.625      
There was a Franco-Belgian network in Seine-Inférieure called Delbo-Phénix, which 
specialised in gathering intelligence in the area around Dieppe, and existed between 1942 and 
1943. Many of the members were French rather than Belgian, and although the network itself 
had no formal ideological leaning, at least one of its members was simultaneously in the FTP, 
engaged in sabotage actions.626 Albert Pognant however considered these actions to be 
complimentary, and not contradictory- moreover, neither network knew of the other.627 This 
supports the thesis of résistance-mouvement rather than the idea of a coordinated organisation 
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when one looks at the nature of resistance in practice and on the ground- even this late in the 
Occupation. 
Nationality seems not necessarily to have been a deciding factor in the orientation of a 
network’s activities. It was more a question of circumstance. If Belgian was the largest non-
French nationality represented amongst resisters in Seine-Inférieure, it was a reflection of the 
local sociological composition of the time. The First World War had seen an influx of 
refugees from Belgium, and the department had the highest number per capita of Belgians of 
any department in France even in the 1920s and 1930s.628 Equally, with regard to the 
participation of Italians in resistance in the Eure, it was limited to areas where the Italian 
population was already well-implanted.629  
 There was also a concentration of Spanish resisters in Saint-Etienne-du-Rouvray 
within the FTP. Felicimo Vicente recounted being part of a small group of Spanish 
Republicans who from early on the Occupation, decided to try and resist the Nazi 
Occupation. In 1941, they became part of the FTP, and engaged in the Communist 
Resistance, whose ideas they were closest to, although in truth, convenience also played a 
part- it was the resistance network in the commune.630  
There were two sides of immigrant participation within resistance. There is a 
Communist, or maybe Communisant, perspective- the clandestine PC representing 
internationalism in a society that was becoming increasingly chauvinist. Blanquet’s research 
indicates that a majority of immigrant resisters in Seine-Inférieure were affiliated to the 
FTP.631 Gérard Abrahamovici was born in 1925 in Romania, but his parents moved to France 
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for economic reasons in the early 1930s.632 He joined in 1941 the network of Georges 
Touroude as a schoolboy at Lycée Corneille, but unlike Touroude and Lawday, had firm 
Communist sympathies, and joined the FTP proper, involved chiefly in propaganda and 
sabotage actions. Touroude indicates that he did share anti-fascist, pro-French ideals, but that 
for Abrahamovici, Communism represented the best expression of these French ideals in the 
20th century, and appealed to his desire to defeat Nazism.633 
The story of Abrahamovici does reflect to a certain extent what Gavin Bowd showed 
in his study of Romanians in resistance- that they were mostly Jewish in terms of ethnicity 
and Communist in terms of political outlook, but also that as a consequence of the repression 
that they suffered, his story has been one relegated from the main narrative of resistance.634 
Bowd identified that the involvement of Romanians raises questions about the role of 
nationalism and patriotism in the Resistance, and the impact of internationalism, yet in this 
instance, internationalism appears to have been of secondary importance.635 In any event, as 
François Furet has identified at a national level and Claude-Paul Couture in his study of the 
local clandestine press, Communist resistance at this time tended to stress French concerns 
over any dimension of a global struggle, preferring Jacobinism over internationalism.636  
But a significant minority- well over 40% according to Blanquet’s study- were not in 
Communist-affiliated networks, and saw their cause not as one of internationalism, but of 
identification as wanting to be French- the politics of identity rather than the politics of 
ideology.637 One of the best examples of this was the trajectory of Bronislaw Piontek. Piontek 
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was born in 1913, in Poland. His family only came to France in 1923, as economic migrants 
who worked (in both Poland and in France) in agriculture. He only took French citizenship in 
1934 at the age of twenty-one. Yet when asked in 1982 to describe himself and his identity, 
he replied that he was ‘un immigré, naturalisé de souche’.638 The use of de souche is 
interesting as well as oxymoronic- it implies that one could become “authentically” French 
via a period or a process of naturalisation- the difference between naturalised as French, and 
naturalised as ‘native’.  
Neither Piontek nor his parents were politically active in the sense of belonging to 
parties or unions. Their outlooks were formed by past experience and by education. The 
family history was one already heavily marked by occupations- Piontek said that his parents 
had lived through no fewer than three foreign occupations in Poland- by Austria, by Russia, 
and by Germany.639 This in itself instructed the family that occupation was never a benign 
experience. The one constant in a family history that was marked by an uncertain sense of 
national identity was Catholicism. Yet Bronislaw Piontek, at roughly the same time as taking 
French citizenship, stopped practising. For him, French identity was now the identity that 
counted above all, and although he worked as an apprentice fitter with the Chantiers de 
Normandie in the Rouen docks, he was relatively apolitical (unlike his colleagues)- and he 
saw French education, and moreover French culture more widely, as a process of self-
improvement. This included learning about French literature and history in his spare time, but 
also engaging within popular culture - he cited that the most important thing to retain from 
his early life-history was that he was the regional wrestling champion for Normandy in the 
mid-1930s.640 This would indicate that Piontek believed strongly in the onus being upon 
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immigrants to integrate within French culture and society, whether it be la culture populaire 
or la culture savante. 
 Piontek had done his military service in the French air force as a radio operator, and 
returned to that role in 1939 at the outbreak of the war, which started with Nazi Germany 
invading Poland. However, he said that his outlook at this time was French rather than Polish, 
although the one constant between the two was Germanophobia- a sentiment that he saw as 
linking both his past heritage and his present engagement.641 His unit was evacuated to the 
south-western department of Gers just a few days before Pétain asked for an armistice, and so 
despite being a member of the armed forces, he was not taken prisoner- his unit was not 
disbanded until August, and he was allowed to return to Normandy. He did not join the 
Resistance straight away, but instead returned to the Chantiers de Normandie, and began 
resistance activity at the end of 1940 by occasionally sabotaging lorries. The choice of what 
lorries he sabotaged seems to have been haphazard- he did not sabotage every lorry that he 
worked on for the occupier, and it depended on his sentiments at the time. He described his 
over-riding sentiment at this time being one of disappointment- which as 1941 went along, 
gave way more to a sense of anger- informed by his work, which saw the scale of the Nazi 
war effort become truly apparent, he decided to start resistance actions, although he did not 
feel able to go further until comparatively late in the Occupation- the summer of 1943. He 
described his sentiments as progressing from a déçu to a révolté.642 The reason for him not 
entering formally into a resistance network until quite late in the Occupation was in part 
because of his work situation- although a member before the war of the CGT, he called his 
membership purely a practical matter- a professional adhesion rather than an ideological 
                                                             




adhesion, which meant that he never wanted to join the FTP. In fact, he only joined because 
of his brother joining a network- the intelligence network Salesman-Hamlet. 643 
Even Salesman-Hamlet were a network quite apart from the rest of the Resistance- 
they were in close contact with the Special Operations Executive (SOE), but not the other 
networks within the region.644 Strictly speaking, they were more of a circuit of SOE than a 
network of the Resistance. Their activity was motivated purely by a desire to liberate France, 
and their action revolved entirely around the preparation of Allied landings- including mock 
invasions (what to do in the event of Allied landings), radio intelligence, transporting arms, 
and the sabotage of German installations. But they drew the line at attacks against people, 
which they feared would plunge the country into civil war- they even referred to other 
resisters who did such actions (e.g. the Front National and FTP) as ‘terrorists’- the same word 
as what Vichy used to describe them.645  
The attitude of Piontek could be described as being one of expression politics, but 
within a pragmatic approach. His resistance revolved around both his patriotic sentiments, but 
also his professional competences- as well as sabotaging vehicles and installations, he was 
also a bodyguard for SOE’s radio operator, Isidore Newman. Furthermore, he was charged 
with ensuring that Newman did not have to speak in public, owing to the Englishman’s less 
than competent oral proficiency in the French language.646 In working for SOE, strictly 
political sentiments were put to one side in the name of military efficiency. To this extent, 
Piontek’s trajectory can be seen as moving from accommodation to resistance, albeit a 
resistance that was slightly apart from the Resistance, and come 1944, was more orientated 
towards liberation than resistance for the sake of resistance- ultimately a pragmatic approach 
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to expressing the sentiment of patriotism, like the approach of André Gosse. This though, was 
limited in its actual impact upon the Liberation- Salesman-Hamlet was broken up by the 
Gestapo, and Piontek was arrested on March 11 1944.       
Another foreign resister who was keen to establish a French identity from his 
resistance action was Svetislav Tschitt, born in the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1889, and 
resident during the war just outside Le Havre in Sainte-Adresse. He fought in World War 
One as a volunteer in the Belgian army, and then came to France where he found work in Le 
Havre as a mechanic.647 A largely enigmatic figure, Tschitt appears to have never bore arms, 
or even spoken about his resistance experience, having died in November 1944 from injuries 
suffered in the bombing raid of September 5 1944.648 His involvement with the Resistance 
was with a small group with a bizarre title- Le Vagabond Bien Aimé, which was also the title 
of a 1937 film starring Maurice Chevalier. 
The network started in 1940 as a resistance newspaper called Le Patriote, and seems 
to have specialised mostly in propaganda. Each edition contained the slogan ‘When one 
hasn’t given everything, one has given nothing’.649 The sentiments were patriotic, and largely 
devoid of any party political ideology. According to Georges Godefroy, Tschitt was largely 
involved in the writing and distribution of these papers, which led to an incident whereby he 
was released from custody by the Feldgendarmerie, who arrested him on suspicion of 
distributing clandestine newspapers- but after having searched his home, and been unable to 
find any papers, released him- it seems that the idea of an immigrant writing such patriotic 
texts was not an idea that the occupiers could entertain.650 
Some other immigrant resisters did not work in networks, but acted alone. In Bolbec, 
in between Le Havre and Rouen, an Austrian anti-fascist called Wilhelm Weiss settled in 
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1938, fleeing the Anschluss. Weiss lived quietly just outside the town, and kept a low public 
profile during the Occupation. This had a twin effect- it enabled him to provide assistance to 
individual resisters, and also to réfractaires, but also meant that at the Liberation, he was 
arrested, having been accused of collaborating and assisting the enemy- an accusation which 
it transpired was founded on nothing more than an assumption based on his nationality, and 
of which he was quickly cleared.651 
In terms of sheer numbers, foreigners were not a large contribution to resistance in 
Upper Normandy, as Blanquet has indicated.652 Their contribution is to show that resistance 
was not exclusively French in terms of ethnic make-up. Though immigrant resisters fell both 
sides of the Communist/non-Communist divide, they all seem to have a common motive- a 
vision of France as a terre d’accueil and a template of civilisation. All had come to France, 
not always for political reasons, but sometimes for economic reasons. Yet they had adopted 
France as a home, and conceived and adopted a certain idea of being French. This was 
something that was key to Piontek in his second interview given to the archivists at Rouen, 
also in 1982, where he talked about his experience of deportation, and his reflections upon 
being a resister. It is worth noting that after surviving both Buchenwald and Auschwitz, he 
returned to Normandy, and eventually to the Chantiers de Normandie, but then became a 
teacher of History and Geography in a technical lycée, and correspondent for the CH2GM,653 
so this may help to explain the nature of his observations: 
 
The Resistance was, for me, at first a disappointment with the defeat of 1940, 
and then it was every French person needing to defend their country, 
wherever they may be, by whatever means…I would have liked more French 
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people to have resisted… The Resistance was an issue of conscience… We 
were alone, an individual facing up to a problem alone, it was not always 
easy… [it was] not a political or social project.654  
 
For immigrant resisters, resistance was about belonging to a vision of France, the country that 
had welcomed them. It was also about proving themselves to be French, proof to have 
integrated into a society that, ironically, was governed by a regime set on demonising them. 
For Piontek, resistance was not something that should be measured numerically. It was an 
engagement of the individual, which frames the question even further in terms of identities 
and where one belonged. To define being French and being a resister depended on the 
individual visions, and highlights again the importance of applying Koselleck’s twin 
emphasis upon expectation and experience (Erwartungshorizont) when it comes to the 
understanding ofresistance mentality and action.655 The inability to understand what he called 
‘the philosophy of the Resistance’ was what Piontek reproached in the work of Raymond 
Ruffin.656  
So the nightmarish vision conjured up by the Vichyites of a foreign-backed army of 
bandits and brigands is quite false. Firstly, resisters of immigrant origin were a minority 
strand within a movement that was, in itself, within a minority strand of French society. To 
use the word ‘army’ would itself be linguistically inappropriate under the circumstances. But 
also, in the case of Upper Normandy, most resisters of immigrant origin did not engage in 
violent action (and were condemning of violence), and were determined to lead lives that 
were respectful of their adopted homeland. Furthermore, they were not all Communists as 
depicted by Vichy, and this section shows that immigrants in the Resistance were more than 
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just the FTP-MOI.657 Many were simply determined to prove that they were as French as the 
French, if not more so. What they lacked in ethnicity, they attempted to make up for in 
conceptions, visions, and actions. To them, unlike Vichy, être français was about values, not 
racial purity. 
A reflection of this is a comparison between immigrants in resistance in this region, 
and the picture at a national level. Writing a history of immigrants in resistance nationally is, 
as Denis Peschanski noted, difficult, because they were mainly concentrated in a 
geographically small area of France- namely the Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the Lorraine, and the 
area around Paris.658 But he notes that immigrants tended largely to fight in groups defined by 
their immigrant identity in these areas, and this is reflected also in the work of Rolande 
Trempé in the south-west.659 This is not the case with immigrants in Upper Normandy- they 
joined the groups nearest to them or the ones that they identified with the most according to 
circumstances or beliefs, just as ‘native’ French people did. Occasionally they joined 
together, but even then, it has not been possible in this research to identify any group vaguely 
equivalent to the MOI, or any unit of the MOI, present in Upper Normandy during the course 
of this period. It is perfectly possible to talk about immigrants in resistance in Upper 
Normandy, but it is not possible to argue that there was an immigrant resistance in Upper 
Normandy. 
However, the conclusion that Peschanski arrives at for immigrant resisters is one that 
is shared by this analysis- namely that resistance was linked clearly to the process of 
integration into French society for these resisters.660 What immigrant resisters had in common 
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was a desire to be seen as French, a feeling of being French, or at the very least of knowing 
and sharing what they held to be French values, and an identification with being French. 
There is a clear sense of patriotism that runs through this current, whether the resisters in 
question were with the Communists or not, and this was the patriotism of those who were 
integrating into France, and proving their worth to French society. This integrational 
patriotism was, like the patriotism of those who were native-born French, born out of an 
affection for France, but rather than the France of republican legacies in republican 
patriotism, or the providential France of national patriotism, this was the France of the pays 
d’accueil.661  
 
Modern ephebes? Resistance as Remasculation  
Having identified multiple patriotisms amongst patriotic resistance, what is it that binds these 
different patriotisms, despite sometimes stark differences? To some extent, the ‘imagined 
communities’ argument advanced by Benedict Anderson could apply to describe patriotic 
resistance as much as what it does nationalism.662 Despite all of these differing strands and 
conceptions of resistance, and the fact that each resister had their own conception of what 
resistance was, “the Resistance” was something that each resister felt as though they could 
share amongst other resisters- the very fact of resistance, of engagement within a mass 
struggle, was what bound resisters more than anything. 
 But what bound resisters specifically who felt involved in resistance primarily as a 
patriotic struggle was that they were restoring France and French sovereignty, not just 
legalistically, as implied in the title of Michel Baldenweck’s doctoral thesis, but also 
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psychologically. We have mentioned at the beginning of this chapter how 1940 represented 
the crisis not just in French identity, but also in French masculinity, and France’s sense of 
self-worth. The Resistance, and the ensuing liberation in 1944, gave these men a chance to 
redress this.663 For many FFI units, their armed action after D-Day essentially consisted of 
intensifying their existing actions of sabotage, and at the Liberation, acting as guarantors of 
law and order and securing local landmarks in the case of Le Havre, or mairies in the case of 
several villages in the Pays de Caux.664 This allowed for resisters to pose as liberators of their 
villages and towns, and gave the Resistance an important social function- as having restored 
French (and local) honour. This was apparent in the post-war rhetoric of André Gosse, hailing 
the virtues of the cauchois, and framing his action within loyalty to them, and also, at a 
national level, in the speech made by de Gaulle at the Hôtel de Ville in Paris on August 24, 
1944.  
What then links patriotic identity and the expression of this patriotism as resistance? 
The answer is a gendered construction of self-identity and the nation. In this chapter, female 
resisters have largely been absent, though we will be looking at them in chapter four. The 
argument is that resistance was gendered in the same way that French society at large was 
gendered, and that the resisters that we have covered here in this chapter were the masculine, 
virile, representation of the Resistance- young men rising up and fighting for their country. 665 
Patriotism is anything but a gender-neutral concept; the word’s etymology comes from 
patria, meaning ‘fatherland’. Paternalism was re-established after the Revolution by the 
Napoleonic Code, and Napoleonic society also revered the army.666 At the beginning of the 
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20th century, military service became universal for all young men, enshrining the concept of 
the levée en masse further into the French psyche (having its origin in the Battle of Valmy in 
1792).667 1940, with the swift shock of defeat, and the armistice reducing the French army to 
a very small role, was an emasculating experience, or possibly a “de-masculinising” 
experience. Fabrice Virgili has written about how the Occupation forced France into a 
submissive, unmasculine, relationship with Germany- and the Liberation with its purges was 
seen as a process of restoring French national pride.668 I would like to contend that the 
Resistance can be seen in much the same light- the resisters examined in this chapter were 
motivated by a sense of anger at the shame of occupation, and many had either not fought or 
fought all too briefly in 1940. For these resisters, resistance was their chance to fight for the 
nation, and atone for the errors and the defeat of four years previously.  
Moreover, at the beginning of this chapter, we talked about the nation and the 
community as structures of family and of kinship. Military service was not simply a case of 
enough men to fight off a foreign invader or quell any trouble in the colonies- it was also a 
case of bringing young French men into society as fully-grown men. The resisters in this 
chapter were often aged in their late teens or early twenties, and they were seeking the 
approval of their peers, and in the case of resisters of immigrant origin, seeking 
appartenance, or belonging. In the process of forging a self-identity, resisting was a form of 
initiation into adulthood, and with it the assumption of paternal, or masculine, roles in a 
masculine society. These resisters were now les hommes de famille, and could take part in 
political affairs within their communities. They had proved their masculinity by engaging in 
the forefront of the struggle with the Nazi occupier, during it seemed the violence of the final 
months of the war, and helping to drive them out of Normandy and France- the heirs to the 
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poilus of 1914-18, or those who had fought for the Republic in the 19th century- which as 
John Horne has argued, was in itself an inherently masculine institution.669 
We have talked in the introduction about framing resistance within the structure of 
polis, or what the French call la cité. The work of Raoul Lonis shows how the polis was 
structured by a series of circles that functioned inside the greater collective of the polis, 
which was essentially a group of men, then bound together by bonds of family and of 
association.670 One of the most important characteristics in ancient Greece was the concept of 
ephebos. This was a two-year period of military service where young men not only fought for 
their polis, and proved their masculinity, thereby proving not just their capacity for military 
service, but also their citizenship. Once their service was complete, usually at around the age 
of twenty, they were considered as having become full members of the phratria, or 
brotherhood, and were then considered full citizens, and admitted to what Lonis terms as the 
‘first circle’ of the polis.671 Immigrants were not considered citizens unless they had proven 
their service to a polis.672 
A parallel process can be seen to be operating here with resistance. It is worth noting 
that many, even most, of the resisters in this category were young, and only just coming of 
age. By fighting in resistance, and being seen to be liberating both the nation and their 
surroundings, these resisters could be seen as finally restoring national pride, but also of 
having finally come of age themselves, and having finally become les hommes de famille. 
After a period whereby the French military, for so long important to the French collective 
identity, had been, in turn, humiliated, emasculated, then dissolved, the Resistance, and their 
mutation into the FFI, represented the renaissance of what Dominique Borne has termed le 
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citoyen-soldat, the citizen fighting for the Nation, a concept that he traces back to Valmy in 
1792.673    
This show of masculinity then led to a certain element of mysticism and distancing of 
women. When I interviewed Bernard Lawday in 2011, the interview took place in a 
consulting room with walls so thick that I concluded afterwards that no-one outside the room 
could have heard. It was only much later that I realised that one of the likely reasons was that 
it would have meant his wife would have been unable to hear us. Later correspondence with 
Monique Lawday, after his death, indicated that they had met shortly after the war, and Mme 
Lawday seemed surprised that someone should want to pay tribute to his qualities as a 
resister, although she was aware that he had been in the Resistance.674 Equally, Tony Larue 
testifies that many resisters were keen for their wives not to know very much about their 
resistance activities, either during or after the war- and when it came to designing a 
monument to those who had been executed on the site of the shooting range at the Madrillet 
gardens in Grand-Quevilly, the monument was of a man about to be shot, displaying a naked 
torso.675 The symbolism was clear- the Resistance was meant to be seen as masculine virility, 
fighting against the subjugation imposed by the German other. Masculine virility was also an 
important aspect in the self-identities of many resisters cited here: the wrestling of Bronislaw 
Piontek, the weightlifting of Raoul Boulanger and his diables noirs, the réfractaires working 
on the land to cite but three. There was also the sense of fraternity of the maquisards that 
Boulanger lauded after the war- which he considered far more central to the maquisard 
identity than party politics.  
So this was how the mystical, masculine nature of the resistance identity was 
acquired- the lauding of the country above all else, the resisters collectively inscribing 
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themselves in a tacit narrative of what Thomas Carlisle called ‘Great Men’.676 What was 
implicit in this was that those who had not actively resisted were weak, and thus to be 
marginalised, or at the very least, to be distanced from the Resistance legacy. This also 
reflected Athenian citizenship in its own way- Lonis identifies women as belonging to the 
second circle of the polis, not benefiting from the same privileges of citizenship as those in 
the first circle.677 The Liberation was the re-assertion of the masculine and the virile, whereby 
the French stood proud again militarily, with a newly victorious generation of younger men 
who could properly assume their roles within the patriarchal society. Meanwhile, those whose 
‘Frenchness’ had been doubted or had reason to be doubted prior to the war could show that 
they had proven their affiliation to France, and that they merited acceptance into a new form 
of what Lonis called le premier cercle, and thereby asserting their own sense of masculinised 
self-identity.  
In summary, this was resistance as “remasculation”, the reversal of emasculation, the 
restoration of masculine pride/macho psyche, reprising their roles as the masculine protectors 
of the nation after having been emasculated and devalued by defeat and occupation.678 In 
achieving this, resistance became a modern form of ephebos, service to the nation carried out 
in sometimes hazardous conditions, at the end of which resisters, who had entered into 
resistance as ephebes, had acquired and re-gained a sense of masculinity, and with it, what 




                                                             
676 Horne, op.cit., p.29. 
677 Lonis, op.cit., p.47. 
678 For a further understanding of this concept functioning in other, but similarly comparable environments, see 
Susan Jeffords, The remasculinization of America: Gender and the Vietnam War (Bloomington, Indiana 
University Press, 1989) for the gendered nature of political and military discourse in the United States 




Behind the simple explanation of resistance as patriotic action,679 this chapter has uncovered 
a greater series of complexities. Firstly, this chapter has shown that if all the resisters within 
this chapter were fighting for their country, then it is more accurate to talk about patriotisms 
in the plural rather than a singular, essentialist patriotism. This is because resistance could be 
viewed as being the communion of the imagined community, and yet its image varied 
according to the resister. Therefore, it cannot be said that resistance was purely about 
patriotism, because as the other chapters of this thesis show, the reality was more complex 
than that. When there are multiple images and visions of France at work, as this chapter has 
shown, patriotism, and with it, national identity, has to be conceived heterogeneously, with a 
variety of different identities and different patriotisms, yet all of them laying claim to the 
same word and same idea- being French, and fighting for a restored, sovereign France.680   
 Secondly, patriotism was a subconscious reflex of the masculine domination of 
French society at this time. The Allied landings allowed for the Resistance to become the 
incarnation of masculine virility restoring a national honour that had been devalued four 
years earlier, and to attempt to exorcise the spectre of debacle and defeat that clearly haunted 
the psyche of so many of these resisters, and gave these resisters a sense of self-identity, 
maybe even self-worth. For many, resistance played an important part not just in shaping 
their lives, but in shaping their citizenship and their identity.681 Resistance as such took upon 
the representation of a form of apprenticeship, by which a resister could integrate into the 
phratria, or brotherhood, becoming a French, masculine, citizen, or citoyen-soldat. 
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Finally, this chapter has shown the role of patriotism within the larger picture of resistance as 
a political engagement. Bronislaw Piontek stated that resistance was not a political project. 
Yet if one looks at expression politics, or what this thesis defined in the introduction as the 
personalised political, one can see that a political engagement can be the expression of a 
sentiment and a belief without necessarily being the elaboration of a political project such as 
le grand soir presented in chapter one, or the après-Vichy being envisaged in chapter two. 
This was resistance that more often than not was not concerned with the desire to either 
revolutionise society or exercise power, but instead act for a personal, deeply-held belief, and 
to serve the community, both imagined and real. As such, the patriotic resistance examined in 
this chapter can be seen as being political, because it was very much an action for the polis, 
both as proof of integration and initiation within the idea of la cité, but also as an idea of 
serving it in the sense that ephebos had been a service to the polis in the era of antiquity. The 
memoirs of Jacques Chaban-Delmas, who himself had been a resister, contain the phrase 
‘Remind yourself that France is your mother, and that you must serve it’.682 Chaban-Delmas’ 
words could be seen as summing up the views of the resisters examined in this chapter; their 











                                                             




In the Shadow of the Army of Shadows? Auxiliary Resistance 
 
In the previous three chapters, we have seen different kinds of resistance action and 
resistance ideals. But what made resistance possible? Moreover, this thesis has tended to 
focus on acts of resistance that confronted either Nazism or Vichy. Yet resistance was not 
always about confrontation; it could just as easily be about subversion, as is shown by James 
C. Scott’s Weapons of the Weak.683 It could also be in defiance of the occupier and the 
collaborator, and the sinister ideologies of both National Socialism and the National 
Revolution. 
 It is at this point that we are obliged to consider a definition of resistance within not 
just la guerre, but also what Alya Aglan & Robert Frank have called la Guerre-monde.684 
The Second World War was a war that touched every aspect of society, every aspect of daily 
life, particularly in a country that was occupied. It was not just soldiers, administrators and 
rebels who had to make their own individual arrangements with the wartime situation, it was 
virtually every person in the country who had to make these decisions- a situation that led to 
John Sweets to call his 1976 study of Clermont-Ferrand Choices in Vichy France.685 So in 
this situation whereby even everyday life, le quotidien, became politicised, aiding and 
abetting an act of resistance was, in itself, resistance. With this in mind, François Marcot 
broadened the scope of study for the Resistance. He chose to insist upon résistance-
mouvement, and to look at resistance as a social phenomenon within the broader context of 
the French population and French society.686 Equally, Alya Aglan, in Le temps de la 
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Résistance, looked not just at accélerateurs and planificateurs, but also at a third group, 
sauveteurs, whose action was inscribed purely in the present, and whose action could be 
qualified as largely phenomenological, because it did not engage directly with the future- in 
Aglan’s definition, the future could only be saved if there was salvation in the present.687 This 
final group concerned itself with humanist actions, such as rescuing and sheltering resisters, 
airmen, and those targeted by Vichy, such as Jewish children. 
 So the object of this chapter is to examine this wider definition of resistance, and 
show how these indirect acts of resistance, not always carried out under the official auspices 
of organised resistance, are critical to a full understanding of resistance within Upper 
Normandy, and the struggle against Vichy and Nazism. At the start of the previous chapter, 
we introduced the idea of expression politics, and used this to frame the idea of patriotism 
within resistance. In this chapter, we aim to look at the idea of auxiliary resistance, resistance 
designed to help other resisters and those fleeing persecution, to represent another dimension 
of expression politics within resistance.  
 
The Importance of Gender 
One of the more interesting developments in French historiography over the last twenty-five 
years or so has been the shift away from histoire des femmes to histoire du genre.688 This can 
be seen in the shift from women’s history, seen in the works of Michelle Perrot or Françoise 
Thébaud,689 to gender history, which has been charted by the journal CLIO, founded in 1995. 
This chapter aims to try and incorporate the use of gender into analysing resistance. Central 
to this thesis is the argument that the understanding of resistance can only be achieved by the 
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understanding of the action undertaken by individual resisters. This relies upon 
comprehending their roles. The idea of agency being shaped by the role played by a social 
agent is not a new one- it is famously a key argument in the work of Jean-Paul Sartre.690 But 
the argument advanced by Joan Scott when trying to define the difference between gender 
history and women’s history is that gender is ‘power relations between men and women’.691 
So this chapter proposes to use gender to look at how resistance roles were shaped by 
relations between male and female resisters, as well as look at men whose resistance roles 
were less active than the resisters examined in chapter three. 
This analysis is highly relevant because Inter-War French society was itself a 
gendered society, as was shown by Sian Reynolds in her 1996 book.692 Moreover, the power 
relations were governed by an extra factor; women still did not have the vote at the outbreak 
of the Second World War. So as such, the idea of women as citoyennes was slightly absurd, 
because they were not full citizens. In addition to not having the right to vote, French women 
did not have the right to work, have a passport, or even to have their own bank account 
without the permission of their husbands.693 Ultimately, the citoyenne was an oxymoron, 
describing a situation whose effective existence was denied realisation by regulation and 
legislation of the day, this denial being further reinforced by contemporary mores. This alone 
meant the idea of women engaging in resistance was a social transgression, even without 
considering any further ideological factors such as the contestation of the National 
Revolution. So once again, there is a further need to understand resistance as a political 
action, but in the sense of le politique rather than la politique- because as far as the latter was 
concerned at this time, women and the female condition were at best marginalised, and at 
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worst non-existent. This chapter aims to show that one of the impacts of resistance action was 
to show the ability of women to act in the public sphere, and their potential capacity to resist, 
in spite of the legal, institutional and social apparatuses of the day.  
 Furthermore, if men made up the entirety of chapter three, it should also be pointed 
out that many men were also involved in roles that were on the fringes of resistance, and did 
not bear arms except at the Liberation. Jean-Marie Guillon & François Marcot have written 
that the Resistance was ‘a man’s affair, in a society dominated by the masculine’,694 but if it 
is true that resisters were mostly male, it is equally true that a significant minority were 
women,695 and that a significant proportion of the men were not resisting in ways that were 
especially masculine, and conforming to the stereotype of the masculine resister. Because 
many of the activities covered in the first three chapters could only be made possible by 
activities being covered in this chapter, resistance is therefore only possible to understand by 
understanding the roles of resisters in relation to each other, which means that male resisters 
and female resisters cannot be understood in isolation from each other. This means that an 
understanding is required of the interplay between the two groups, which is why gender, the 
study of power relations between the sexes, is proposed here as a paradigm.    
 A lot of this conditioning was not just the consequence of gender. There were other 
influences too, such as cultural capital, and individual, as well as local, circumstances. 
Resisting in a rural area required a different set of skills to resisting in an urban area, because 
ultimately the circumstances and the opportunities, as well as the structures of the 
communities, were very different. H.R. Kedward has always been careful to stress the 
importance of local context and environment in understanding resistance,696 and that is still 
the case here. The usage of gender however is intended as a compliment to this 
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understanding. If environment permits us to situate and understand the nature of resistance, 
then gender allows us to situate and understand its functioning and its realisation- which is 
critical to the understanding of a movement whereby action was pivotal.  
 
Aiding the Allies: the Rescue of Allied Airmen 
Resisting was as much about opportunity as it was about the desire to act, and where this was 
a factor was in rural areas. Whereas, as we have already seen, the urban areas of the region 
offered an environment reasonably favourable to resisting, through the presence of 
organisations such as the former trade unions, the écoles normales, or the civil service, rural 
areas of Upper Normandy posed an altogether different environment. Firstly, the countryside 
was more likely to be disposed towards supporting the National Revolution.697 The 
testimonies of Raphaël Mallard and Roger Cressent indicate that both the Pays de Caux and 
the Pays de Bray had been hostile to the Popular Front; further testimonies account for the 
fact that rural society was much more receptive to Catholicism than urban areas.698 The social 
environment needed for fostering resistance was often lacking, and so too were the 
opportunities- it was difficult, if not impossible, to distribute resistance tracts within the 
villages.699 Anyone wanting to resist who lived in the countryside was likely to find 
difficulties meeting many, if any, others who shared the desire for resistance during the early 
years of the Occupation, and opportunities were few and far between for perpetrating any 
resistance activities.  
These were problems that Roger Cressent in particular encountered. It is interesting to 
note how Cressent defined himself and his background as ‘presque insurgé contre la 
société’.700 Born in rural Normandy in 1911, his father was killed at Verdun in 1916. 
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Consequently, his background was poor, and his upbringing dominated by the Catholicism 
that was prevalent in the Pays de Bray at that time, but he rejected Catholicism on the 
grounds that he could manage for himself without the need for divine assistance.701 Yet as a 
pupille de la Nation, he was able to go on to further education beyond his leaving certificate; 
cours complémentaires at Neufchâtel-en-Bray, and then, from 1927-30, teacher-training at 
the école normale in Rouen. In 1930, he returned to the Pays de Bray to take up his first 
teaching post, at Gournay-en-Bray, to where he returned again in 1933 after completing 
military service in the Navy in Toulon.702 Here was a paradox- someone whom was in revolt 
against society, but whose background had much to be grateful for to the French state, and 
who felt deeply and strongly about the values of the French Republic, even if he refused, in 
his words, to be a traditional instituteur.703 He joined the SFIO in 1934 because of the 
perceived danger that he saw posed by the leagues, but did not consider himself to be 
especially anti-clerical, even if he was an atheist. Likewise, he was a member of the Syndicat 
National des Instituteurs (SNI), the teaching union, but only for ‘practical reasons’. Perhaps 
the biggest contradiction came in his attitude to the war- he mixed within pacifist circles, but 
still did his military service (although he worked as a teacher in the Navy), and volunteered to 
fight at the outbreak of war in 1939, having been opposed to Munich. Despite having been 
initially rejected, he was then later admitted, but was not taken prisoner. 
It was this experience that led him to a peculiar stance in the summer of 1940- he was 
convinced that the Armistice was necessary, because he had seen at first-hand how badly 
overrun the French army had been, but he did not support the Vichy regime.704 In August 
1940, Cressent returned to his post as instituteur-secrétaire de mairie in the small village of 
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Nesle-Hodeng just outside Forges-les-Eaux. This again posed both advantages and 
difficulties for him. The advantage was that it was a fixed post, which equally provided 
employment for his wife, who was equally a schoolteacher, and a home for his family. The 
difficulty was that he could not resist too overtly from this post, in part because the 
alternative to Vichy was still ill-defined, and in part because his views meant that many in the 
villages considered him to be a Communist.705 Had he entered into the distribution and 
preparation of tracts at this time, he would have been easily traced because he was one of just 
a handful of people to whom such Left-wing views could have been attributed. Consequently, 
Roger Cressent testified that the Resistance in the Pays de Bray never once prepared or 
distributed any kind of propaganda.706 
 What he could do at this stage, if resistance was not possible, was refuse to co-operate 
entirely with Vichy. He did not display the portrait of Pétain in his classroom, nor did he 
confiscate books that the regime had prescribed as forbidden.707 More active forms of 
resistance came in 1941-1942 with the forgery of ration cards. But it was only in the summer 
of 1943 that his resistance became more active still, with his engagement in the Bureau des 
Opérations Aériennes (BOA). 
 The BOA was set up as a response to the need of the Allies to keep hold of as many 
pilots and air crew as possible- Sir Arthur Harris, the Air Chief Marshal of the Royal Air 
Force, later estimated that it was cheaper to send someone to Oxbridge for three years than to 
train a British aviator.708 It had initially a forerunner in the southern zone, but as the number 
of raids on the northern zone began to increase in 1943, the need for a counterpart in northern 
France became greater, and it was created by Jean Moulin in April of that year as part of the 
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Free French forces within metropolitan France.709 Firstly, it was charged with organising 
parachute drops and landings of agents, but as the war intensified, missions that had 
originally been considered as secondary, such as the recuperation of Allied airmen, became 
more and more of a feature of their activities- in Seine-Inférieure, a coastal department, it 
seems as though this activity became the dominant co-operation with the Allied military 
forces.710  
 The recuperation of Allied airmen was not just the exclusive domain of the BOA. It 
also became one of the prevalent forms of activity for groups that already existed and 
engaged in active resistance. Le Léopard was primarily a network engaging in sabotage and 
intelligence as we have seen in chapter three, but there was also a wing of the network that 
looked after crashed Allied aviators. This extra resistance activity required a new approach 
and a new structure for them. 
 The approach that André Gosse decided upon was to separate the two in all but name. 
Those carrying out sabotage and those carrying out shelter were unknown to each other, and 
only Gosse knew both.711 The latter became almost a shadow network within the so-called 
‘army of shadows’, and even for a way of life that was secret by its definition, it required the 
combination of discretion, extensive knowledge and contacts. 
 The population of the countryside being largely Roman Catholic, priests had both 
knowledge of their surroundings and their parishioners, and were capable of secrecy through 
their regular hearings of confession. They also had means, at least in the short-term, to 
accommodate aviators, and could escape the attention that others might have attracted. 
However, whether priests actually engaged in resistance themselves or not was a question for 
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individual priests. There was certainly no command for the priesthood to engage in acts of 
resistance, or politics for that matter.712 
This sentiment of isolation characterised the early recollections of one priest who did 
engage in resistance, Claude Gricourt. In fact, he described his early years as being outside of 
society and politics in general- his seminary education closed him away from questions such 
as the Depression of the 1930s, the Leagues of the Far Right, and the Popular Front.713 He 
had had a brief stint outside of the seminary, which he had joined upon leaving school in 
1925 at the age of 14, when he did his military service in 1932-33. But though he was aware 
of such things happening, his background and way of life, he said, did not permit him to 
understand fully these events.714 His first parish, in a poor part of Le Havre, came as a culture 
shock, and he only lasted a year after ordination in 1937 before being sent to La Crique, a 
village in the Pays de Caux, which was also a parish that administered several churches in 
surrounding villages, which was near to his childhood home in the Varenne valley, and 
where, by contrast, he remained for the next four decades.715 
 But a year after arriving in La Crique, the war broke out, and Gricourt was mobilised 
into the 150e d’infanterie. The war of 1939-40 was short, but it was enough to show him the 
scale of the defeat suffered by France, stating that even before May 10, the army was marked 
by a combination of poor morale and poor equipment.716 It was also enough to show him the 
scale of man’s inhumanity to man. Whilst on patrol with two other soldiers, they found 
themselves in a wood. Near to a clearing, Gricourt spotted the dark grey of a Wehrmacht 
uniform, just before the soldier spotted him. In the space of a few seconds, a brief shoot-out 
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took place, and the Wehrmacht soldier fell. Gricourt approached him, and found the soldier 
dead from one of Gricourt’s bullets. He pronounced the last rites, and then returned to base, 
dazed and distressed. Over forty years on, he referred to it as ‘un mauvais souvenir’.717 Very 
shortly afterwards, Gricourt himself was wounded, and evacuated to a military hospital in 
Biarritz, and from there to Montpellier, where he heard about the armistice- meaning that he 
was able to return to La Crique, and was not taken prisoner. He was stunned to find that his 
vicarage had been taken over by Wehrmacht soldiers, who were now billeted there, and 
remained so until the spring of 1941.718 
 Gricourt’s starting point with regards to Vichy was very different to that of Roger 
Cressent. Whereas Cressent refused to show Pétain’s portrait in class, Gricourt considered le 
Maréchal to be a symbol of resistance against Germany.719 At this point, Gricourt did not 
really distinguish between Germany and Nazism- only after laws against Jews came in, and 
he had experienced the Occupation at close hand in the winter of 1940-41 did he begin to 
distinguish between the two.720 The same period of time led him to question Pétain’s stance, 
with evidence of collaboration being provided by the photograph at Montoire. But it was not 
until the end of 1942 that he began to enter into a more active kind of resistance. Firstly, he 
helped some of those who came to his door searching for assistance in fleeing the STO by 
finding them work upon farms in the area. Word of this may well have established Gricourt 
as someone whom André Gosse could depend upon, because it was that summer that the 
latter contacted him, and recruited him to help in the shelter of Allied airmen.721 This was 
presumably also a result of instructions from London, because at the same time, Raphaël 
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Mallard was instructed by radio from London that Libération-Nord in the region around 
Dieppe should now prioritise the rescue of Allied airmen over the collection of intelligence 
and the spreading of propaganda, which had been the network’s primary activities in the 
Dieppe region in 1942-43.722 
 This shows that resistance activity, which was often decided upon by the resisters 
themselves, could also be governed by external factors, such as the demands of the Allied 
forces. It also reveals something about the military aspect of the relationship between 
resisters and the regular military. Although the ultimate aim was the same in the sense that 
the defeat of Nazi Germany was the overriding priority, the relationship between these two 
was sometimes strained because of differences in approach. Speaking about his 2014 book 
The Cruel Victory, Paddy Ashdown stated that what amazed him the most about the resisters 
of the Vercors was that their patriotism- as he put it ‘Professional soldiers do not go to war 
for their country, no matter what our politicians would like to believe; they go to war for their 
mate stood next to them’.723 This conception can be transferred to the situation in Upper 
Normandy in 1943-1944- the British military as a collective agent wanted to defeat Nazi 
Germany because in Normandy, they were a clear danger to them; the resisters in the 
Normandy countryside wanted to defeat Nazi Germany because they were occupying the 
area, and subjugating the interests of France and the French people, ultimately destroying the 
local economy and livelihoods. These two aims did have an overlap in the sense of a common 
enemy, but defeating this enemy would manifest differences between the two approaches and 
tensions. 
 In his 2014 work La France sous les bombardements alliés, Andrew Knapp talks 
about the Liberation showing a ‘partenariat manqué’, or missed partnership, between the 
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Allies and the Resistance- in Knapp’s argument, had the Allies been interested in establishing 
a genuine partnership with resisters on the ground, they would have learned about the futility 
of bombing Le Havre so heavily in the summer of 1944.724 The switch from intelligence to 
rescuing Allied airmen shows that Allied military strategy was moving away from the 
conception of a partnership even in the summer of 1943, and that for the Allies, the defeat of 
Nazi Germany was more important than the liberation of occupied France- it was simply that 
the latter was an especially useful means of achieving the former.725 This shows a clear 
difference in vision between London and the resisters in Normandy. It also shows that for 
London, there was a view that resisters were useful for London’s purposes, but that London’s 
view did not go beyond that, that there was a definite limit in that usefulness, and that their 
concern for the political situation in France at this time only extended as far as how it would 
impact upon the Allied military objectives.726 The ‘partenariat manqué’ was therefore not 
just something present in the combats of the Liberation- it characterised, at the level of 
organisational contact between the two, relations well before that.  
 Yet if this mistrust was present in the register of organisational relations between 
London and the Resistance, then the register of individual relations between Allied airmen 
and resisters in Upper Normandy reveals a different history, one where the sense of 
partnership was not a missed opportunity, but in fact a vital and real part in establishing 
relations across the divides of language and culture, or in establishing a resistance version of 
the concept that Philippe Burrin called ‘îlots de rencontre’, or ‘isles of contact’.727 These 
contacts with Allied air crew helped to show resisters that as individuals, British and 
American airmen were not necessarily motivated by the imperial ambitions or Francophobia 
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that Vichy propaganda accredited to them.728 The structure of how the resisters operated 
when rescuing airmen was also indicative of a human element being considered, but also 
taking into account operational considerations such as security. Resisters would try to keep an 
observation of aircraft in the local area, knowing that the first moments after the crew 
parachuted out of the plane were when the aviators were at the greatest risk.729 They were 
also at risk from injury, or from locals whose motives may well have been less than pure, or 
from anything hazardous in the local landscape. Observation became more important, but 
also easier, during the summer of 1944- firstly, the number of aircraft that the Allies were 
flying over Normandy was more significant; secondly, the hours of sunlight were longer; and 
finally, as many of the members of the BOA were instituteurs, they were able to have more 
time available for plane-watching.  
 Roger Cressent was keen to ensure that there were no misunderstandings between the 
aviators and himself, and so, in what might retrospectively seem like recklessness, he was 
accompanied in his missions by his son, Guy, who at the time was aged only 10.730 The 
justification was that this was evidence of his sincerity, and as the aviators were hidden in the 
Cressent house for a time, there seemed no point in trying to conceal the existence of the 
airmen from young Guy.731 An example of how a typical recuperation proceeded can be seen 
in this extract from Roger Cressent’s diaries, which he kept in order to detail all of the events 
that occurred to him during his engagement in resistance. On August 8, 1944, a plane crashed 
in the Pays de Bray, in some fields in between Cressent’s village of Nesle-Hodeng and the 
neighbouring village of Saint-Saire: 
                                                             
728 Céline Lagny, L’opinion publique en Seine-Inférieure pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale (unpublished 
mémoire de Maîtrise, Université de Rouen, 1999), p.42. The notorious British bombing of the fleet at Mers-el-
Kébir did not exactly aid relations between the two nations, and Vichy propaganda made much use of ‘la Perfide 
Albion’ after the raid on Dieppe in 1942. See also Dominique Rossignol, Histoire de la Propagande en France 
de 1940 à 1944 (Paris, PUF, 1991). 
729 Interview with Roger Cressent, op.cit. 





I left with my son. Guy went towards the nearest aviator (the parachute was 
already hidden under the wheat). Contact rapidly established. The usual 
phrase: the French Resistance at your aid. Guy took his escapee towards the 
wood, a few hundred metres away.732  
 
Having then taken hold of the airmen, they were then provided with civilian clothes, and 
hidden for a few days, before then being repatriated.733 The extract shows that though this 
may well have been an auxiliary form of resistance, it was certainly well-organised, and 
performed with an almost perfunctory briskness, which seems to have been born out of 
regularly carrying this out. Though not necessarily part of the ‘military’ resistance, the BOA 
carried out their actions with the efficacy one might expect of military routine.  
 In the Pays de Caux, with Le Léopard, the structure appears to have been slightly 
different, in the sense that whilst resisters recuperated crashed airmen, they were hidden for a 
few days, and then, in Claude Gricourt’s testimony, hidden on neighbouring farms with 
families.734 Repatriation seems to have been less of a priority for them, and also for the few 
individuals in the Deux Léopards network in and around Yvetot. There, a young woman is 
reported to have hidden an Allied airman for four months between April and August 1944.735 
The reason for this lack of prioritisation of repatriating airmen by comparison to the BOA 
was possibly because these networks were not in contact so much with London.736 In a sense, 
this form of resistance is even more remarkable because it is one of a humanist motivation 
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entirely- the desire to save the life of an ally, at considerable risk to one’s own.737 Yet 
conversely, which shows yet again the divergence between French resisters and Allied 
military, this form of resistance was not especially useful to the Allies- an airman hidden by 
the Resistance in French territory could not execute the missions of a pilot that had cost their 
country several thousand pounds at the time (worth considerably more in today’s money).738 
The success of these actions is worth reflecting upon. The research carried out by 
Michel Baldenweck for the Seine-Inférieure show that although resisters rescued 155 airmen 
in 1944, there were still 497 killed, and 215 taken prisoner.739 The research carried out by 
Julien Papp in the Eure gives a slightly more complex picture, because he does not 
distinguish between air crew who had been shot down and parachutists from special British 
forces (the latter number is estimated by Papp to be around 100, which would leave roughly 
200 for the former in 1944 alone), nor does he give numbers as to how many were killed or 
captured, although he states that 119 aircraft were shot down in 1944 (107 between D-Day 
and the Liberation), with a further 53 shot down in 1943.740 But what these studies show is 
that resisters were not always able to help air crew- in fact, it seems that even allowing for 
those who were killed and therefore could not be helped, they were unsuccessful in more than 
50% of cases.  
Recuperating air crew in the cities was particularly difficult, not least because planes 
that did crash in towns and cities usually struck houses, thereby increasing the chances of 
death, but also their chances of capture even if they did survive. But this form of resistance 
allowed those whose civilian duties prevented them from taking up more active, more direct, 
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resistance to engage in the struggle against Nazism in their own way. Roger Cressent as a 
secrétaire de mairie knew that he could not leave his post without arousing suspicion, and it 
was similarly the case for Claude Gricourt. The dilemma was perhaps best summed up after 
the war by Roger Madec, the instituteur-secrétaire de mairie for the commune of Les Essarts 
in the Eure, near Damville. Writing in 1945 to the authorities determining whether or not 
resisters merited a Combattant Voluntaire de Résistant (CVR) card, he apologised for a lack 
of active resistance during the war, stating that his commune was too remote to make contact 
with other resisters frequently, and that he found himself too often burdened by the twin 
duties of teaching and local government administration (which had enabled him to falsify 
some identity papers)- but that in the spring of 1944, an American airman had crashed in his 
commune, and he had managed to hide him on his property for the last few months of the 
Occupation. He regretted though, not being able to do more than that.741 It would seem that 
the apologetic nature of his letter indicated that some found their resistance roles as being 
limited, as if they regretted, in hindsight, not having done more. 
 Yet this form of resistance was one valued by the British, whom after the war, 
corresponded with local authorities in Normandy to establish those who had helped to hide 
Allied airmen. For the Rouen area, 140 resisters were honoured by the RAF in late 1945.742 It 
was also a form of resistance that was at great risk of persecution- many who hid Allied 
airmen in both departments were arrested; in the case of the Eure, a network of fifty 
sauveteurs were arrested in the region of Louviers as part of a Nazi round-up in January 
1944.743 The risks were elevated compared to other resisters because the sauveteurs were 
often more ‘fixed’ than other resisters, who had a larger degree of mobility- their resistance 
action was ultimately carried out in their own homes. Roger Eliot, writing to the Prefecture of 
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the Seine-Inférieure in September 1945, stated that a number of his fellow contacts, some of 
whom he had taught in his capacity as an instituteur, had been either deported or shot.744 
Testifying after the war, Francis Eonin, one of the fifty resisters arrested in Louviers & 
Acquigny in January 1944 for helping Allied airmen, stated that out of those fifty, forty-five 
were deported.745 It seemed that the greater the intensity of the guerre-monde, the greater the 
level of repression and persecution that resisters encountered from both collaborator and 
occupier alike. 
A final element of this danger needs to be underlined. Because these activities often 
took place in people’s own homes, the greatest danger, which often led to arrests, was 
denunciation. Roger Cressent only narrowly escaped arrest on three occasions- one of which 
was when a neighbour denounced him in a letter to the Feldkommandantur in Rouen. It 
seemed as though the neighbour did not trust the local gendarmerie, who were based in 
nearby Gournay-en-Bray, and who themselves would have been entitled to arrest anyone 
sheltering airmen. However, the neighbour’s letter was intercepted by the Nesle-Hodeng 
postmistress, who ran the commune’s PTT, and was responsible for all communications in 
and out of the commune- and who was part of the BOA, and so handed the letter to Roger 
Cressent.746  
This form of resistance that was both ordinary, in terms of the relative banality of the 
activities undertaken, and extraordinary, in the sense that the risks faced were considerable, 
and that the bulk of people undertaking it by 1944 were fully aware of the risks that they were 
facing. They were also flying in the face of not just the occupier, but also the virulent 
Anglophobe propaganda of Vichy, either in the form of locally-produced posters, or the 
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nationally-broadcast radio talks of Philippe Henriot.747 They were also risking the wrath not 
just of the occupier and the collaborator, but also the potential treachery of their neighbour. It 
was a resistance against the occupier, against the cultural hegemony of Nazi Germany and 
Vichy, and within the everyday society that they lived, motivated by the desire to do 
something. This shows an element of resistance that was within the framework of organised 
resistance, yet was not primarily concerned with either the idea of combat, except perhaps in 
an abstract sense, nor was their resistance necessarily driven by any ideological vision, 
beyond a simple aim of defeating the occupier. It shows the expression politics of resistance, 
because it demonstrates a sentiment of resistance, despite limitations on their individual 
capacities to resist.  
 
Resistance as aiding resistance: women resisters  
Women played a critical role in the networks that helped Allied aviators to escape, but also 
more generally amongst resistance networks throughout Upper Normandy. Yet they often 
seem to be forgotten in resistance histories, which seem to be a male-dominated narrative, 
even in the oral histories that have been carried out. This is no surprise- Guillon & Marcot 
stated that resistance was often a man’s affair in a masculinised society, and the decision to 
give a legal status to resisters was taken through a masculine perspective- the awarding 
process for the CVR favourised the military over the civil, and by extension, the male over 
the female, and the masculine over the feminine.748  
Unlike other European resistance movements, such as Yugoslavia and Tito’s 
Partisans, where women did engage in active combat, known as the partizanka, women rarely 
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bore arms in occupied France.749 An explanation can be seen in how French society viewed 
women- Vichy propaganda saw womanhood as synonymous with the family, one of the key 
values lionised by the regime, along with work and the fatherland.750 Politics was not seen as 
a feminine domain- or when it was, as Anne-Sarah Moalic-Bouglié pointed out, it was limited 
to so-called ‘women’s issues’, such as the family.751 Robert Paxton summed up that Vichy 
saw a woman’s place as “barefoot and pregnant in the kitchen”.752 
 But if 1940 was ‘the World turned upside down’,753 then the role of women was also 
brought into question, particularly in a society where so many men were either imprisoned or 
in camps. It meant that whilst Vichy was preaching a policy of female submission to a male 
breadwinner, the reality meant that women felt the necessity to go out and try to earn a wage, 
and in some cases, this extended to assuming the roles played by men in the polis. This was a 
motivation for many working-class women close to the underground Communists, of which 
the women’s wing would become known as the Union des Femmes Françaises (UFF). 
 The story of Yvonne Jouvin is one that represents the role played by many female 
Communist resisters. Her husband Louis had been one of the underground Communists in 
Grand-Quevilly after the PC had been banned in 1939, and meetings were often carried out at 
their house on the rue Thiers.754 After Louis Jouvin had been arrested in 1941 for sabotage, 
Yvonne Jouvin continued to act as a resister, organising meetings of female Communists in 
secret, but also more overt protests, albeit not in the name of the PC. In late 1941, she and a 
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group of fifteen other women protested outside the Prefecture in Rouen about poor material 
conditions.755 Their houses were scarcely fit for habitation, bread rations had been cut, and 
making ends meet, a sometimes precarious task even in peacetime on the rive gauche, was 
becoming impossible.756 Her son Pierre had passed the School Certificate the previous year, 
but was obliged to go to work at 14 because there was now no other source of income other 
than what she could make via knitting and sewing.757 Their protests were directed firmly 
against the Vichy regime, lobbying for their husbands to be released from captivity, either in 
France or in Nazi Germany, as soon as possible. The protests were not dispersed- in fact, they 
were allowed inside the Prefecture in order to present their petition for better material 
conditions.758 What this did allow for was, of course, the local police to take her details and 
put her (and others) under surveillance. She continued to be active in the Communist 
underground in Grand-Quevilly, until late 1942, when the Police came to arrest her.  
 H.R. Kedward has remarked upon the phenomenon of ‘the woman at the doorway’, 
whereby women held up either the police or the occupying authorities for a few moments, 
allowing the male resister to escape.759 Yvonne Jouvin engaged in a female appropriation of 
this for herself. She requested a moment to go into the bedroom to pack some belongings. 
Instead, she escaped via a condemned door in the shanty bungalow that she and her family 
inhabited. The door was not guaranteed to open, and in fact, forcing it open could have 
resulted in the entire structure collapsing. But she forced it open, having used the small 
amount of time that she could buy (no male policeman wanted to be seen prying upon the 
intimacy of a female suspect), and escaped into the back passage. This involves a double 
agency- using a man at the doorway for reasons of decency, whilst she herself escaped via the 
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back- the combination of gender and ingenuity. She then passed a message to the pharmacy 
where Pierre Jouvin worked, and then passed into clandestinity- she would join a Communist 
Maquis, but only as a liaison agent, and in the Somme department in the Picardy region, 
where Pierre Jouvin rejoined her in 1944 after deserting his STO camp in Normandy.760 
 The attitude of French Communists towards women was a contradictory one. At 
times, they had encouraged female suffrage; at others they had considered it less of a priority 
compared to class struggle.761 Like other organisations, women’s affairs were considered a 
different sort of politics by the PC. Women were given lessons in political economy (as we 
have seen in chapter one, the classes that Jean Basille called ‘Catechism Classes’), but these 
were separate to male members.762 The role of female Communist resisters, in the testimony 
of Yvonne Dissoubray, was always secondary to that played by male Communist resisters. 
They were never given roles that could be given direct action, although, in contrast to other 
groups, the Communists did allow female resisters to be equipped with revolvers, for the 
purpose of self-defence.763 It is worth adding though in the case of Yvonne Dissoubray that 
although she was a liaison officer, she would never have actually fired (and never did) 
because of her pacifist convictions, and consequently refused to bear arms.764 
 The roots of Yvonne Dissoubray’s engagement in resistance were very different to 
those of Yvonne Jouvin. Firstly, she was unmarried, so was not engaged in resistance by 
virtue of her husband, but rather as an ideological commitment.765 Secondly, she came from a 
background with greater cultural and social capital than Yvonne Jouvin- she was an 
institutrice. Thirdly, there was a difference in date of adhesion. Whilst Yvonne Jouvin had 
belonged to the Communists before the war, although Yvonne Dissoubray saw herself as 
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working-class, her family had been more traditionally allied to the SFIO, and her father had 
remained in the party even after the scission between Socialists and Communists at the Tours 
Congress of 1920. The family only moved further to the Left in protest at the Popular Front’s 
inaction over Spain in 1936, and she only joined the PC when it had been already declared 
illegal (she joined in the summer of 1940, under the influence of Valentin Feldman).766 For 
her, the Third Republic was discredited, and the only alternative to Nazi occupation was 
Communism.  
 Yvonne Dissoubray’s main tasks, as someone with an intellectual background, were 
to take responsibility for propaganda, and to help found, along with Lucie Guérin, the UFF in 
the summer of 1941, although this was really a case of unifying a series of different 
committees that already existed for women’s rights in the party, and had been founded in the 
autumn of 1940 and the winter of 1940-41.767 But the UFF as an organisation did not engage 
in the political narrative that other Communist organisations did (although as an individual, 
Dissoubray did contribute to the clandestine regional newspaper L’Avenir normand, where 
she recalled contributing to the editorial discussions). Instead, they focused firmly on welfare 
issues.768 Yvonne Dissoubray was also involved in the demonstrations over bread rations in 
Rouen, and was actually arrested in April 1941 for refusing to disperse from in front of the 
prefecture.769 Even differences in terms of cultural and social capital did not massively or 
fundamentally alter the role of how Communists saw women in politics- the idea that the 
female condition was in itself a condition subjugated to the male condition does not seem to 
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have crossed the thoughts of the party. Women clearly had a gendered role, and the 
Communists did not see any point in questioning this role.770  
Even when operating outside and performing resistance activities, women were still 
defined in relation to male resisters. Yvonne Dissoubray recollects that the groups of resisters 
who put up posters under cover of darkness in Rouen were always constituted of groups of 
four, and always three men and one woman- this was as a cover should they be intercepted by 
a police patrol, which would entail the woman and one of the men acting as a couple.771 
Jacqueline Desjardins had a slightly greater role in the Resistance in Elbeuf, where as well as 
distributing tracts, she also collected intelligence on troop movements by the Occupier, and 
then, from 1943, decided to go into hiding and become a liaison agent, working across the 
whole of the northern zone, because she wanted a greater involvement in resistance.772 Until 
that point, her father had ensured that her resistance activities were limited- although a 
resister himself, and in the clandestine PC, he did not want Jacqueline participating in 
resistance, presumably because it went against his view that resisting was a matter for men. 
Between 1940 and 1943, she considered her role as being more ‘sympathisante’ than 
résistante.773 
 Simone Sauteur, known as ‘Puce’, was the only woman who was fully part of the 
Maquis Surcouf in the Eure. Her account of the actions of the Surcouf, at over 200 pages, is 
an extremely detailed and moving account of their activities, their lives, their attitudes, but 
also the realities of being a female resister.774 Yet even as a woman who could be considered 
a maquisarde, her role was very much gender-defined. She had been a schoolmistress in a 
village in western Eure who had left her post to join the maquis. But although she was 
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working at close quarters with Robert Leblanc, her role was that of a ‘secretary’, assuring 
liaisons with other networks and typing orders.775 On occasion, she would accompany male 
resisters in their duties, but never bore arms- although she did witness, and later describe in 
detail, the attack and killing of suspected collaborator Violette Morris.776 She seemed content 
to be another sort of ‘woman at the doorway’- the observer noting, remembering, cajoling, 
the witness to the struggle, switching between roles such as supporter, active resister, fellow 
traveler, and chronicler. Parts of her testimony are written in the form of letters to her mother, 
and it is here that one detects the greatest tension- ‘Puce’ was not behaving in the way 
expected of a daughter, and she knew it. But in these letters, she stresses resistance as a 
greater calling, one that broke down the usual rules and divisions, and prompted her to resist, 
even if it went against conventions of society and her family.777   
 Some resisters actually considered that resistance was not a place for wives and 
daughters. Césaire Levillain thought that if his wife knew about his resistance activity, she 
would end up facing a firing squad.778 Claude Gricourt recounts of women being kept at 
arm’s length in the villages where he was a resister, in order to keep the running of the group 
simpler.779 Whilst Simone Fagot, who carried out resistance activities herself, and who was 
married to François Fagot, who led the OCM in Seine-Inférieure in 1943-44, said in 1984 that 
she knew relatively little about her husband’s activities, and was never asked to undertake 
any missions by him.780 
However, this was not universally replicated across Normandy, and a large number of 
women carrying out resistance actions approached resistance activity as being what Guy 
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Cressent termed ‘une affaire de famille’.781 That is to say, they were in the Resistance 
because their husbands or other male relatives happened to be. This was often the case in 
rural parts. Guy Cressent’s mother Madeleine was an active resister, and according to Guy ‘at 
the heart of all the resistance activities, and well-informed about them’.782 Her role was 
largely to act as a support for her husband’s activities; she maintained the clothes that the 
airmen seeking shelter were obliged to wear, talked to the airmen in order to ascertain 
intelligence about them, such as where in either America or Britain they came from, and 
cooked for the family and for the airmen being sheltered.783 Yet she was more than just an 
auxiliary- in the 1983 interview with her husband, she speaks for almost as long as her 
husband, and if she was ‘the woman at the doorway’, she was also the equal of her male 
resister husband, a schoolteacher as politically active as her husband was, with views formed 
independently of the marital home, and she held the CVR in her own right.784 In the case of 
the Cressents, resistance appears to have been taken as a joint decision, with her political 
views clearly formed, and with herself very much responsible for her own agency- the 
decision to resist seems to have truly been a case of joint enterprise rather than something 
totally framed and conditioned by marriage and gender. 
The case of Madeleine Cressent was slightly more isolated though in terms of agency. 
Amongst les diables noirs in Ry, it was the wives of the Boulanger brothers, Henriette and 
Augustine, who helped organise the complex operation of feeding a maquis of twenty men, 
almost all of whom were living underground in the daytime, and this maquis in itself required 
a network of five or six women in the local villages manipulating the ration coupons and 
obtaining food from neighbouring farms.785 They also helped to unravel the parachutes that 
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were sent down to the maquisards from the Allies, a task that Raoul Boulanger referred to as 
‘delicate and difficult’.786 This role of auxiliary to a male, military resistance was also present 
in the Pays de Caux, where Denise Legras hid an airman for four months in 1944,787 and 
where four women also helped to provide material support for Les Deux Léopards- all four 
women were related to male resisters in the group- and equally in the town of Eu, near to the 
frontier with Picardy, where Andrée Beauvisage, the daughter of Edmond, provided domestic 
support to the activities of her father.788 But their roles were all defined by relation to the 
male resisters in their family circle. To use a gender terminology in film and literary studies, 
resistance in Upper Normandy more often than not failed the Bechdel test.789  
 Even women who were nominally in a role of authority were liable to be subject to 
the influence of a male. Anne Derrien’s dissertation uncovers what she states to be the only 
instance of a female resister in a role of command within a resistance network. Suzanne 
Savale was the wife of Henri Savale, and in 1941, entered into contact with Césaire Levillain 
and Michel Corroy.790 The network, known as the centre de Darnétal was affiliated to 
Libération-Nord. She provided the supporting role mainly, and although she did participate in 
the running of the ‘centre’, it would seem that her role as a co-leader was defined purely by 
the fact that her husband had been hospitalised for part of this time, and that Levillain and 
Corroy saw her to some extent as Henri’s proxy.791 Even for a woman whose biography 
presents her as headstrong,792 it seems that her resistance activity was perceived in her role as 
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“Madame Savale” rather than “Suzanne, résistante”- a perception confirmed in her obituary 
in 1952, which described her as ‘the ideal companion of a man devoted to public life’.793 
Advancing a figure for how many resisters were female is difficult, as it revolves in 
large part around the debate about precisely what is a resister- a debate alluded to in the 
introduction to this thesis. Anne Derrien advances a statistic of around 10%.794 Michel 
Baldenweck, by contrast, puts it at just 5%.795 Though women made a considerable 
contribution to resistance activity, they were acting in a masculine-led and masculine-defined 
society, which the Resistance faithfully reflected. Some Communist resisters did engage in an 
attempt to advance women’s rights, and the meeting of the CDL for the Seine-Inférieure in 
April 1944 does show that the FN and their representatives were pushing for universal 
suffrage to include women.796 But women resisters existed in relation to their male comrades, 
and as such, their roles and resistance activities were often defined by the gendered 
organisation of French society.  
We can observe here another parallel between the polis in ancient Greece and the 
structure of resistance. Raoul Lonis identified women as being members of the ‘second 
circle’ within the polis in ancient Greece- that is to say they played no political part in the life 
of the cité, but did have a certain amount of rights and participation- and that although they 
had no formal role in the defence of the cité, they did sometimes play an informal role in 
defence and in wartime.797 So likewise in resistance, women did play a role, but it was one 
that was never formally defined, rather it was conditioned, and in official resistance, women’s 
agency was something that denied, or at best, limited. Resistance challenged Vichy on many 
things and in many ways, but with the exception of elements of the Communists, there does 
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not seem to have been a conscious challenge to the Vichyite conception of the female 
condition.798    
 Yet how would resistance have functioned without their supporting role? In the view 
of Raoul Boulanger, a resister not noted for his progressive political tendencies, it would not 
have been as effective.799 In the case of the BOA, where Roger Cressent was by no means the 
only resister to draw upon such support from his wife, it might not have been realisable at all. 
Resistance covered a multitude of activities as well as a multitude of motivations, and women 
resisters played a multitude of roles. These included maintaining structures and activities that 
might have otherwise lapsed in the case of the housewives of the UFF, or distributing 
propaganda to an audience that male resisters might not have been able to reach, or liaising 
between groups. But they also involved roles outside of organised resistance, such as making 
clothes for those on the run, or forging papers, or even ensuring that maquisards and airmen 
had somewhere to sleep and something to eat (in the case of the Maquis de Barneville, the 
site was chosen because it was near to the farm where Albert Lacour’s sister lived, and she 
helped to provide food for the maquisards). Without these résistantes, these tasks would 
probably not have been as accomplished as well.800 Can one imagine a man in wartime 
society doing large quantities of shopping, ostensibly for a famille nombreuse, without 
arousing suspicion? Could a male resister, searched for by the ‘anti-terrorist’ police of the 
Vichy regime, have moved with as much ease as a female resister? Probably not. Les 
résistantes provided the practical glue that ensured the stability of the everyday for many of 
their male comrades, and the lubricant that facilitated the resistance activities that the 
Resistance would become best-known for.      
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What the involvement of women resisters does show is a development in the role of the 
citoyenne. Prior to 1944, the citoyenne was an oxymoron, and even in Vichy’s constitutional 
project of January 1944, the role of women in French politics was formally gendered, and 
limited to a small range of issues (such as the family) which were considered to be a 
woman’s domain.801 The female political role under Vichy was not unlike that of the woman 
at the time of the ancient Athenian cité.802 Yet les résistantes did show that women could 
make a contribution to polis, and in a much wider range of ways than what Vichy’s National 
Revolution and Nazism’s Kinder, Kirche, Kürche foresaw.803 The Liberation brought with it 
women’s right to vote, and although social regulations still constrained the woman’s place in 
society after the war, female citizenship was now far more tangible after the war than what it 
had been before.804  
 The role of women in resistance was therefore one usually governed by social 
condition, and regulated by the gendered norms of French society at that time, and therefore 
should be understood by taking into consideration the considerable constraints upon their 
individual capacity to resist. But the role of women and their importance to the functioning of 
resistance is not something that should be underestimated. Above all, if women were largely 
absent from the Resistance, women were important to the workings of resistance, and were 
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The Moral Economy of the Réfractaires? 
Aiding resisters was but one part of female resisters and their actions- they were also 
involved in aiding and sheltering réfractaires, or those fleeing the STO in 1943-44. This also 
involved many of those who were implicated in the shelter of Allied airmen. Not everyone 
has seen rescue as worthy of recognition as resistance- Olivier Wieviorka’s Histoire de la 
Résistance is an example-805 and fleeing the STO did not automatically mean joining the 
Maquis, but the STO was another form of repression imposed by the Nazi occupier, as the 
economic impact that it had on France was ultimately punitive, depriving it of the most vital 
resource of manpower, which meant that rural Normandy was just as threatened by the relève 
as urban Normandy. 
 In grounding the causes of resistance within both the moral context of the Occupation 
(the threat posed to the sense of patriotism by permanent subjugation to Germany) and also 
the economic context (namely that the STO could never have fulfilled the exigencies of the 
German war effort, and so would have ultimately finished with the total destruction of the 
French economy by slowly depriving it of all manpower), and by looking at other forms of 
resistance both in France and outside of France, and both during and outside of the Second 
World War, the question of the moral economy is of a certain relevance. What many resisters 
were doing was, effectively, subverting the Nazi war effort by economic means.806 The more 
réfractaires came to the Eure, the less assistance that the Nazi war effort received. Moreover, 
food was provided and sold outside of the normal Vichy price regulations and rations- 
thereby indicating the existence of a ‘just price’ as opposed to the increasingly exorbitant 
prices that were being charged either by the regime or by black-marketers.807 As 1943 went 
on, it seems more and more as though the area around Saint-Georges-Vièvre was engaging in 
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small-scale resistance by trying to subvert slightly the economic power of Vichy and of the 
Nazi occupiers. 
Like the peasant farmers cited in E.P. Thompson’s study of eighteenth-century 
England, or in James C. Scott’s study of twentieth-century Malaysia, the motivations for this 
moral economy were simply to protect the survival of their existence.808 After three years of 
occupation and rationing, which in itself followed a twenty-year demographic slump and the 
damage sustained by the war of 1914-1918, the French economy was in a parlous state, and 
was now having its most vital resources threatened by deportations and internments- namely 
manpower.809 The provision of an alternative for those wishing to flee the STO draft or the 
construction sites for what would become the V1 missiles was ultimately a form of economic 
resistance, and by keeping French workers in France, and away from Nazi Germany, was 
resisting the economic subjugation that Nazi Germany wished to impose upon occupied 
France. This was patriotism engaged at an everyday level, where the humanistic and the 
mythical crossed, complimented and coincided.  
Likewise, André Gosse saw the réfractaires as being critical to the functioning of le 
Léopard, making up a large proportion of those who fought.810 Whilst Boulanger’s 
underground maquis in Ry was an attempt to hide as many réfractaires as possible- as much 
as it was an engagement to liberate France in its intentions, in its practices, it was a response 
to an acute situation in the local area.811 Moreover, it was Boulanger who showed the full 
extent of the moral economy of the réfractaires. As well as depriving the STO and the Nazi 
war machine of much-needed labour, to support a network that contained more than a dozen 
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men escaping the relève required considerable effort, means, and organisation.812 Thus, the 
wives of the Boulanger brothers, Lucienne and Augustine, along with three or four other 
women, established a supply network providing food.813 Boulanger himself liaised with other 
villages, in particular with secrétaires de mairie, to ensure a supply of false identity papers 
and extra rationing coupons.814 Neighbouring farmers also provided help, and it was this 
obtaining of food at source in the countryside helped foster a rural culture of subversion- not 
only was there a nourishing of the réfractaires, but there was also the fact that this also 
denied the occupier rural produce to nourish themselves.815 An economic system was 
required to support the réfractaires that was firmly outside of both the price controls of the 
Vichy regime, and the profiteering hyper-inflation of the black market, and was founded 
upon principles of kinship, of community entraide.816  
The question of the réfractaires and the résistants, and how many of those fleeing the 
STO became resisters, is a question sometimes evoked. It is certainly true that most did not 
take up armed action- the research of Dany Lejeune in the Seine-Inférieure shows that only a 
minority actually became active resisters.817 To a certain extent, the idea of young men 
flocking en masse to the hills and woods in order to become maquisards is one of the myths 
upon which the concept of résistancialisme is founded.818 But whilst the idea of an armée des 
ombres composed fully of réfractaires is one that is at best an exaggeration when examined 
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in terms of sheer numbers, the critique also rests upon the idea of réfraction and resistance 
being separate concepts.819  
Yet the contention here is that réfraction is itself resistance. Scott highlights as more 
common, and more successful, forms of resistance actions such as foot-dragging, shoddy 
work, and sabotage.820 The foundation of all economic systems lies within its resources- and 
the most basic of human resources is the workforce- only in the highest-skilled, most 
technologically-advanced economies can the workforce be marginalised or eliminated 
without a knock-on impact upon the exploitation of the natural resources or manufacturing. 
This was why the STO was necessary- it provided extra manpower, and thereby extra 
workforce- to sate the ever-expanding needs of the Nazi war economy. So by refusing to aid 
this Nazi war effort, and fleeing the relève, there was an individual act of resistance. 
Whether other acts of resistance then followed is questionable- the research of 
Lejeune, and the fact that the Resistance was never more than a minority of the population, 
indicates that most did not become active maquisards-821 but the fact that the STO never 
achieved the targets set by it or requested of it suggests that nationwide, non-compliance was 
widespread. So even if a réfractaire did not then go on to perform sabotage or bear arms at 
the Liberation, their very refusal to take part consists, for this study, an act of resistance. The 
difference between these two categories of réfractaires can be encapsulated within the two 
concepts of Hirschmann that we examined in the previous chapter, namely ‘exit’ and ‘voice’, 
but both of these concepts can be identified as forms of non-compliance- opposites to the 
third form of behaviour identified by Hirschmann, ‘loyalty’.822 In fact, whereas in chapter 
two, we have distinguished between ‘exit’ and ‘voice’, in this instance, ‘exit’ is a sort of 
‘voice’, because both were intended to harm the Nazi war effort and the Vichy policy of 
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collaboration. Moreover, there was a tangible result of refusing to go and help the Nazis- the 
ensuing limits that lack of manpower imposed upon the Nazi war effort impeded the 
manufacture of weapons or of coastal defences against an Allied invasion. 
Furthermore, to successfully achieve this form of resistance, it required, for those not 
lucky enough to possess a medical certificate or to be in a reserved occupation, a certain 
amount of guile, the means and the ability to make a living, and support. That support was 
often provided, as we have seen, by resistance networks, particularly within the countryside. 
So that made, in the increasingly polarised society of 1942-44, réfractaires into the role of 
résistants par association. It was resistance networks that found them jobs as farm labourers, 
or as mechanics, or in other lines of employment if they were not actually resisters directly.823 
So a new economy, one that possessed both legal illegitimacy and moral legitimacy, had to 
be developed in support of the Resistance, by the Resistance, and by its indirect harm to the 
Nazi war machine, represented a form of resistance. 
This can be seen in the case studies of réfractaires in the Eure. In the first instance 
René Gérard, a railwayman from Evreux, was officially designated as ‘skilled’ (he held a 
Certificat d’Aptitude Professionnel in mechanics) and his skills and domestic situation 
(young, in good health, of the age of majority and without children) drew him to the attention 
of the Reichsbahn.824 In September 1942, he was designated as having been requisitioned as a 
“specialised worker” to work in Nazi Germany. The next day, he did not turn up for work, 
providing a medical certificate stating that he had bronchitis.825 He then requested a year’s 
exemption, which the Vichy administration granted. This, however, did not satisfy the 
Feldkommandantur, who sent him to see a doctor in Evreux, and from there, to the 
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dispensary of the city infirmary. Both the doctor and the nun administering the dispensary 
could see that he was not truly suffering from a severe pulmonary condition, but provided a 
forged radiography, and a report stating a catalogue of bronchial and cardiac complaints, 
which sufficed for the Feldkommandantur.826 
This was not only enough to ensure that he avoided being sent to Germany, but was 
also enough that he was sent home to his family in Conches, no longer able to work for the 
SNCF (which was the reason for him being in Evreux).827 There, he found alternative 
employment as a lumberjack, which would have been the end of his difficulties, until a law of 
February 1943 widened eligibility to include unskilled workers.828 He received papers 
requisitioning his labour, and requesting that he be examined again. However, the doctor 
charged with examining him was Dr Mathieu, the family doctor who had initially provided 
him with a sick certificate for bronchitis, and so again, he was able to avoid going to 
Germany, thanks to the aid of Dr Mathieu and the unwitting assistance of a German doctor.829 
His firm was requisitioned though to work on the air base at Conches, and it was in this form 
that he worked for the occupier for almost three months digging trenches.830 
This then shows the first element of the moral economy- it went beyond manual 
labour, and also involved the complicity of the clerical professions, such as civil servants and 
doctors. Though they were not directly involved in operating it, unless they had contacts 
amongst the farmers in order to take some réfractaires- which was actually the case in 
Conches as we shall see- they played a key role in facilitating this moral economy and in 
negotiating some of the bureaucratic obstacles for those who were involved in making the 
moral economy function. A similar role could also have been played (although this thesis has 
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not uncovered any evidence of this happening) by work inspectors turning the proverbial 
blind eye to extra workers on farms- although in practice, such visits were rare.831 
Then, in July 1943, the Feldkommandantur decided to review all instances of 
exemption- out of sixty exemptions, over forty were cancelled, including René Gérard’s.832 
The next day, along with 247 others, he was herded onto a train at Rouen, and sent to Paris. It 
was at St-Lazare station that he saw his chance to escape, which he did by striking up a 
conversation with a former colleague he knew who worked at the station. From there, he 
went to a nearby barber to change his hair, and went into clandestinity.833 He returned briefly 
to Conches where he made contact with the town pharmacist, a Monsieur Dagiral, whom was 
rumoured to be in charge of a network responsible for organising placements for deserters.834 
He found a farm near to Conches, where he worked on the harvest, but after the harvest, 
worried about the risk of being denounced,835 fled to the department of Mayenne, where he 
spent the rest of the Occupation working as a farmhand, and after the Allied landings, aiding 
the Resistance with the administration of the railways and sending Allied troop trains towards 
Paris.836 Here we can see that the moral economy of the réfractaires was essentially an 
agrarian one- it was farmers and the countryside to where most fled, and upon whom there 
was also a demand for food via the black market to circumvent the regulations around 
rationing. 
The Eure’s geography and topography made it more helpful for resisters trying to 
organise evasion from the STO. But the problem lay really for resisters in those who wanted 
to evade the STO, but not become a maquisard. Their situation in some ways was something 
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of a halfway house- rejecting both the obedience of legality and the culture of being an 
outlaw- but even if they rejected life as a maquisard, then they certainly needed the help of 
resisters in order to make their new life feasible.837 The first issue was the problem of 
identity- police checks were regular amongst both French gendarmes and the Nazi 
Feldgendarmerie.  
Réfractaires thus needed a new identity upon fleeing. This was provided by resisters 
from the same bases as the shelter of Allied airmen, and the false identities were often drawn 
from lists of people who had died or been reported missing- this drew upon the links of the 
resisters within the mairies.838 It was also preferable for resisters to keep a list of towns and 
mairies that had been bombed- they could then make cards for réfractaires saying that they 
belonged to these communes, and it would be impossible to carry out any double-referencing, 
as the records had been destroyed.839 Following on from this was the problem of ration cards, 
which were also forged by resisters in the beginning.840 However, the influx of réfractaires 
meant that this became unsustainable in itself from 1943 onwards- it was from this point 
onwards that groups such as Maquis Surcouf, Diables Noirs, and Maquis de Barneville turned 
their activities towards breaking into mairies- on 13-14 January 1943, no fewer than four 
mairies in the Eure were broken into during the course of one night.841 That the authors of 
such acts were rarely apprehended for these acts in themselves shows a certain connivance 
amongst the local population and police alike. Indeed, on occasion, it was the mayors 
themselves who staged the break-ins. George Filet of Gisay-le-Coudre was one example- 
                                                             
837 This problem was typified in the case of Fernand Février, a worker from St-Etienne-du-Rouvray in the Seine-
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over the course of his resistance in 1943-44, he stole almost 2,000 ration cards from his own 
mairie.842   
There then came the problem of placement- very often this was on farms, because this 
served several purposes. The first was the obvious issue of concealing- farms were more 
remote, and less susceptible to inspections du travail than factories.843 The second issue was 
that those who had gone left a gap to be filled. So a consequence of the phenomenon of the 
réfractaires was actually to protect the rural French economy from the damage that the STO 
would wreak upon it- and in return, gave the resistance groups that were fighting a maquis 
campaign a valuable source of food that was outside of the state-regulated food market.844 So 
a ‘hidden economy’ built up to serve this society that was clandestine et résistante. It was an 
economy of forgery, document manufacturing, prices set outside of Vichy’s controls, and a 
workforce regulated by resisters themselves. Housewives found themselves employed and 
engaged to carry out such activities, as were male secrétaires de mairie, for whom this was 
often the heart of their resistance activity, and farmers found themselves no longer working 
simply to meet the demands of the market and the authorities, all of which were subject to 
influences and pressures by and from both the collaborating state and the Nazi occupier. 
Everything about this, from its existence to its functioning to its subversion, was done in 
resistance to both occupier and collaborator.                    
When Thompson presented his concept of moral economy in a seminar at the London 
School of Economics in 1969, the critique raised against it was whether or not the moral 
economy was truly moral after all. The seminar convenor, F.J. Fisher, asked if it was simply 
self-interest that led the peasants of the eighteenth century to riot over grain prices.845 A 
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similar question could be posed of the réfractaires. Was it not simply a desire to remain in 
France rather than a desire to defeat Nazism that caused them to flee the relève?  
Though this question is understandable, the parallels between Fisher’s critique of 
eighteenth-century peasantry and suspicions of the ulterior motives of the réfractaires are 
limited, and perhaps also a little inexact. The French economy was in dire straits indeed in 
1942-44 - the French franc was becoming worth less and less, workers wages were rapidly 
losing their purchase power, unemployment was a major issue, and food rationing and other 
material conditions becoming harsher.846 In contrast, as Tony Judt has argued, living 
conditions in Germany did not deteriorate until very late in the war.847 The Office du Travail 
promoted working in Germany as a way of re-launching the French economy, of providing 
much-needed revenue to ordinary French households.848 From a perspective of naked self-
interest, even avarice, the more remunerative option was that of taking the offer and giving in 
to the lure of the Reichsmark- even if once in the Reich, the reality did not match the 
advertising.849 
As for the understandable emotion of wanting to stay in France, and not wanting to 
live in a country that quite besides being the traditionally perceived enemy, was also a way of 
life, a language and a culture that was alien to most French people, there needs to be a caveat 
added that is especially pertinent to the regional history of the war in Upper Normandy. The 
STO did not automatically equate to working in Germany, despite both popular perceptions 
and the propaganda of both Vichy and the Resistance. From 1942 and 1943, the Nazi 
occupier began to construct coastal defences against Allied attacks, which as the daring raid 
on St-Nazaire showed, were no longer confined to the Channel ports, but the ports of the 
Atlantic and the Bay of Biscay. Furthermore, 1943 saw work begin in earnest upon the V1 
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missile sites, which were heavily concentrated upon the Seine-Inférieure.850 The supply of 
slave labour from the Todt Organisation could not meet demands, so the consequence was 
that most requis in Seine-Inférieure, particularly in the north of the department, carried out 
their service in the department- they never left Normandy, even less so France.851 So the 
critique of réfractaires simply wanting to remain within their home country is slightly 
negated by this local factor. 
 Therefore, fleeing the STO was no easy option, and involved a certain amount of 
sacrifice, one that even some committed resisters, such as Pierre Jouvin, did not feel able to 
carry out in 1943.852 Self-interest may have come into the equation in the sense that 
Germanophobia was an important factor, but that did not equate to financial gain. In a society 
with war as its defining characteristic, resistance was not purely an armed struggle- when the 
war and the fight against Nazi Germany permeated all aspects of society, resistance had to be 
performed in all domains of society.853 This was resistance not as armed conflict, or 
propaganda, or targeting military installations, or the collation of intelligence- this was 
ordinary French people using the time-honoured tradition of système D as a form of 
resistance, often because it was the only form of resistance open to them, the only way by 
which they could oppose occupation and collaboration, and the only way by which their 
capacity to resist could function and be manifested. 
If the culture of the outlaw is one often perceived via the prism of violence, then this 
shows an outlaw culture that was well-developed at a very small scale, only perceptible at the 
micro-level, and which was often built upon non-violence (although violence was sometimes 
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219 
 
a necessary part of maquisard life).854 This also shows us about the potential for banditry to 
be non-violent, and that whilst many of the case studies examined by Eric Hobsbawm did 
involve a mixture of both social conscience and violence (hence Hobsbawm’s term of ‘social 
crime’),855 life as an outlaw, on the fringes of both society and legal norms need not 
automatically entail violent crime. This was especially the case whereby the consent and aid 
of the local population, outside of the organised Resistance, was necessary to the continued 
success of such banditry. 
Above all, it was the fusion of both a struggle for the future of France as a nation and 
a struggle for human dignity. Just as clandestine newspapers and the discussions for l’après-
Vichy represented a form of resistance in the war of ideas, and violent action represented a 
form of resistance within warfare, then the moral economy of the réfractaires represents an 
engagement in economic combat, challenging and undermining the governance of the Vichy 
regime and the war economy of the Nazi occupier- a resistance within a world of total war. 
This was resistance as an expression of individual refusal and individual non-compliance 
with the regimes of occupation and collaboration, and resistance that helped the bigger and 
greater struggle against Nazi Germany and Vichy France by undermining the strength of the 
Nazi war machine, and undermining the competence of Vichy as an administration. 
 
The Kindness of Strangers? Humanist resistance and rescue 
Aglan’s final category of sauveteurs rests purely on those who were engaged in acts of 
humanism concerned entirely with the present.856 These acts were not directly concentrated 
against the enemy, but aimed at helping those targeted by collaborator and occupier alike. 
This has led to some historians, such as Olivier Wieviorka, to omit these resisters or this form 
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of resistance from their analyses,857 but considering the risks involved, such as arrest or 
deportation, it is felt here worthy of considering them as part of resistance. 
Very often, these acts were small-scale. Often, they served as a form of entry into 
resistance, before going onto more organised acts. Claude Gricourt was not recruited into the 
Léopard network until 1943, but said that from 1941 onwards, he had been providing false 
certificates of baptism for Jews.858 Roger Cressent used his role as a secrétaire de mairie to 
provide forged papers from that time onwards, and that had been his sole resistance activity 
until the formation of the BOA.859 Equally, we have already seen that this was the entry into 
resistance for Henri Savale and Michel Corroy into what would become the Darnétal cell, a 
part of Libération-Nord.860  
 However, there were others for whom this was their only form of resistance, and who 
did not wish at all to be a part of the militarised structure of resistance. These acts had roots 
which were spontaneous, and remained so even if being done at the service of an organisation 
or network that had much wider and much larger activities than what was being undertaken 
on the face of it. 
 The village of Bézancourt lies on the very eastern fringe of the Seine-Inférieure, 
bordering the Oise department in the Picardy region. It is not obviously on the main road to 
anywhere major, and has a population of only around 200 people. It was only in the 1990s 
that an extraordinary story became known. Elisabeth Besnard was a teacher living in 
Bézancourt. She had never married, and led a seemingly anonymous life. Somehow though, it 
seems that she had been in contact with a Protestant pastor called Paul Vergara, who lived 
and preached in the Ile-de-France region.861 He was also a leading member in a network that 
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aimed to provide shelter for Jewish children from the Paris region in villages outside of Paris. 
Between the end of 1942 and 1945, she sheltered five refugee children. One of them, Denise 
Vartin, recalls seeing Pastor Vergara occasionally, but also recalls being brought up under the 
Occupation as Catholic.862 They led lives which were like those of the other children in the 
village, which included catechism on Thursday and Mass on Sunday. They went to the 
village school, but were also taught by Mlle Besnard, who made them read aloud each day, 
before hiding them in an upstairs room, because for a short time in the autumn and winter of 
1943-44, the house was also requisitioned as a billet for the Wehrmacht.863 It was in many 
ways a typical rural French upbringing; the combination of republican schooling and 
religious upbringing. They remained in Bézancourt after the Liberation, but were collected by 
their father after the war ended, and they never returned to Bézancourt again.864 For her 
family, it was considered a brief interlude. Mlle Besnard’s story was only discovered in the 
mid 1990s, and in 1997, she was posthumously awarded the title of Righteous Amongst the 
Nations. No surviving member of her family was there to collect the award.865  
 In this instance, it is easy to see how Elisabeth Besnard could disappear into (and even 
beyond) the margins of history. An elderly woman was not the ‘ideal-type’ of a resister that 
fitted in with the national meta-narrative that was quickly being constructed in the post-war 
period. She never married nor had children. Moreover, Denise’s father considered the 
Occupation an episode that belonged in the past, and was not to be evoked.866 She herself, 
along with a sister, emigrated to Israel in the late 1950s.867 Like much of resistance history, it 
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rested upon diffusion and dissemination- if there was no-one to do either, then history and 
memory omitted these episodes. 
 Elisabeth Besnard’s entry into resistance appears to not have been spontaneous as 
such (it seems that she was solicited by Pastor Vergara), but there were instances of more 
spontaneous acts of sheltering. Edouard and Joséphine Vain of Sotteville both hid two boys 
who fled to them from their neighbour when the police came to search for their mother. Their 
mother was arrested, but the police did not search other houses for the children.868 Their 
forenames were changed- ‘Isaak’ became ‘Jacques’- and new identities were created for them 
via the aide of resisters- but the decision by Monsieur and Madame Vain to take them in was 
done spontaneously. In their case, the adoption became permanent- their mother perished in 
Auschwitz- though after the war, they maintained their ‘French’ forenames but reverted back 
to their original surname of Mizrahi.869  
 Sometimes, the decision to shelter was actually taken as an opportunity to intensify 
resistance engagement. Louis and Marguerite Grenouillet lived in the Eure in the commune 
of Saint-Georges-Motel, whose population was only 380, but where the chateau was 
requisitioned by the Luftwaffe for the duration of the war, even welcoming, on occasion, 
Hermann Goering.870 Louis Grenouillet had been a mechanic, but not wanting to be in a 
position where he could do anything to aid the Nazi war effort, he left his job and took work 
as a lumberjack.871 The permanent presence of the Nazi occupier made active resistance 
dangerous, and Grenouillet’s resistance action was further limited by his age- born in 1885, 
he was already fifty-five by the time France fell in 1940. In 1943 though, he and his wife 
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were approached to look after a young boy whose parents had been arrested and deported, 
and had been hidden in various locations across northern France.872 Despite the constant 
presence of the occupier, Grenouillet agreed, and the boy, Simon, was hidden in the house, 
although attending the village school as normal, through to the end of the war.873  
Not all rescue and assistance was carried out in response to Vichy’s role in what 
would become known as ‘The Final Solution’. It was sometimes carried out in relation to 
resistance itself. Simone Fagot recalled hiding, of her own initiative, a deserter from the 
Wehrmacht- not, as she stressed, Rudolf Pfandhauser, the Austrian who became a maquisard, 
whom we have seen in chapter one, but another Austrian altogether.874 Other Catholic priests 
hid resisters as well as réfractaires and airmen- Joseph Kérébel of Montville was viscerally 
anti-Communist, but by dint of the fact that he hated “les Boches” even more, aided the Front 
National in the Cailly valley.875 He accommodated Paul Le Goupil, a Communist teacher, in 
1942, as well as recruiting members of the Jeunesse Ouvrière Chrétienne (JOC) in the area. 
Kérébel knew that his role was not one that easily leant itself to resisting, but realised that 
sheltering resisters was the best way for him to resist the occupier, even if their own politics 
were rather different to his own. In both of these instances, the acts of resistance were 
spontaneous- Kérébel had been expecting Le Goupil in mid-September, only for him to arrive 
in July- and motivated by what may well have been patriotism, but had undeniably a hint of 
humanism informing the action that was carried out.876  
This was not totally a contradiction in itself- humanism being seen as one of the 
defining traits of the French Republic, and a reference to France having been the home of the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man. It was another strand amongst the tapestry of resistance 
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against the anti-republicanism of Vichy and the anti-humanism of Nazism. This strand 
operated on the fringes of, if not totally outside, the organised Resistance, and was a sudden 
manifestation of a desire to resist and combat the enemy, even in the smallest and most 
miniscule way.877 Again, this was resistance designed to help those resisting Nazism and 
Vichy, but also those who were being persecuted by these regimes, even if they themselves 
were not active combatants. Finally, this was resistance as an expression of the humanist 
challenge to Nazism, a defence of mankind against what they held to be an ideology that was 
profoundly anti-human.878   
 
A Civil Resistance? Categorising Non-Violent Resistance 
The shelter of those fleeing the persecution of the Jews was also an example of what Jacques 
Sémelin meant when he made the important distinction between different kinds of résistance 
civile. In his 1989 work Sans armes face à Hitler, Sémelin distinguished between civil 
resistance that was actually designed to help and further military objectives, and civil 
resistance that was designed not to facilitate military objectives at all, but was conceived of 
from a purely peaceful perspective as defiance of an oppressive regime.879 
The shelter of the Jews fits this latter kind of résistance civile, which was what 
Sémelin primarily dedicated his work to. However, not all of this auxiliary resistance in this 
chapter falls into that category. The role of women in organised resistance largely fell into the 
former category of civil resistance facilitating military objectives, because even those who 
simply hid resisters temporarily knew that if the resisters evaded arrest for long enough, they 
would be able to bear arms against the Nazis. Whilst the assistance given to Allied airmen 
also falls into that category, even if the intentions were sometimes humanistic rather than 
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military, and in some cases, where there appears to have been no actual attempt to help the 
airmen to be repatriated, such as the case of Denise Legras, one could categorise it as purely 
the peaceful, non-violent resistance which is the object of study for Sémelin’s theory of non-
violent resistance. Equally, much of the early female Communist resistance, such as the 
protests organised by Yvonne Jouvin in 1941-42, was genuinely intended to be non-violent- it 
was designed to be a protest over the conditions of working-class women in occupied France. 
Only after she fled into clandestinity and then passed into the maquis in 1943-44 did her 
action become more military-orientated. In the case of Suzanne Savale, whose resistance 
consisted largely of forging identity cards, the same activity could serve both forms of 
résistance civile.  
Robert Gildea evokes a divide between ‘spontaneous’ and ‘organised’ resistance, 
which also leads him to talk about a ‘pénombre de la Résistance’.880 Yet in the instance of 
non-violent resistance, this divide does not work fully. Organised resistance could be 
(although rarely was) purely non-violent in the sense of Sémelin’s paradigm. Equally, so-
called ‘spontaneous’ resistance, though usually totally peaceful, could aid a military 
objective. In truth, forms of resistance were of a spectrum rather than a binary, one where the 
penumbra could well and truly exist when acts of resistance spanned across divides. 
The object of Sémelin’s work was to formulate a theory of non-violent resistance and 
apply it to one of the most violent periods of the 20th century in Europe.881 To that end, he 
was less interested by résistance civile that aided a military (and thereby violent) objective, 
and did not include this kind of resistance in his study.882 The auxiliary resistance studied in 
this chapter may well have been a form of resistance that owed far more to the civil than to 
the military, but it spanned across both kinds of résistance civile as defined by Sémelin, and 
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across both conceptions of resistance as imagined by Gildea. It was not directly violent, but 
only a part of this auxiliary resistance could be categorised as being totally non-violent, 
whilst auxiliary resistance could be both spontaneous, as in the case of Edouard & Joséphine 
Vain, and yet highly organised, as in the case of the BOA organised by Roger Cressent. Its 
common denominator, as the categorisation advanced here in this chapter suggests, was that 
it was intended to facilitate resistance, whether it be the military struggle against Nazism, or 
the survival of individuals whom were being persecuted by the agents of Nazi and Vichyite 
ideology. 
   
Le Masculin-Féminin? Interpreting gender within resistance 
What is worthy of note about these acts is that they involved both men and women, but were, 
in the cases of both sexes, the auxiliary roles that in Kedward’s analysis had often been 
assigned to women. This is where gender becomes crucial, particularly when men are 
performing roles that could be seen as ‘non-masculine’ in terms of resistance action, and 
where intersectionality, or the crossing of a series of different determining factors, becomes 
relevant to the analysis.883 
 The men in this chapter were often of a particular kind of class and structure- not 
wealthy and middle-class, but occupying jobs that required a level of education. They were 
sometimes too old to fight- in the Eure, in the area of the Plateau du Neubourg, one resister 
was born in 1868-884 or in professions that would have meant that were sometimes exempt 
from being conscripted, such as teaching or the priesthood. They did not always possess the 
greatest of cultural and social capital, either because of lack of education or lack of 
opportunity, in remote, rural areas. So to some extent, these were men who were willing to 
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engage in the resistance struggle, but who were sometimes to one side in both the political 
and the military resistance, which did not always sit well with the masculine ideal-type that 
emerged at and after the Liberation. Yet these men were better remembered as resisters- both 
Claude Gricourt and Roger Cressent experienced no trouble in gaining official post-war 
recognition, from both France and the United Kingdom in the case of the latter.885 Moreover, 
these men were often the people who led resistance networks, even when the purpose was 
auxiliary and not at all military, and could also have fitted in with Sémelin’s paradigm of 
résistance civile. This reflects the gender politics in many other domains at this time- in the 
docking industry in France for example, the roles of the office workers were usually carried 
out by men who were considered too old and too ill for manual work, rather than women, as 
the docks were not considered a working environment for a woman.886  
Therefore, we can use the intersectionality of gender, profession and age to see a 
hierarchisation of resisters, a social organisation that was based on the relations between 
masculine and feminine, but that was more than just a simple binary. Whereas the male 
resisters of chapter three were part of the image that gave France back a sense of 
masculinised self-identity,887 and the male resisters of chapter two prepared the après-Vichy 
and assumed the mantle of future leadership, the male resisters in this chapter were in 
‘weaker masculinities’, affected by age and by social function. For example, no-one could 
reconcile the image of the virile masculine warrior with the image of the priest in an 
environment that mixed particularly with women parishioners and which was defined by the 
vow of celibacy- the very antithesis of virility.  
                                                             
885 Documents at the Musée de la Résistance, Forges-les-Eaux, Collection Guy Cressent (private archive). 
Shown to the author in interview with Guy Cressent, op.cit.   
886 Michel Pigenet, ‘Les dockers. Retour sur le long processus de construction d'une identité collective en 
France, xixe-xxe siècles’ in Genèses, 1/2001 (no. 42), pp. 5-25. 
887 See also chapter three, and the theory of ‘remasculation’.  
228 
 
Meanwhile, those resisters who were female were characterised by their sex and obliged to 
follow a gendered role- their role as resisters very often mirrored the roles that were expected 
of women in society more generally at this time. Yet in taking on responsibilities within 
resistance, as was the case with resisters such as Suzanne Savale and Yvonne Jouvin, women 
were acting in roles that went beyond what was seen as socially acceptable for women, and 
beyond the role typically expected of women at that time, demonstrating, by contrast, ‘strong 
femininities’, that is to say greater agency than most French women at this time. 
It is also worth noting that their very engagement in resistance was seen as 
particularly transgressive by Vichy, and singled out for particular punishment. An 
examination of the photographs of female resisters who had been arrested (and who in some 
cases would be deported and defined as Nacht und Nebel, the Nazi term for their political 
prisoners) had their hair cut short, and were reduced to a very unfeminine look- a treatment 
that would be a precursor to the punishment handed out at the Liberation to those women 
who were judged to have collaborated with Germans ‘horizontally’.888 It is also worth noting 
that of the women who survived deportation, very few were able to bear children after 
returning from the camps- the conditions of their detention had caused irreparable damage to 
their menstrual cycles.889 In daring to challenge what was expected of them, and to demand a 
greater place in society than what Vichy had wanted to condition for them, we can see the 
cases of those deported as Nacht und Nebel as being indicative of ‘strong femininities’ 
challenging traditional gendered roles of French womanhood at this time. We can also see 
that these résistantes encountered repression that was particularly cruel and degrading, and 
that a challenge to gendered norms by women was also a challenge to the National 
                                                             




Revolution and a challenge to the ideological order and assumptions of National Socialism, 
and therefore a challenge that had to be stamped out.  
If masculinity was key to the traditional vision of resisting, then this traditional idea 
would not have been possible without those in weaker masculine or in feminine roles who 
facilitated resistance activity. Resistance was heavily gendered, just as French society at large 
was at this time. However, gender also permits us to see that there was more than a simple 
binary of masculin-féminin, but that in fact gender within resistance was nuanced by an 
intersectionality of factors, such as age, location, professional situation and political beliefs. 
The consequence of these nuances was a variety of masculinities and femininities, which 
affected both social condition, and in turn, the capacity to resist. Where gender acted as an 
enhancer, as in the case of the hegemonic masculinity seen in chapter three, it allowed for a 
greater capacity to resist; where it had an inhibiting effect, as seen in this chapter, it often 
constrained and conditioned this agency, forcing many of the resisters as seen in this chapter 
into resisting in a different manner to the resisters seen in the previous three chapters.       
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that resistance in Upper Normandy was much broader than the idea 
of an organised, male and militaristic organism of networks and groups. Though there was a 
résistance-organisation, there were many different forms of resisting, across many walks of 
life. This is where the résistance-mouvement becomes important, implanted within French 
society at large.890 Indeed, not all of these resisters were classified as such by the state when 
it came to the distribution of the CVR, the official recognition of a resister in the immediate 
                                                             
890 Marcot has even gone as far to use the term résistance-mouvement social, in order to stress the social 




post-war period.891 So this chapter shows that understanding resistance in 1940-1944 requires 
going beyond the military and the dossier d’homologation, and towards the everyday and the 
individual testimony. 
 This chapter has also shown that resistance, and in particular the idea of auxiliary 
resistance, was something that went beyond the idea of direct combat and challenge, and 
expanded far from the domain of the military- it seeped into the social, the economic, and the 
everyday. It was not simply about fighting, it was also about surviving, and helping others to 
survive, in order to thwart the ambitions of both Nazi Germany and the Vichy regime.    
This chapter shows that auxiliary resistance, as we have outlined it here, cannot be simply 
conceived as either ‘violent’ or ‘non-violent’, or as ‘spontaneous’ or ‘organised’. It spanned 
across all of these explanations and conceptualisations of resistance, and across and beyond 
the range of politicisations of resistance as identified by Henri Michel.892 It was resistance 
designed to help the challenge and contestation of Nazism and Vichyism, and oppose the 
oppression of these regimes, shaped by the limitations imposed by societal factors upon 
individuals and their capacity to resist.  
Finally, if the capacity to resist played a key role in defining the resistance of 
resisters, then a limited or constrained agency, which was the case for many of the resisters 
here, did not automatically result in not resisting, as the variety of ways of resistance shown 
in this chapter shows. Although unable or unwilling to engage in resistance like that outlined 
in the first three chapters, these resisters still found a way to manifest their refusal of both 
occupation and collaboration, and helped others to find a way too. If not necessarily part of 
organised resistance, then by their acts of resistance, and their contributions towards those 
operating within the Resistance, they supported the cause of resistance, and worked for the 
                                                             
891 Correspondence with granddaughter of Yvonne Jouvin, Catherine Vorganger, December 10, 2015. In the 
case of Yvonne Jouvin, she was not accorded the CVR until she was aged 75, in 1982.  
892 Henri Michel, Les Courants de Pensée dans la Résistance (Paris, PUF, 1962).  
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polis, and the cause of the polis. As such, their resistance was a form of expression politics, 
expressing their refusal of both Nazism and Vichy, and their resistance a political 


























The liberation of Upper Normandy came in late August and early September of 1944, except 
for Le Havre, where it was not until the German military surrender on September 12, after 
ferocious bombing by the Allies. In many ways, the liberation of Le Havre represented the 
problem for evaluating the impact of the Resistance, either at a regional or a national level. In 
Le Havre, the role of the Resistance was limited to a few combats in the suburbs, and the 
clearing of some Wehrmacht positions, as well as liberating the hôtel de ville at Sanvic.893 
 This, though, is a facile way of evaluating resistance. Rab Bennett demonstrates this 
by stating that although Eisenhower famously claimed that the Resistance had been worth 
fifteen army divisions, and had shortened the war by two months, there was also a need to 
evaluate the contribution of resistance from a view of moral worth as well as strategic 
worth.894 Resistance needed to be considered from a perspective that was broader than just a 
consideration of the military situation. 
 This is what this thesis has aimed to do throughout all four chapters. Rather than look 
at resistance from a purely organisational and military perspective, the thesis, unlike previous 
analyses of resistance in Upper Normandy, has tried to frame resistance within a broader 
context, considering factors such as class, gender, politics, education, location, and age. 
Instead of analysing “the Resistance”, a purely military and organisational concept, the thesis 
has chosen to analyse “resistance”, a social concept situated at the intersectionality of many 
different societal factors. These factors shaped the nature of resistance in Upper Normandy, 
and ensured that it was an engagement that went far deeper than a simple militaristic activity- 
resistance was not an activity in Upper Normandy, but a way of life, even for those who 
never went into clandestinity. 
                                                             
893 Dhaille-Hervieu, op.cit., pp. 158-159. 
894 Rab Bennett, Under the Shadow of the Swastika: The Moral Dilemmas of Resistance and Collaboration in 
Hitler’s Europe (Basingstoke, Palgrave, 1999), p.276. 
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In order to re-discover the lived experience of what was resistance, this thesis has attempted 
to be a ‘history from below’. This has been done by looking at the testimonies of individual 
resisters primarily, either spoken or written, and these show that patriotism, though an 
important part of resistance history, was not the sum of resistance in Upper Normandy, and 
on its own, too facile an explanation for resistance. Rather, there were a whole range of other 
ideologies and influences that also have to be considered, such as humanism, republicanism, 
and Communism. As such, resistance as a behaviour was much more heterogenous than the 
Resistance as an organisation, and this analysis allows for a greater diversity of attitudes, and 
for the collective agent of ‘the Resistance’ to come apart, as well as the great diversity of 
perspectives that resistance testimonies shine a light upon to come through. Resistance as a 
behaviour differs from the Resistance as an organisation because in large part, the voices that 
tell it are wider and more varied than the ‘resistance aristocrats’ that we identified in chapter 
two as key to the shaping of much traditional resistance historiography. 
If resistance was composed of a variety of different motivations, then how it was 
carried out was also varied and numerous. The intersectionality of factors cited above has 
been shown to be important precisely because it impacted directly upon the history of 
resistance, both as it happened at the time, and as it came to be written and portrayed after the 
war. Social and societal factors clearly shaped the agency of individual resisters and their 
‘capacity to resist’. Resistance as such should not therefore be interpreted through the narrow 
parameters of ideology or organisation, but by action, and the factors that shaped these 
actions. This is the biggest difference that can be seen between an analysis of “the French 
Resistance” and an analysis of “resistance in France”, or what François Marcot would term as 
the difference between résistance-organisation and résistance-mouvement.895 The former 
analyses resistance by formal groupings and organisations, agendas determined by the 
                                                             
895 Marcot, ‘Comment écrire l’histoire de la Résistance ?’, op.cit.   
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ideologies of leaders- indicative, one could say, of Thomas Carlyle’s ‘Great Man theory’.896 
The latter analyses resistance by the actions and sentiments of individual resisters, and the 
factors that shaped these actions and sentiments- an analysis that owes far more to history 
from below, especially when this analysis looks at those resisters who have usually been 
excluded or marginalised within the resistance narrative. It was via these factors that 
resistance in Upper Normandy manifested itself, and the actions that resistance involved were 
numerous, and ranged from the violent to the critical and eventually actions that were only 
acts of resistance indirectly, such as fleeing the STO or sheltering Jewish children.  
But by using the concept of the cité, or polis, throughout this thesis, resistance has 
been interpreted differently to either of the concepts evoked by Marcot in 2013, whether it be 
l’organisation or le mouvement social.897 Copeau himself talked about resistance as ‘la cité 
clandestine de l’honneur’.898 La cité or polis, is usually translated into English as ‘city-state’, 
yet Raoul Lonis states that above all, and before anything else, it was a group of citizens, 
which then inhabited a territory, and which was an independent and sovereign political 
entity.899 The thesis has shown, especially in chapters three and four, how the inner workings 
of resistance often reflected functions analogous to an ancient Greek polis, so what this thesis 
wishes to suggest is to go beyond the models advanced by Wieviorka and Marcot, and 
formulate the idea of a résistance-cité. Though there were different strands, actions and 
objectives within resistance, resistance was still conceived as a singular entity- the 
testimonies examined here show that resistance was conceived of as la résistance rather than 
les résistances. Though they may have often been working in isolation, resisters felt part of 
something much larger. This meets the first characteristic of a polis.  
                                                             
896 See Thomas Carlyle, On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History (London, James Fraser, 1841) for 
how Carlyle uses this theory to write history. 
897 Marcot, ‘Comment écrire l’histoire de la Résistance ?’, op.cit.  
898 Copeau, op.cit., p.953. 
899 Lonis, op.cit., pp.7-8. 
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The second characteristic is met by dint of the fact that resisters, by and large, operated 
within their own locality. One of the specificities of resistance in Upper Normandy, as 
opposed to much of the resistance in the southern zone, especially in the period 1943-44,900 is 
that resisters were usually based in their own areas, only regrouping when it came to carrying 
out their activities, before then going their separate ways and back home again.901 So 
resistance was locally implanted, and sometimes, it was implanted at a micro-level. Yet there 
was also another territory that resistance made their own- la clandestinité. The clandestine 
nature of resistance meant that they were operating outside of the structures of Vichyite 
legality at that time. This meant that they had to construct their own rhetoric, their own 
vision, and their own structures- in short, they had to construct their own world and society in 
parallel to the Vichyite and Nazi-occupied society within which they lived. So there was a 
clearly defined territory to the résistance-cité in Upper Normandy at this time. It was la 
Normandie clandestine, a territory that was designed in parallel to the occupied territory in 
which they lived, with the eventual aim and hope that the structures of this hidden world 
could be replicated, in some sort of way, in the post-liberated world that they would inherit 
upon victory. Though they also went about everyday activities, the clandestine newspapers, 
the committee discussions, and the hideouts and small resistance cells meeting behind closed 
doors testify that for resisters, la clandestinité was very much a ‘lived space’, and therefore 
conforming to Raffestin’s definition of a territory.902 The understanding of resistance requires 
the understanding of this territory, which this thesis, by using the paradigm of ‘history from 
below’, has demonstrated the functioning of resistance as this secret world. 
                                                             
900 See Kedward, In Search of the Maquis…, for an examination of resistance activity amongst the maquisards 
in the southern zone at this time.  
901 Norton, ‘Les résistants et les bombardements alliés en Seine-Inférieure, 1940-1944’, in Barzman et al. (eds), 
op.cit., p.232. 
902 Raffestin, op.cit. 
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The third and final characteristic is that of resistance as an independent and sovereign 
political entity. Above all, resistance aimed to defeat the Nazi occupier, and with it the 
collaborationism of Vichy. This involved refusing all forms of individual, collective, 
economic, political, cultural and social subjugation. We have seen that the activities of 
resistance, such as undermining the STO, or protesting against poor living conditions, or 
contesting the military and political power of the enemy either by acts of sabotage or by 
propaganda, could be classified as the assertion of their right to be independent and 
sovereign, not just as resisters, but as French citizens. Resistance, in that sense, was about 
refusing oppression and subjugation by the means that they judged available to them- thereby 
manifesting their independence as a force from both National Socialism and Vichyism, in line 
with the criteria of resistance outlined by Kedward in 2015 which we cited in the introduction 
to this thesis.903 This nature of resistance thereby meets the third characteristic of a polis. 
The cumulative effect of using résistance-cité as a concept is to show that although 
patriotism was an element of resistance, as a whole, resistance was about polis, not patrís or 
patria. The understanding of resistance as polis means that in order to write its history, it has 
to be written as a political history. But this is political history as understanding of the polis, 
not as the story of political parties and politicians. This is politics situated at the intersection 
of a variety of social factors. Resistance should be understood as a political history because 
resistance, by its very nature, was an inherently political act- it was action taken for the good 
of society, for the public interest, for the polis.  
The idea of the résistance-cité also shows also the dynamics of the relationships 
between individual resisters and the larger body of both la résistance and French society. In 
the first chapter, we have seen resisters attempting to revolutionise France, and wanting the 
                                                             
903 H.R. Kedward, The French Resistance: myths, lives and videotape, in the Founding Historians Lecture 
Series, University of Sussex, March 5, 2015. 
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polis to be revolutionary, whilst in the second, we have seen resisters wanting the polis to 
forge itself and be forged more gradually, and to be more carefully prepared, thereby 
avoiding widespread bloodshed. These two chapters oppose the instinctive convictions and 
the dispossessed nature of the ‘resistance subalterns’ with the more methodical approach and 
the social advantages of the ‘resistance aristocrats’. Then, the idea of patriotic resistance in 
chapter three shows a form of service onto the cité, of proving admissibility and belonging to 
France as a country, whether that was France as a republic or France as a nation, whilst 
chapter four shows resistance action that put the emphasis less upon service, and more upon 
aid, this in part being because the ‘auxiliary resistance’ examined in chapter four had a 
different capacity to resist to those resisters in chapter three. As such, these stances within 
resistance did not correspond exactly to a Gaullist-Communist-Social Democrat trinity, or the 
categories outlined in the seven chapter headings of Henri Michel’s analysis of courants de 
pensée,904 but instead, they divided into four traits: revolutionaries; gradualists; service; and 
auxiliaries.       
Political action though can be divided into two forms. On the one hand, there was the 
desire to change society, split between the revolutionary approach to resistance, typified by 
Communists, outlined in chapter one, and a gradualist approach to resistance, typified by 
more moderate left-wing resisters, whom we have examined in chapter two. This was 
resistance concentrating on politics in order to seize power and shape society, either to 
revolutionise the polis, in the case of the resisters examined in chapter one, or to merely 
reform it and slowly forge the polis of the future in the case of the resisters in chapter two. 
This can broadly be qualified as institutional politics, as per the analysis of Moses Finley,905 
or what we called in the introduction the politicised political. 
                                                             
904 Henri Michel, Les Courants de pensée dans la Résistance (Paris, PUF, 1962). 
905 Finley, op.cit. 
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Yet if we are saying that all resistance is political, it must also be said that not all resistance 
was concerned with power or with changing society. This leads us to examine expression 
politics, which is political action simply intended to achieve an ideological goal and express a 
sentiment of belief, or what could also be termed as the personalised political- the statement 
of the beliefs of the individual resister. Our analysis in chapter three has shown that it is more 
accurate to talk about patriotisms in the plural than patriotism as a singular, essentialist 
concept. Yet what these patriotisms had in common was about proving belonging to France. 
Beyond restoring sovereignty to France, their primary conception of France was about 
serving the polis and restoring a sense of its pride and honour, as well as their own self-
worth- an expression of identity. Whilst the resisters examined in chapter four were equally 
indicative of a wide range of motivations and ways of resisting, but what they had in common 
was that their resistance was an expression of their refusal of both collaboration and 
occupation, in spite of their restrained capacity to resist- the expression of the sentiment of 
indignation that Stéphane Hessel identified in his later work as being key to resistance.906 So 
resistance spanned across two political domains- the exercise of power and the expression of 
belief and ideology. This explains the breadth of resistance which we have seen in this thesis, 
spanning across (and perhaps beyond) the political spectrum. 
In the introduction, we posed a problem- the political history of the French Resistance 
and its politics had been much written about and charted, but the political history of 
resistance in France still remained to be explored. This thesis has explored, in contrast to a 
political history of the Resistance in Upper Normandy, what the politics of resistance in 
Upper Normandy were. They were rooted firmly in social and societal factors, and the social 
world that Bourdieu defined as ‘accumulated history’,907 and were not defined by the narrow, 
                                                             
906 Hessel, op.cit. 
907 Bourdieu, op.cit., p.241. 
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‘top-down’ ideological parameters. They were defined by action and vision, both of these 
being shaped by an intersectionality of different factors, particular to the individual life-
history of the resister, which shaped and formed the consciousness and agency of the resister 
as an individual, and the individual as a resister.  
 Resistance was therefore a strand of wartime France, engaged within the struggle to 
create a better polis and a better society, and a hybrid between resistance action geared 
towards institutional politics and resistance action geared towards expression politics. This 
thesis has shown that there was resistance in Upper Normandy, thereby putting ‘history from 
below’ into resistance in Upper Normandy, and Upper Normandy into an understanding of 
resistance using ‘history from below’, by stressing the importance of understanding local 
factors. Equally important is that this thesis has also shown that whilst ‘resistance in France’ 
is a different object of study to ‘the French Resistance’, political history still has a place 
within it, but that it has to be written by using le politique rather than la politique. So this 
thesis has also shown that the politics of resistance were a combination of the search for 
power and the search for expression, of the institutional and the personal. Resistance was 
inherently political, and that, with the idea of action for, about and within the polis, was the 











      Annexe A: After Resistance: Selected Resisters Biographies  
 
Marcel Baudot: After the liberation, returned to his position as chief archivist for the Eure. 
Left in 1948 to become Chief Inspector of Archives in France, a post which he held until his 
retirement in 1967. Wrote a series of works such as L’opinion publique d’un département 
sous l’Occupation (PUF, 1960), La Libération de la Normandie (Hachette, 1974) and 
Encyclopédie de la Guerre, 1939-45 (Casterman, 1977). Died in Paris, 1992. 
 
Famille Boulanger: After their arrests in March 1944, all four (Raoul & Henri, two brothers, 
and their wives, Lucienne & Augustine) were deported to concentration camps. Henri 
Boulanger was executed on March 8, 1945 at Flossenburg. The other three survived, but 
Augustine, Henri’s widow, suffered with health problems, and died in 1952. Raoul Boulanger 
established in Ry a tourist attraction called ‘Maquiparc’, and was active in the memory of the 
Resistance in the local area. He died in 1982. Lucienne Boulanger aided Raoul with the 
running of the business and the farm, and after Raoul’s death, continued to be involved with 
anciens combattants. She was also involved, in 2003, in a campaign against the opening of a 
young offenders centre in Saint-Denis-le-Thiboult. She died in 2004.  
 
Georges Brutelle: Arrested in 1943, and deported the following year to Buchenwald. Whilst 
there, he established a cell of the SFIO within the camp, along with the former deputy Eugène 
Thomas. Freed in 1945, he became general secretary of the FNDIR, one of the largest unions 
of ex-resisters and deportees, which opposed the Communists. He was also secretary of the 
SFIO in Seine-Inférieure, and also became the national vice-chairman in 1947, taking part in 
the party’s post-war reconstruction, and establishing contacts with the Tito regime in 
Yugoslavia and its ‘third way’ between capitalism and Stalinism. He left politics in the late 
241 
 
1960s, after failing in his bid to be elected to the National Assembly, and the dissolution of 
the SFIO in 1971. Served as President of the French association of chartered surveyors, and 
non-executive chairman of Paris-Normandie between 1972 and 1974, and then worked as 
managing editor for several titles for the Hersant media group. Died in 2001.  
 
Michel Corroy: Arrested in 1943, tried in February 1944, and sentenced to death by a 
German military tribunal. Executed by firing squad at Le Madrillet, March 4, 1944.  
 
Famille Cressent: Roger and Madeleine Cressent returned to teaching after the summer of 
1944. In 1954, they moved to Le Havre, where Roger became Headteacher of a primary 
school in the city suburbs. After retirement, they moved back to Gournay-en-Bray. Roger 
died in 1989, whilst Madeleine died in 1999. Their son, Guy, went to Rouen to complete his 
studies in 1949, but dropped out after a year. He eventually joined the Merchant Navy, and 
upon returning to Le Havre, he became a travelling salesman. He retired in the 1990s, and 
moved back to Gournay-en-Bray after his mother’s death, where he continues to live at the 
time of writing. 
 
Raoul Dauphin: Although arrested in July 1944, Dr Dauphin was amongst those who 
escaped in the retreat of the Nazis in August 1944. After a brief spell overseeing the 
transition in the area of Nonancourt, he returned to his medical practice. He was elected as a 
councillor in 1945, and although he refused initially to run for mayor, eventually became 
mayor in 1950, serving until 1965 as a member of the Socialist SFIO.   
 
Madeleine Dissoubray: After being arrested in 1942, she was sent to Compiègne, and from 
there deported to Auschwitz in January 1943. She was transferred to Ravensbruck in 1944, 
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and Mauthausen in 1945, where she was liberated by the Red Cross in April 1945. Although 
she returned to Rouen, she did not return to teaching, instead working in journalism, trade 
unionism, and political activism, moving to the Paris region upon her marriage in 1948 to 
Louis Odru, who for over thirty years between the 1950s and the 1980s, was a leading figure 
in the PCF in its stronghold of the Seine-Saint-Denis. She remained involved in the PCF until 
the late 1980s, when she left the party to join the reformist wing led by Pierre Juquin, but 
continued to defend the legacy of the Resistance, and the memory of deportation. She died in 
Paris in 2012. 
 
Yvonne Dissoubray: Unlike her sister, Yvonne Dissoubray was not deported, but instead 
released in 1943, and resisted in Brittany during the last year of the Occupation. She returned 
to Rouen, and became the leader of the Communist women’s organisation (UFF) in Rouen 
from 1945-48, serving as a city councillor during the transitional period of 1945-47. 
Transferred from teaching in the primary sector to become a secondary teacher working in 
technical schools in the Rouen area until her retirement in 1969. Remained active as a trade 
unionist and within anciens combattants organisations. Died in Rouen in 1996.  
 
André Duroméa: After his arrest in 1944, he was deported, and was imprisoned in 
Neuengamme. Upon returning to Le Havre, he quickly rose through the ranks of the PCF, and 
was a member of the city council between 1947 and 1995. He served as an assistant mayor 
between 1956 and 1959, deputy mayor between 1965 and 1971, and mayor from 1971 to 
1994. He also represented Le Havre in parliament, as a deputy from 1967 to 1986, a senator 




Louis Eudier: Arrested in 1941, and was detained successively at Bonne-Nouvelle prison in 
Rouen, Compiègne detention camp, then deported. He survived both Auschwitz and Dachau. 
He worked principally in trade unionism and political activism after the war, and remained a 
councillor in Le Havre until his death in 1986. 
 
Marie-Thérèse Fainstein (née Lefebvre): Arrested in 1941, and deported in 1944 after 
being involved in a riot in Châlons-sur-Seine prison. Liberated in May 1945. The following 
year, she returned to teaching as a special needs teacher. She served as a councillor in both 
Dieppe and Avremesnil, the latter commune being where she began her career, and where she 
lived until her death in 2013. 
 
Valentin Feldman: Arrested in late 1941 for causing the death of a German soldier, and for 
Communist resistance activity. He was executed by firing squad at Mont-Valérien on July 27, 
1942. 
 
André Gosse: Returned to farming upon being demobbed, and refused all involvement in 
local politics, making a public speech criticising the political instrumentalisation of the 
Resistance and its legacy in 1946. Active amongst anciens combattants organisations in the 
Pays de Caux until his death in 1993. 
 
Louis & Marguerite Grenouillet: Louis returned to working as a mechanic, retiring in 
1950. Louis died in 1960; Marguerite passed away in 1975. 
 
Claude Gricourt: Remained as priest of La Crique and four surrounding villages until his 
retirement in 1978. Upon retirement, he went to live with his sister near Le Havre.  
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Jacques Hamon: Hid in Paris between 1943 and 1944, where under a pseudonym, he 
worked in the Paris art scene. Returned to Le Havre in 1944, and in 1946, opened a gallery 
and dealership in portraiture and landscape painting in Le Havre, in particular Raoul Dufy 
and painters linked to the movement known as le fauvisme, and the business gained an 
international reputation. In 1978, his son Jean-Pierre joined the business, having worked in 
photography and fashion in Carnaby Street in London, then in art in Bond Street, after which 
point the business embraced modern art and photography too. The galerie Hamon celebrated 
70 years in business in 2016 with a retrospective exhibition in Le Havre. Jacques Hamon died 
in 1989 after a long illness. 
 
Famille Jouvin: Louis Jouvin was arrested in 1941, and deported to Auschwitz the following 
year. He was also interned at Sachsenhausen, and Dachau. He was repatriated in May 1945, 
to discover that he had been elected Mayor of Grand-Quevilly in his absence. He served until 
1947. He died in 1995. Yvonne Jouvin, after fleeing arrest, became a liaison agent in the FTP 
in the Somme department, returning to Normandy in the autumn of 1944.  She died shortly 
before her husband, in the same year. Pierre Jouvin worked as part of the STO building ramps 
for the V1 missiles on the Normandy coast. He deserted and rejoined his mother in the 
Somme, where he fought in the Resistance. He then joined the FFI, and took part in the 
liberation of Dunkerque in May 1945. After being demobbed in October of that year, he 
worked for the SNCF until he retired in 1982. He still lives in Grand-Quevilly. 
 
Tony Larue: Returned to Normandy in September 1944, and to local politics. However, he 
lost to Louis Jouvin in the municipal election of 1945. He won back the mayorality in 1947, 
and held the post until retiring in June 1995. He continued to work as a chartered accountant 
until 1970. He was elected as a deputy in 1956, after his former colleague in resistance, Jean 
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Capdeville, was deselected. Larue served in the National Assembly until 1977, when he 
became a senator, a post he held until his death in July 1995.  
 
Bernard Lawday: After participating in the Liberation, he volunteered for the FFI, where he 
served as an interpreter in Rouen between the American forces and French authorities. After 
being demobbed, he returned to complete his studies, and became a doctor, specialising in 
gynaecology, before becoming director of the medical centre at Oissel in 1971, a post he held 
until his retirement in 1990. He joined the PS in 1974, and was elected as a councillor in 
Sotteville in 1977, resigning through ill health in 2012, having served as deputy mayor for 
public health between 1989 and 2008. He died in 2014. 
 
Raoul Leprettre: Arrested in May 1944. Returned from Buchenwald in June 1945. After 
running briefly a publishing firm, he then became commercial director of Paris-Normandie, 
the newspaper that replaced the collaborationist Journal de Rouen, owned and edited by 
Pierre-René Wolf, a friend and fellow resister. He went into local politics with the SFIO, but 
left in 1968, at the same time that he resigned as a city councillor in Rouen. He organised the 
commemorations of the 25th anniversary of the liberation of Rouen in 1969. In 1972, after the 
death of Wolf, Leprettre became Chairman and Chief Executive of Paris-Normandie, a 
position he held until 1982, when the newspaper was restructured following the takeover of 
the paper by the Hersant publishing empire. He died in 1991.   
 
Césaire Levillain: Arrested in 1943, tried in February 1944 and sentenced to death by a 




André & Germaine Pican: André Pican was arrested, along with his wife, in Paris on 
February 15, 1942. He was executed as a hostage at Mont-Valérien on May 23, 1942. 
Germaine Pican was deported on January 24, 1943, as part of the ‘convoi des 31 000’. 
Liberated from Mauthausen in 1945, she briefly served in the French Senate from 1946 to 
1948, and worked as a teacher in Maromme until retiring in 1955. She remained an activist 
for the Communists, for anciens combattants, and for the memory of deportation. She died in 
Rouen in 2001.  
 
Bronislaw Piontek: After his arrest in March 1944, he was deported the following month, 
firstly to Auschwitz, and then to Buchenwald. He was repatriated in May 1945, and after a 
period of convalescence, embarked on a correspondence course, and eventually qualified as a 
teacher, teaching History and Geography at Lycée Blaise Pascal, a technical school in Rouen. 
He was also chair of the judges panel for many years of the Concours de la Résistance et la 
Déportation in Seine-Maritime. He died in Rouen in 2005. 
 
Benjamin Remacle: Was deported to Buchenwald in June 1944, after the infiltration of the 
CDL in Rouen the previous month. He was repatriated in May 1945. He was accused of 
being responsible for the infiltration by Raoul Leprettre in 1946, who made a complaint to the 
police after Remacle refused to accept Leprettre’s ultimatum of leaving Normandy. The 
police enquiry found no evidence to support this, and no charges were brought. He was active 
in the Gaullist RPF in the Pays de Bray, but left in 1953. Though a practicing Catholic, and a 
Gaullist, Remacle also remained active in the ranks of Communist veterans organisations, 
and wrote on occasion (either collectively or on his own initiative) for L’Humanité. Worked 




Simone Sauteur: Became a second lieutenant in the FFI, serving in Normandy and then in 
Germany, until 1945, when she returned to Normandy. She later passed the competitive 
CAPES examination, and became a French teacher in a middle school (college) in Pont de 
l’Arche, a small town in the west of the Eure. She originally intended to publish her diaries in 
the 1950s, but decided against after concerns were raised by fellow ex-resisters. The diaries 
were eventually published in 2016 as Au cœur du Vièvre avec le maquis Surcouf, and edited 
by Alain Corblin, although the original testimonies are available for researchers to consult at 
the archives départementales in Evreux. After retirement, she remained active not only 
amongst anciens combattants, but also active locally as a painter and poet, and staged 
exhibitions in Pont de l’Arche for over twenty years. Died in 2012. 
 
Henri & Suzanne Savale: Suzanne Savale was arrested on May 29, 1943, and deported to 
Ravensbruck soon after. Henri meanwhile escaped from the Gestapo in September, and went 
into hiding in the Eure. He returned to Darnétal after the Liberation. In 1945, Suzanne 
returned to Rouen, and Henri was elected mayor of Darnétal. Suzanne died of complications 
from typhus in September 1952. Henri Savale remained in his pre-war position of chief 
accountant of the infirmary at the Hôtel-Dieu in Rouen until January 1953, when he became 
briefly a deputy for the centrist Radical party after winning a by-election, a position he held 
until 1956. He remained mayor of Darnétal until his death in July 1971.  
 
Christian Sénard: Participated in the FFI in the battle of Normandy in the summer of 1944. 
Returned to his job as an electrician in the Chantiers de Normandie in 1945, having been 
honoured with the croix de guerre 1939-45 (étoile bronze). However, he had difficult 
relations with fellow ex-resisters, some of whom suspected him of having provided names to 
the Nazis. He was charged with collaboration, and tried in Metz in 1949, where he was found 
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not guilty. Left the PCF in 1956 after the crushing of the Budapest uprising. Maintained a 
distance from fellow resisters, and rarely spoke publicly, though he gave an interview to 
ARTE in 2005 as part of a documentary on the battle of Normandy. Retired from the docks in 
1982, and lived the remainder of his life in Saint-Etienne-du-Rouvray. Committed suicide in 
2012.    
 
Georges Touroude: Participated in the Liberation of Rouen in August 1944. However, his 
family were made homeless by the bombing of Le Havre in 1944. He qualified as a teacher in 
1945, and moved to the Charente-Inférieure (now Charente-Maritime) to rejoin his family 
who had moved there and settled in La Rochelle, where he met a family made homeless by 
the bombing of Royan- whose daughter, Gisèle, he married, and with whom he moved back 
to Royan in 1947 where she founded a music school. He taught in Royan until his retirement. 
He joined the PCF after the end of the war, but left in 1956. As well as a teacher, he was also 
a committee member of the local union of teachers (SNI), president of the departmental 
branch of the Ligue des Droits de l’Homme, an active amateur historian who worked 
principally on the history of the Charente and Charente-Inférieure in the 19th century, and a 
writer, who also wrote novels, poetry, and children’s stories. He died in 2001.  
 
Edouard & Joséphine Vain: After the war had finished, they adopted Isaac and José, the 
two boys they had sheltered (Isaac changed his name to Jacques during the war, and kept that 
name), as both of the boys’ parents had died in the extermination camps. Both Edouard & 
Joséphine continued to work as street traders until the early 1960s. Edouard died in 1969, 




































Fig.1: A map showing the departments of metropolitan France, and the geographical situation 













Fig.2: A Map of Upper Normandy, showing principal towns and cities as well as 
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